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abstract.   In 1801 the Jeffersonian Republicans took charge of Congress, the presidency, 
and the national administration, determined to roll back the state-building excesses of their 
Federalist predecessors. In this effort they were partially successful. But the tide of history and 
the demands of a growing nation confounded their ambitions. While reclaiming democracy they 
also built administrative capacity. 
 This Article examines administrative structure and accountability in the Republican era in 
an attempt to understand the “administrative law” of the early nineteenth century. That inquiry 
proceeds through two extended case studies: the Jeffersonian embargo of 1807-1809 and the 
multi-decade federal effort to survey and sell the ever-expanding “public domain.” The first was 
the most dramatic regulation of commerce attempted by an American national government 
either before or since. The second began a land office business that dominated the political and 
legal consciousness of the nation for nearly a century. The embargo tested the limits of 
administrative coercion and revealed an escalating conflict between the necessities of regulatory 
administration and judicial review in common law forms. The sale of the public domain required 
the creation of the first mass administrative adjudication system in the United States and 
revealed both the ambitions and the limits of congressional control of administration in a polity 
ideologically devoted to assembly government. 
 Together these cases describe the early-nineteenth-century approach to a host of familiar 
topics in contemporary administrative law: presidential versus congressional control of 
administration, the propriety and forms of administrative adjudication, policy implementation 
via general rules, and the appropriate role of judicial review. Perhaps most significantly, both the 
embargo episode and the efforts to privatize the public domain demonstrate the singular 
importance of internal administrative control and accountability in maintaining neutrality and 
consistency in the application of federal law. This “internal law of administration” remains both 
a crucial and an understudied aspect of American administrative governance. 
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A great irony propels American political development: the search for more direct 
democracy builds up the bureaucracy.1  
introduction  
When George Washington took office as President with John Adams as his 
Vice President, the United States had two executive officers—them. Twelve 
years later, Thomas Jefferson inherited a federal administrative establishment 
that included 3000 civilian employees and a substantial military force, 
supplemented by a significant number of private contractors.2 
Federalist administrations and Congresses had been committed to building 
national capacities that would stitch a fragile union together with the threads of 
effective administrative governance. They moved forcefully to establish the 
Departments of War, State, and Treasury, to increase the reach of the postal 
service, to “nationalize” responsibility for the debts from the Revolutionary 
War, to establish a national bank and a sound national currency, to institute an 
effective system of taxation, and to create a national court system. They 
supported a strong army and navy and extended the preexisting system of 
publicly owned and managed trading “factories” to regulate trade with Indian 
tribes. 
These state-builders were hardly inattentive to the need to control state 
power—politically, administratively, and legally. As they built administrative 
capacity, they also bound it.3 But when creating a government to exercise the 
authority established by the new Constitution, the major official actors of the 
Federalist period did so mindful of the weakness of the national government 
under the Articles of Confederation and the feeble executive power provided in 
virtually all the post-Revolutionary state constitutions.4 Federalists were 
ideological nationalists whose emphasis on national authority and executive 
leadership sometimes led their political opponents to brand them as 
monarchists. Whatever the truth of that claim, the Federalists lost their 
political mandate in the bitterly contested election of 1800—an election that 
 
1.  JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH 1 (rev. ed. 1998). 
2.  The classic study of Federalist administrative institutions and practices is LEONARD D. 
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948). 
3.  See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations 
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006). 
4.  See ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION: 1775-1789 
(1924); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 120-23 (1979); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION 
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 127-96 (1969). 
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Jefferson later described as effecting a “revolution in the principles of our 
government.”5 Convinced that the ascendancy of the Republican Party had 
saved the Republic,6 Jefferson and his supporters subscribed to a “Republican” 
ideology that was anti-Federalist at almost every major point. 
Republicans were strict constructionists who viewed the legitimate sphere 
of the national government as limited almost exclusively to war and foreign 
affairs. They were fiscally austere. They abhorred the national debt and the 
national bank that managed it. Republicans not only begrudged the expense of 
a standing army and navy; they viewed the Army, commanded by the 
President, as a threat to democracy itself. For them democratic governance 
resided in Congress, particularly in the House of Representatives, the national 
body closest to the people. Republicans hoped that the federal government 
could carry on its limited affairs and conduct its administration so softly and 
invisibly that citizens would hardly know that it existed.7 In his first inaugural, 
Jefferson prayed for “a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men 
from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their 
own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth 
of labor the bread it has earned.”8 In short, Republicanism’s general answer to 
the problem of controlling and structuring administration was to eliminate 
administrators when it was possible and to restrict administrative discretion 
when it was not.9  
The realities of governance would put these principles to a harsh test.10 The 
early years of Jefferson’s first term were blessed with peace and prosperity, and 
Republican principles triumphed. Under Jefferson’s leadership Congress 
 
5.  Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 15 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 212, 212 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 
1905). 
6.  1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 208 (N.Y., Charles A. Scribner’s Sons 
1890). 
7.   For a description of Jefferson’s hopes for both the substance and style of government at the 
beginning of his first term, see JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 169-228 (1996). 
8.  President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in 1 JAMES D. 
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 
at 321, 323 (1911). 
9.  For example, the elimination of internal taxes—alluded to obliquely in Jefferson’s message 
as taking bread “from the mouth of labor”—was motivated in substantial part by the 
reduction in federal offices that repeal promised. See Charlotte Crane, Pennington v. Coxe: 
A Glimpse of the Federal Government at the End of the Federalist Era, 23 VA. TAX REV. 417, 419-
22 (2003). 
10.  The most illuminating general history is probably still 1-4 ADAMS, supra note 6. 




substantially reduced the military establishment, abolished internal taxes, and 
made progress toward retiring the national debt. Resistance to new federal 
programs reinforced the domestic authority of the several states—as did the 
repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, which had expanded the federal judiciary.11  
But these idyllic circumstances did not last. Two forces militated against a 
passive national administration. The first was the rapid territorial expansion of 
the country. Settlers were pushing ever westward into the public domain—
national public lands created by state cessions of western land claims to the 
federal government during the Confederation, and then by the Louisiana 
Purchase, the acquisition of the Floridas, and the establishment of the Pacific 
Ocean as the nation’s western boundary. 
Following the end of the War of 1812, the stream of settlers from the east to 
the west side of the Alleghenies became a flood that put severe pressures on the 
American political and administrative systems. The public domain had to be 
surveyed, sold, and governed—a task that could be accomplished only by the 
federal government. Republican “small-government” orthodoxy fit awkwardly 
with an explosive expansion of national territory and population. Indeed, 
Jefferson viewed his own purchase of Louisiana, which helped to fuel westward 
expansion, as unauthorized without an amendment to the Constitution. He 
withdrew his proposal to request an amendment only out of fear that delay 
would prompt Napoleon to retract his offer of cession.12 Not all Republicans 
agreed that the federal government lacked the power to annex foreign 
territory,13 but the Louisiana Purchase would be only one of a series of actions 
from 1801 to 1829 that violated the principles of strict construction of national 
power to which Republicans were supposedly committed. 
Franco-British rivalry also resumed in Jefferson’s second term—a 
competition that threatened both American commerce and American 
sovereignty. British and French naval vessels seized hundreds of American 
ships, and the British impressed thousands of American seamen. Jefferson met 
this challenge by resorting to commercial pressure—a cessation of all foreign 
trade. The commercial embargo that he substituted for military might 
 
11.  An Act To Amend the Judicial System of the United States, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 156 (1802) 
(repealing An Act To Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the Courts of the 
United States, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801)). 
12.  On Jefferson’s doubts, see THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1803-1898, 
at 8-10 (Sanford Levinson & Bartholomew Sparrow eds., 2005). 
13.  See John Gorham Pelfrey, The Growth of the Idea of Annexation, and Its Bearing upon 
Constitutional Law. A Study Among the Records of Congress, 13 HARV. L. REV. 371, 378 (1900) 
(noting that some Jeffersonian Republicans did not challenge the constitutionality of the 
government’s authority to annex foreign lands).  
MASHAW_11-07-06_FORMATTED FOR SC1 5/30/2007 11:39:19 PM 
the yale law journal 116:1636   2007  
1642 
 
ultimately required the use of domestic coercive authority that was more 
aggressive and intrusive than the Federalists’ hated Alien and Sedition Acts.14 
And when war finally came in 1812, it demonstrated that the Republican policy 
of avoiding the expense and political dangers of a professionalized military 
establishment had been a paradigmatic triumph of hope over experience.  
Following the sobering events of the War of 1812, Republican 
administrators proposed and Republican Congresses authorized major 
reorganizations in many federal departments.15 These reforms were designed to 
provide precisely that “energy” and system in the national administration that 
Republican ideology disdained. But with the Federalist Party no longer a 
threat, strict adherence to Republican principles had become less attractive for 
many Republicans. They were now relatively comfortable with a national 
government run by themselves. Even Jefferson, in his second inaugural 
address, declared that the surplus of federal revenue should “be applied in time 
of peace to rivers, canals, roads, arts, manufacturers, education, and other great 
objects within each State,”16 a statement that would have fit easily in the 
collected works of Alexander Hamilton. 
But strict construction remained official Republican dogma. In Jefferson’s 
view, the application of federal monies to domestic activities within the states 
required a constitutional amendment. Thus framed as “we must do it, but we 
cannot,” the issue of internal improvements vexed Congress and the country 
throughout much of the Republican period.17 Other parts of Republican 
ideology also remained intact, and not just in the “Old Republican” wing of the 
party. After Jefferson left office, Congress increasingly insisted that it should 
play the major role both in policymaking and in the structuring and control of 
administration. Administrators were, if possible, to be kept on short fiscal and 
 
14.  See Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 
(1798) (expired 1800); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798), repealed by Act of Apr. 
14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2 Stat. 153, 155.  
15.  These reorganizations are described in some detail in LEONARD D. WHITE, THE 
JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1801-1829, at 211-98 (1951). 
16.  President Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), reprinted in 1 
RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 378, 379. 
17.  The story of the internal improvements controversy has been told in a number of places. 
The most extensive account is perhaps Joseph Hibson Harrison, Jr., The Internal 
Improvements Issue and the Politics of the Union, 1783-1825 (May 1954) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with author). For other useful accounts, 
see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 
258-83 (2001); and WHITE, supra note 15, at 474-95. Developments in the states, where most 
of the action was, are discussed in GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION 
REVOLUTION: 1815-1860 (Econ. History of the U.S. vol. 4, 1951) (describing the 
development of turnpikes and canals between 1815 and 1860). 




statutory leashes. When the practicalities of administration demanded that 
these principles be abandoned, Congress was determined to oversee 
administration in a more substantial and systematic way than it had during the 
Federalist period.18 
This clash between Republican ideological commitments and the realities 
of an expanding nation in a dangerous world produced many uneasy 
compromises. The Federalist administrative system was reformed and 
extended rather than reduced to insignificance. Congress reintroduced internal 
taxes when fiscal necessity demanded. It reauthorized the Bank of the United 
States and, following the debacle of 1812-1814, both strengthened and 
professionalized the Army and Navy. Survey and sale of the public lands 
shifted from being a secondary, revenue-raising function of the Treasury to 
occupying a position of major political and administrative prominence. 
Jefferson inherited two land offices that reported directly to the Secretary of the 
Treasury. John Quincy Adams, the last “Republican” President, bequeathed to 
Andrew Jackson a General Land Office, thirty-nine local land offices, and a 
system of administrative land claims commissioners whose adjudicatory output 
rivaled that of the judiciary.19  
The land office expansion was merely symptomatic of the growth of 
national governmental activity with respect to Indian affairs, post offices, and 
post roads—indeed, anything having to do with the settlement of the West. A 
population of 5.3 million in 1800 more than doubled, to 12.9 million in 1830.20 
Public civilian employment nearly quadrupled, from slightly fewer than 3000 
in 180121 to nearly 11,500 in 1831.22 Technological innovation was also 
intruding. The steam engine and the cotton gin were giving a whole new 
complexion to transportation, manufacturing, agriculture, and—incidentally, 
but momentously—the question of slavery. 
 
18.  For descriptions of structural and procedural changes that increased congressional 
oversight, see RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE 
PERIOD BEFORE 1825 (1917); and WHITE, supra note 15, at 89-107. 
19.  On the extension and reform of the Federalist system of administration, see WHITE, supra 
note 15, at 546-59. The growth and operation of the land office business is discussed infra 
Part II. 
20.  BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-
78, pt. 1, at 8 (1975).  
21.  WHITE, supra note 15, at 255. 
22.  H.R. DOC. NO. 93-78, pt. 2, at 1103. A large amount of this growth was in the Post Office. 
The 903 post offices in 1800 had metastasized into 8004 by 1829. WHITE, supra note 15, at 
303. These figures do not include contractors, but, as in the Federalist period, many officials 
remained part-timers paid by fees and commissions. On the ambiguities of office in the 
early Republic, see Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1304-19.  
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In some sense the history of Republican ideological retreat is an oft-told 
tale. Garry Wills’s biography of James Madison describes his presidency as 
“carried by events toward a modernity he neither anticipated nor desired.”23 
And Wills has suggested that we might agree with the bitter “Old Republican” 
John Randolph that the Republican Party had by the end of Madison’s term 
won the hearts of the people by losing its soul.24 Madison’s successor, James 
Monroe, had a vision of the United States as a continental empire that 
generated a muscular foreign policy and spilled over into an increasingly 
nationalist domestic policy.25 And the final “Republican” President, the one-
time New England Federalist, John Quincy Adams, proposed a domestic 
program in his first message to Congress that was so energetic that his cabinet, 
presciently, urged him not to send it.26 
But these developments should not be understood to suggest that 
Republican small-government ideology had little effect on the politics or 
policies of the Republican era. Republican Congresses extended the Federalists’ 
regulation of merchant seamen’s labor contracts27 to fishermen28 and even 
enacted some mild regulation of ocean-going passenger ships.29 But it balked 
at proposed regulations to stem the rising death toll from bursting boilers on 
steamboats,30 ended the system of Indian trading houses that had existed since 
the Confederation period,31 and repealed the late-Federalist legislation 
regulating bankruptcy.32 Congress also ended a largely successful experiment 
with federal promotion of smallpox vaccine distribution on the ground that it 
was an improper incursion into the police powers of the states.33 
The election of the one-time Federalist John Quincy Adams might have 
been thought to signal an end to systematic Republican reticence to flex 
national muscles. But congressional Republicans almost instantly rebelled at 
 
23.  GARRY WILLS, JAMES MADISON 159 (Am. Presidents Ser. vol. 4, 2002). 
24.  Id. at 151. 
25.  See GARY HART, JAMES MONROE 57-82 (Am. Presidents Ser. vol. 5, 2005). 
26.  See ROBERT V. REMINI, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 78 (Am. Presidents Ser. vol. 6, 2002).  
27.  See An Act for the Government and Regulation of Seamen in the Merchants Service, ch. 29, 
1 Stat. 131 (1790); Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1277-78. 
28.  See An Act for the Government of Persons in Certain Fisheries, ch. 2, 3 Stat. 2 (1813). 
29.  See An Act Regulating Passenger Ships and Vessels, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (1819). 
30.  See H.R. REP. NO. 18-125, at 1-8 (1824). 
31.  See An Act To Abolish the United States’ Trading Establishment with the Indian Tribes, ch. 
54, 3 Stat. 679 (1822). 
32.  See An Act To Repeal an Act, Intituled “An Act To Establish an Uniform System of 
Bankruptcy Throughout the United States,” ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (1803). 
33.  See CURRIE, supra note 17, at 295-301. 




Adams’s “national program”; little of his legislative agenda succeeded, and he 
was swept away in the next election by antipathy to—in Andrew Jackson’s 
words—the “splendor and magnificence of the government,” which “must end 
in consolidation and then in despotism.”34 Given Republican parsimony, one 
might wonder what Jackson was talking about, but this political rhetoric had 
power then, as now.35 Small government remained the ideological preference of 
the people, however much events pressed presidents (and sometimes 
Congresses) to abandon the true faith. 
Managing enormous, indeed explosive, growth in territory, population, 
and commerce, while maintaining the idea of a small and frugal national 
government, put serious strains on the efficacy of administration. 
Administration was demanded, but Congress was loath to fund it. The 
insistence on congressional control introduced both inefficiencies and local 
politics into national administrative organization and functioning.36 And as 
federal officialdom expanded numerically and spread across a vast territory, the 
administrative and legal control mechanisms employed in the Federalist period 
often proved either inadequate or counterproductive. 
This Article examines how administrative structure, organization, and 
technique were challenged by the most important developments of the 
Republican period—the threats posed by belligerent and powerful foreign 
states and the dramatic westward expansion of the United States. I concentrate 
on only two areas of national policy and administration: the embargo of 1807-
1809 and the sale and settlement of the public domain. Many other areas of 
national administration obviously were also affected by territorial and 
population growth as well as by the reluctant realization that America could 
not remain aloof from the fratricidal competition among European sovereigns. 
The size and organization of the military, the management of Indian affairs, 
and the organization of the Post Office are chief among them. But an 
investigation of the embargo’s implementation and of the sale of the public 
 
34.  REMINI, supra note 26, at 78-87. 
35.  Which is not to say that the rhetoric had the same meaning. On the relationship of small-
government ideology to the idea of “systematic corruption” in early American politics, see 
John Joseph Wallis, The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History, in 
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 23 (Edward L. 
Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006). 
36.  Congressional control and localism were particularly evident in the development of the Post 
Office, notwithstanding the considerable degree of administrative autonomy achieved by 
certain strong-willed postmasters general. For general treatments of the development of the 
postal service and its relation to Congress, see DOROTHY GANFIELD FOWLER, UNMAILABLE: 
CONGRESS AND THE POST OFFICE (1977); and RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE 
AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE (1995).  
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domain is sufficient to illustrate how administrative law struggled during the 
Republican period to structure effective political control of administration, to 
maintain centralized administrative control of distant and multiplying federal 
officials, and to accommodate external legal control in the courts. It also 
illustrates weaknesses in the administrative system and what then passed for 
“administrative law” that would take many decades to repair. 
Indeed, given (1) the lack of systematic procedures for either rulemaking or 
administrative adjudication, (2) the ambiguous nature of public office in an 
administration often peopled by part-time officials who were paid by fees and 
commissions, and (3) the dominance of damage actions against these “officers” 
as the modality of “judicial review,” one might sensibly object to the use of 
“administrative law” as a descriptor. But in my view this narrower vision of the 
field allows a focus on differing and malleable techniques to obscure more 
fundamental and enduring goals. As I have argued elsewhere, administrative 
law has three generic tasks: to structure the accountability of administration to 
the political branches of the government, to regulate the internal processes of 
administrative decision-making, and to provide means for testing the legality 
of administrative action.37 The means by which law pursues these goals shift 
across both time and space. But to confine administrative law’s domain by 
attending to contemporary techniques and preoccupations may lead us to 
misunderstand the significance of administrative law in prior historical 
periods,38 in foreign systems,39 and perhaps in our own contemporary practice. 
Part I explores the administration of the embargo of 1807-1809. This grand 
experiment had many interesting moments for a student of administrative law. 
Among others, it featured stunning delegations of discretionary authority both 
to the President and to lower-level officials, as well as heroic struggles by the 
President and the Secretary of the Treasury to unify administration. The 
embargo also generated massive resistance, often through the medium of a 
“judicial review” conducted in the form of jury trials. The history of the 
 
37.  See Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of 
Administrative Law, ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, Mar. 2005, http://www.bepress.com/ils/ 
iss6/art4. This tripartite division hardly originates with me. It appears in very nearly the 
same form in the first major treatise on administrative law in the United States. See FRANK J. 
GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 371-72 
(1905). 
38.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1260-66. 
39.  Perhaps the most famous misunderstanding in all of administrative law is A.V. Dicey’s belief 
that remedies in specialized courts created an administrative law in France that was 
antithetical to the rule of law. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 329-30 (9th ed. 1939). For a discussion and refutation of Dicey, see 
CECIL THOMAS CARR, CONCERNING ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 22-23 (1941).  




embargo thus has much to teach us about early understandings of the 
nondelegation doctrine, about the crucial importance of the “internal law” of 
administration, and about the limits of administrative power in a legal world in 
which judicial enforcement was the norm, jury trials were standard, and official 
immunity was nonexistent. 
While Part I explores a brief but dramatic episode in the nation’s regulatory 
history, Part II examines a governmental function—the sale of public lands—
that dates to the colonial period and that continues today, primarily in the 
attenuated but voluminous form of mineral leases, timber sales, and grazing 
rights. And while the discussion of the embargo focuses on presidential power, 
administrative rulemaking, and judicial review, the analysis of public land sales 
in the Republican era features large-scale administrative adjudication and the 
modalities of congressional control of administration. Together these two 
stories sketch a picture of what “administrative law” was like in a period before 
that term existed and in which the dominant political actors might well have 
considered it ideologically suspect. 
i. the embargo 
Most administrative lawyers have been taught to believe that the Interstate 
Commerce Act of 188740 was the first great national experiment in economic 
regulation.41 It was not. Eighty years earlier, a Republican President and an 
overwhelmingly Republican Congress embarked on a much grander 
experiment—the embargo of 1807-1809. Indeed, the scope of the embargo and 
the powers that it gave the executive branch over American commerce make the 
Interstate Commerce Act’s attempts at regulating the railroad industry seem 
almost pathetic by comparison. And while the embargo is generally treated as a 
dramatic episode in the early political history of the nation,42 the administrative 
significance of the embargo’s massive attempt at economic regulation is less 
well known.43 
While the embargo’s legal technique was regulation of commerce, it was 
motivated by foreign policy concerns. From the Founding of the Republic, the 
 
40.  Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (repealed 1978).  
41.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985); see also 
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); 
Richard J. Stillman II, The Constitutional Bicentennial and the Centennial of the American 
Administrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4 (1987).  
42.  Classic treatments include WALTER WILSON JENNINGS, THE AMERICAN EMBARGO 1807-1809 
(1921), and LOUIS MARTIN SEARS, JEFFERSON AND THE EMBARGO (1927).  
43.  The major exception, as usual, is WHITE, supra note 15, at 423-73. 
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British Navy had harassed American shipping through seizures and through 
the impressment of American seamen. And Franco-British belligerence often 
led to French interference with American shipping as well. By 1807, a 
combination of British Orders in Council and decrees by the Emperor 
Napoleon had made virtually any U.S. vessel on the high seas fair game for the 
British or French navies, or for privateers acting under British or French 
authority.44  
This systematic interference with American neutral commerce would 
clearly have justified a declaration of war by the United States. But declaring 
war against the world’s greatest naval power, or the world’s greatest land force, 
or both at once, hardly seemed prudent for the fledgling United States. Indeed, 
the Jefferson Administration’s reductions in the military establishment had 
made war virtually infeasible.45 Yet to accept British and French depredations 
on American commerce was as insufferable as war seemed imprudent. The 
alternative, promoted jointly by Jefferson and by Madison, his Secretary of 
State, was an embargo on all transport of goods from U.S. ports to foreign 
destinations.46 
The embargo of 1807-1809 was novel in two separate senses. First, it was 
novel as a matter of foreign policy because the nation had never before 
experimented with such an extensive form of peaceful coercion.47 
Nonimportation statutes and temporary or limited embargoes respecting a 
particular nation were relatively common, but Jefferson proposed a complete 
embargo on all foreign commerce with no fixed term. His purpose was “to 
 
44.  On the run-up to the embargo, see Thorp Lanier Wolford, Democratic-Republican Reaction in 
Massachusetts to the Embargo of 1807, 15 NEW ENG. Q. 35, 37-40 (1942).  
45.  In early 1802, Congress fixed the strength of the Army at about 3350 officers and men, see 
WHITE, supra note 15, at 213, and discharged the remainder with a modest bonus, see An Act 
Fixing the Military Peace Establishment of the United States, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 132 (1802). The 
Republicans’ fear of a standing army led to a reluctance to fund the military establishment, 
which fell particularly heavily on the Navy. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 265-69. 
46.  Although Jefferson’s name is forever associated with the embargo policy, Wills has argued 
that Madison, Jefferson’s great friend, may have seized on the idea earlier, and he certainly 
supported it as tenaciously as did Jefferson. See WILLS, supra note 23, at 51, 53, 61-62, 99, 
123-24. 
47.  This is not to say that embargoes and nonimportation acts did not have a venerable history 
in pre-Revolutionary America. Limited embargoes had been used against the Stamp Act and 
the English Revenue Acts. Moreover, nonimportation followed by nonexportation was the 
crucial weapon used by the First Continental Congress in its attempt to shift British public 
opinion in favor of repealing the “insufferable acts” that led eventually to the American 
Revolution. See Paul Leicester Ford, The Association of the First Congress, 6 POL. SCI. Q. 613 
(1891). These colonial embargoes were, of course, directed only at Great Britain, not at all 
foreign commerce. 




keep our seamen and property from capture, and to starve the offending 
nations.”48 The first purpose, if the embargo could be put into effect, would 
surely be successful.49 American maritime assets could not be captured on the 
high seas if they were all in port. 
Starving the offending nations was surely more problematic, but not 
wholly implausible. British and French colonies in the Caribbean were highly 
dependent upon American trade for most of the necessities of life,50 and the 
dependence of British manufacturers on American cotton and other 
commodities was significant.51 There is substantial evidence both that the 
embargo dramatically curtailed foreign trade and that the negative economic 
impact on Great Britain was greater than the admittedly harsh effects on 
American commerce, agriculture, and manufacturing.52 The embargo was 
ultimately a political, not an economic, failure.53 
Second, the embargo was a commercial regulatory experiment of equal or 
greater novelty. Mercantilist trade regulation by the great European powers 
had long subjected their commerce to pervasive governmental control. And 
states and localities in the United States heavily regulated internal commerce 
for a host of purposes.54 But mercantilist regulation was designed to promote 
commerce, not to stop it in its tracks. And commercial regulation under the 
states’ general police power was an exercise of an authority implicitly denied to 
the national government by its establishment as a government of enumerated 
powers. 
 
48.  Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Apr. 8, 
1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 27, 27. 
49.  This was the only purpose mentioned in Jefferson’s message to Congress proposing the first 
embargo statute. ROBERT M. JOHNSTONE, JR., JEFFERSON AND THE PRESIDENCY: LEADERSHIP 
IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 268 (1978). 
50.  For one account of the extent and content of trade between New England and the 
Caribbean, see RICHARD PARES, YANKEES AND CREOLES (1956). Canadian exports could, and 
did, fill some of the gap created by the embargo, but not all of it. See James Duncan Phillips, 
Jefferson’s “Wicked Tyrannical Embargo,” 18 NEW ENG. Q. 466, 471-72 (1945). 
51.  Many commentators, perhaps Henry Adams chief among them, viewed the embargo as 
doomed from the start by the improbability that it would seriously coerce the continental 
powers. See 4 ADAMS, supra note 6, at 288, 344. Careful examination of the effects on British 
manufacturers, however, suggests that the embargo was economically significant, if not 
politically efficacious. See SEARS, supra note 42, at 277-301. 
52.  This argument is developed in substantial detail by Jeffrey A. Frankel, The 1807-1809 
Embargo Against Great Britain, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 291 (1982).  
53.  See SEARS, supra note 42, at 73-142.  
54.  See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996) (exploding thoroughly the myth that “laissez faire” 
was the dominant practice of nineteenth-century American governance).  
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Indeed, preexisting federal regulation of ship-borne commerce simply 
adopted state inspection and quarantine laws by making compliance with state 
regulations a requirement for clearing into or out of U.S. ports.55 And federal 
“licensing” of vessels was really only a certification requirement that facilitated 
customs collection56 or provided a necessary condition for the receipt of federal 
subsidies.57 Moreover, unlike the “association” embargoes of the colonial 
period—which had been carefully tailored to sectional interests, adopted by 
agreement, and enforced by local persuasion, publicity, and social 
ostracism58—the laying and enforcement of Jefferson’s embargo would entail 
executive implementation authority of enormous reach and coercive force. To 
stop all commerce with foreign nations was to impair, if not to imperil, the 
livelihood of most citizens of the United States.59 Resistance was inevitable. 
The Jefferson Administration and Congress quickly discovered that effective 
implementation of a general embargo required draconian administrative 
authority. 
A. A Statutory History of the Embargo 
The initial Embargo Act,60 passed three days before Christmas of 1807, was 
brief and to the point. No ships or vessels in the ports of the United States 
were to be cleared for any foreign port save by the explicit direction of the 
President. The President was given the authority to issue “such instructions to 
the officers of the revenue, and of the navy and revenue cutters of the United 
 
55.  See An Act Relative to Quarantine, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (1796); An Act To Prevent the 
Exportation of Goods Not Duly Inspected According to the Laws of the Several States, ch. 5, 
1 Stat. 106 (1790). 
56.  See An Act To Regulate the Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law on the Tonnage of 
Ships or Vessels, and on Goods, Wares and Merchandises Imported into the United States, 
ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (1789). 
57.  See An Act Concerning Certain Fisheries of the United States, and for the Regulation and 
Government of the Fishermen Employed Therein, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 229 (1792). 
58.  For an excellent, brief description of the association embargoes, see DAVID AMMERMAN, IN 
THE COMMON CAUSE: AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE COERCIVE ACTS OF 1774, at 73-87, 103-24 
(1974). 
59.  For a detailed account of the embargo’s drastic effects on one important port, Salem, 
Massachusetts, see Phillips, supra note 50. 
60.  An Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports and Harbors of the United 
States (Embargo Act), ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451 (1807). The embargo policy was drafted in the White 
House and passed in extraordinary haste. Jefferson forwarded his message to Congress on 
December 18, 1807, and the Senate, suspending its rules, passed the embargo the same day. 
The House followed suit three days later. See BURTON SPIVAK, JEFFERSON’S ENGLISH CRISIS: 
COMMERCE, EMBARGO, AND THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION 102-04 (1979). 




States, as shall appear best adapted for carrying the same into full effect.”61 
Registered vessels of the United States were allowed to engage in coastal trade 
within the United States itself, provided that the owner, master, consignee, or 
factor of the vessel gave a bond equal to double the value of the vessel and its 
cargo, guaranteeing that the ship’s cargo would be re-landed in some port of 
the United States, “dangers of the seas excepted.”62 
As we shall see, the provisions for presidential authorization to sail to 
foreign ports and the exception for dangers of the seas would generate 
significant administrative and legal complications. Even more troublesome, the 
initial Embargo Act failed to provide any penalties (other than bond forfeiture) 
or enforcement mechanisms.  
Merchants flocked to customs officials to exchange their foreign 
registrations for coastal licenses.63 The likely intent to evade the embargo was 
obvious. The new year had hardly begun, therefore, before Congress returned 
to the embargo question.64 The supplementary legislation made the embargo 
applicable to vessels exclusively in the coastal trade and to fishing vessels as 
well. Any violation of the statute subjected the guilty parties to forfeiture of the 
ship and its cargo, or, if these were unavailable, to a fine equal to double their 
combined value. In addition, any master or commander of a ship, or any other 
person who was knowingly involved in a prohibited foreign voyage, would be 
subject to fines of between $1000 and $20,000. Moreover, owners of ships 
violating the embargo would thereafter be denied all credit for duties payable 
to the United States, and masters or commanders of such ships would no 
longer be able to give any acceptable oath or affirmation before any collector of 
the customs of the United States. These disabilities would effectively deny the 
offending parties the ability to pursue their livelihoods.65 Enforcement could be 
 
61.  Embargo Act § 1. 
62.  Id. § 2.  
63.  SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 163. 
64.  See An Act Supplementary to the Act, Intituled “An Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and 
Vessels in the Ports and Harbors of the United States,” ch. 8, 2 Stat. 453 (1808) [hereinafter 
First Supplementary Act]. 
65.  An owner who could not give a bond for the payment of customs duties would be virtually 
excluded from foreign trade. Until goods were sold or delivered, owners or factors seldom 
had the wherewithal to pay their customs duties. The common practice was to give bond for 
the duties whereupon the goods were released to be sold or delivered. In effect, the 
merchant was given a loan for the amount of the duty, secured by his bond. Virtually every 
customs document required an oath or affirmation by the master of the vessel. A master 
whose oath was no longer acceptable could no longer serve as a master. Many of the details 
of customs collection were established in the First Congress. See An Act To Regulate the 
Collection of the Duties Imposed by Law on the Tonnage of Ships or Vessels, and on 
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had in federal court, revenue officers were granted up to one-half the value of 
forfeited vessels and cargos, and vessel owners or masters were remitted to the 
administrative system for relief from forfeitures or penalties that were used for 
relief from customs duties generally.66 
Two months later, Congress acted again to preempt further techniques of 
evasion. The second supplementary statute applied the embargo to small, 
unregistered vessels and also to any exportation carried out on land as well as 
by sea.67 This statute also required merchants to document their re-landing of 
goods at an American port by obtaining a certificate from the collector of 
customs of that port. In its only ameliorating action, Congress responded to 
the complaints of merchants with goods stranded abroad by giving the 
President authority to authorize a voyage solely for the purpose of recovering 
those goods.68 
Congress was then close to adjournment. But before it left, it passed two 
more embargo statutes. The first authorized the President to suspend the 
operation of the embargo in whole or in part “in the event of such peace or 
suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers of Europe, or of such 
changes in their measures affecting neutral commerce, as may render that of 
the United States sufficiently safe, in the judgment of the President of the 
United States.”69 
Should these happy circumstances fail to materialize, the administration 
was to have yet more authority. In another “supplementary” statute, Congress 
provided that no ship was to receive clearance to leave any port unless it had 
been loaded under the direct supervision of the revenue officers.70 
Furthermore, there was to be no clearance from any harbor adjacent to foreign 
ports without the specific authorization of the President himself. All naval 
 
Goods, Wares and Merchandises Imported into the United States, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29 (1789); 
see also First Supplementary Act, supra note 64, 2 Stat. 453. 
66.  For a description of the system for providing relief from customs duties, see Mashaw, supra 
note 3, at 1279, 1332. 
67.  An Act in Addition to the Act, Intituled “An Act Supplementary to the Act, Intituled an Act 
Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports and Harbors of the United States,” 
ch. 33, §§ 1-4, 2 Stat. 473, 473-74 (1808) [hereinafter Second Supplementary Act]. 
68.  Id. § 7. 
69.  An Act To Authorize the President of the United States, Under Certain Conditions, To 
Suspend the Operation of the Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports 
and Harbors of the United States, and the Several Acts Supplementary Thereto, ch. 52, 2 
Stat. 490, 490 (1808). 
70.  An Act in Addition to the Act Intituled “An Act Laying an Embargo on All Ships and Vessels 
in the Ports and Harbors of the United States” and the Several Acts Supplementary Thereto, 
and for Other Purposes, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 499 (1808) [hereinafter Third Supplementary Act]. 




vessels and revenue cutters were authorized to stop and examine any United 
States ship if there were “reason to suspect [it] to be engaged in any traffic or 
commerce, or in the transportation of merchandise of either domestic or 
foreign growth or manufacture, contrary to the provisions of this act.”71 
While naval vessels and revenue cutters needed “reason to suspect” that a 
violation was in progress, the collectors of customs were empowered “to detain 
any vessel ostensibly bound with a cargo to some other port of the United 
States, whenever in their opinions the intention is to violate or evade any of the 
provisions of the acts laying an embargo.”72 Collectors were to refer such cases 
to Washington, and the detained vessel could be released only upon a decision 
by the President. Moreover, collectors were authorized to seize “any unusual 
deposits” of goods “in any of the ports of the United States” that were 
“adjacent to territories, colonies or provinces of a foreign nation.”73 Authority 
to seize or detain vessels on “suspicion,” or on an official’s “opinion” that the 
vessel intended to violate the embargo laws, or to seize deposits of goods 
viewed as “unusual” was, to put it mildly, a remarkable grant of administrative 
discretion. 
Even these extreme provisions proved unavailing. Having returned from its 
recess, in January 1809, Congress passed its penultimate embargo legislation: 
the so-called Enforcement Act.74 Under this statute, all preexisting penalties 
and forfeitures were applied to anyone aiding and abetting the violation of the 
embargo. Informers were given a bounty of half of the fines resulting from 
their information. Ships now could not be loaded without an explicit permit 
from the collector of the port and were required to be loaded under his 
supervision. Collectors were to deny a permit if, in their “opinion,” there was 
“an intention to violate the embargo, or whenever they shall have received 
instructions to that effect by the direction of the President of the United 
States.”75 
The Enforcement Act went on to specify evidentiary provisions making the 
government’s proof easier when it sought forfeitures or penalties, and the 
defendant’s proof more difficult when it sought to justify going to a foreign 
port because of capture or distress. Indeed, these latter facts had to be proved 
 
71.  Id. § 7. 
72.  Id. § 11 (emphasis added).  
73.  Id. § 12.  
74.  An Act To Enforce and Make More Effectual an Act Intituled “An Act Laying an Embargo 
on All Ships and Vessels in the Ports and Harbors of the United States,” and the Several 
Acts Supplementary Thereto (Enforcement Act), ch. 5, 2 Stat. 506 (1809). 
75.  Id. § 2. 
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by the testimony of every living member of the vessel’s crew.76 Collectors were 
given authority to seize any goods on land or sea when “there is reason to 
believe that they are intended for exportation” or “apparently on their way 
towards the territories of a foreign nation, or the vicinity thereof, or towards a 
place whence such articles are intended to be exported.”77 
The statute also purported to give collectors virtual immunity from suit for 
actions designed to prevent violations of the embargo, as long as they were 
carrying out the statute or any general rules or instructions issued by the 
President. Anyone who sued a collector and lost would be required to pay the 
collector treble the cost of the suit.78 And, in perhaps the most spectacular 
provision of the statute, Congress gave the President the authority to 
employ such part of the land or naval forces or militia of the United 
States, or of the territories thereof as may be judged necessary . . . for 
the purpose of preventing the illegal departure of any ship or vessel, or 
of detaining, taking possession of, and keeping in custody any ship or 
vessel, or of taking into custody and guarding any specie, or articles of 
domestic growth, produce or manufacture, and also for the purpose of 
preventing and suppressing any armed or riotous assemblage of 
persons, resisting the custom-house officers in the exercise of their 
duties, or in any manner opposing the execution of the laws laying an 
embargo, or otherwise violating, or assisting and abetting violations of 
the same.79 
Having given the President all these powers, they took from him, at his 
request, the authority to give permission to recover goods stranded in foreign 
ports.80 
In combination, the various embargo statutes made virtually everything 
that moved in commerce in the United States potentially subject to seizure. 
Collectors of revenue, naval personnel, and the masters of revenue cutters 
could stop sea and land transports on mere suspicion, or on forming the 
“opinion,” that violation or evasion of the embargo was intended. No ship 
could be loaded without a permit, and then only under the watchful eye of a 
federal official. The President could use the full force of the Army, Navy, and 
militias not just to suppress insurrection, but simply to prevent the violation of 
 
76.  Id. § 7.  
77.  Id. § 9. 
78.  Id. § 10. 
79.  Id. § 11.  
80.  Id. § 14. 




any provision of the embargo statutes. Virtually nothing could be loaded or 
moved in commerce without a permit or a license, often backed by a huge 
bond.81 Permission to load or move goods was subject to the apparently 
unconstrained discretion of the permitting authorities. 
This was regulatory authority of astonishing breadth and administrative 
discretion of breathtaking scope. That such an administrative system would 
raise constitutional doubts and provoke stiff resistance was inevitable. Indeed, 
Congress’s willingness to go to these extremes suggests the level of resistance 
that the embargo and its implementation encountered. Resistance triumphed. 
Only three months after adopting its most draconian enforcement provision, 
Congress repealed the embargo and substituted a much milder regime of 
nonimportation.82 
B. The Constitution and Republican Constitutional Principles 
There is little doubt that the embargo, as established by statute and carried 
out in practice, violated virtually every constitutional principle that the 
Jeffersonian Republicans held dear. Limited government was clearly out the 
window, as was congressional control of administrative authority. 
Administrative powers of coercion were to be applied on the basis of suspicion 
or opinion, backed by the Army, the Navy, or presidentially controlled militias. 
Henry Adams concluded: 
[T]he embargo and the Louisiana purchase taken together were more 
destructive to the theory and practice of a Virginia republic than any 
foreign war was likely to be. Personal liberties and rights of property 
were more directly curtailed in the United States by embargo than in 
Great Britain by centuries of almost continuous foreign war . . . [E]ven 
the Secretary of the Treasury and the President admitted that it 
required the exercise of most arbitrary, odious, and dangerous 
powers.83 
Were federal statutes providing this level of administrative regulatory 
authority constitutional? From the perspective of 1808, the question was far 
from fanciful. A broad swath of contemporary opinion urged the embargo’s 
 
81.  See, e.g., id. § 4.  
82.  See An Act To Interdict the Commercial Intercourse Between the United States and Great 
Britain and France, and Their Dependencies; and for Other Purposes, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528 
(1809). 
83.  4 ADAMS, supra note 6, at 273-74.  
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invalidity. The proponents of unconstitutionality were, to be sure, strange 
political bedfellows. They included radical Republicans, who clung to a 
compact or confederation theory of the Constitution, and New England 
Federalists, many of whom were willing to jettison their traditional beliefs in 
both broad national power and the need for an energetic executive in the 
service of protecting New England’s commerce from the embargo’s devastating 
effects.84 Charles Warren, in his classic history of the Supreme Court, stated 
that “[t]he Embargo Law was a far more extreme exercise of Congressional 
power than either Republicans or any one else had believed possible under the 
Constitution.”85 And Justice Joseph Story, who argued in favor of the 
constitutionality of the embargo in the only case that straightforwardly 
addressed the issue, later wrote that he considered the embargo “a measure[] 
which went to the utmost limit of constructive power under the 
Constitution.”86 
Others have seen the constitutional concerns as less serious. After 
canvassing the constitutional arguments that were put forward in Congress 
when the various embargo statutes were being discussed, David Currie has 
concluded that the arguments in favor of the embargo’s validity were 
“overpowering by modern standards” and that they “had been consistently 
accepted since the Government was first established.”87 
Currie’s position echoes Judge John Davis’s opinion in United States v. The 
William.88 Davis, a staunch Federalist, found the embargo constitutional not 
only as a regulation of commerce, but also as an exercise of the war powers, as 
a preparation for war under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and as 
appropriate to carrying out the general purposes of the Constitution and to 
protecting the inherent sovereignty of the nation.89 
The opinion in The William, which reads as if written by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in one of his more unguarded moments, upheld Federalist principles 
of judicial supremacy but dashed the New England Federalists’ hopes for quick 
relief from the embargo. For Republicans, Davis’s ruling was both a blessing 
and an embarrassment. Their embargo had been upheld, but viewing the 
court’s pronouncement as conclusive violated deeply held Republican 
 
84.  For a general discussion, including extensive citation of the newspaper commentary at the 
time, see 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1789-1835, 
at 316-65 (1928). 
85.  Id. at 342. 
86.  1 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 185 (Boston, Little & Brown 1851). 
87.  CURRIE, supra note 17, at 155. 
88.  28 F. Cas. 614 (D. Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700). 
89.  See id. at 616-23.  




principles. Jefferson never accepted the idea that judicial review settled 
constitutional or statutory issues with finality, and Republican attacks on the 
authority and independence of the federal judiciary were a hallmark of his 
presidency.90 The decision in The William thus produced the odd spectacle of 
Republicans clasping a Federalist judge’s decision to their bosoms, while 
Federalist opponents of the embargo continued to deny the embargo’s 
constitutionality.91 
C. Administration and Its Control 
The implementation of the embargo, like any system of administrative 
implementation under the American Constitution, was subject, at least in 
theory, to three forms of control: political control by elected officials; 
administrative control through hierarchal supervision; and legal control 
through judicial review. All three are of considerable interest. Resistance, while 
far from universal, was widespread. Hence, the enforcement powers that 
Congress so freely granted had to be employed with vigor. Could compliance 
be effected while maintaining political, bureaucratic, and legal oversight that 
was consistent with conventional understandings of democracy and the rule of 
law? 
1. Political Control 
The Constitution divides political control of administration between the 
President and Congress, but the embargo almost represented what we might 
currently call pure “presidentialism.”92 Congress retained political control 
neither through statutory specificity nor through political oversight. The 
embargo statutes, as we have seen, provided remarkably broad grants of 
enforcement discretion both to the President and to enforcement personnel. 
The President was granted almost unlimited authority to decide specific cases, 
to direct the activities of lower-level personnel, and to suspend the operation of 
the embargo (with such exceptions as he deemed prudent). And during the 
short period that the embargo was in effect, Congress devoted itself primarily 
 
90.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 111-266 (2005); RICHARD E. 
ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 3-107 (1971). 
91.  See 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 316-65. 
92.  See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (providing a 
description and defense of this form of administration in the modern administrative state).  
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to enhancing the administrative powers of the President and others,93 not to 
investigating or overseeing their practices. This was clearly contrary to basic 
Republican principles and to congressional practice in most areas of 
administrative action during the Republican period. 
Broad delegation of authority reduced political accountability to Congress 
but enhanced accountability to the President. Political control thus operated 
more in accordance with Federalist than with Republican principles. President 
Jefferson proposed the embargo policy and took full responsibility for it. He 
was active in the development of subsidiary policies for implementing the 
scheme, and supplementary legislation to strengthen the embargo was 
consistently enacted at his request. When the embargo ultimately became 
intolerable to the people, they laid the blame firmly at Jefferson’s door.94 
At the same time, Congress may be said to have failed in its critical 
constitutional role of providing a check on executive power. Leonard Levy has 
had a notoriously gloomy view of Jefferson as a civil libertarian, but it is hard 
to argue with his statement that 
[o]n a prolonged, widespread, and systematic basis, in some places 
lasting nearly a year, the armed forces harried and beleaguered the 
citizenry. Never before or since did American history exhibit such a 
spectacle of derangement of normal values and perspectives.  
  . . . .  
. . . This was the only time in American history that the President 
was empowered to use the army for routine or day-to-day execution of 
the laws.95 
Moreover, Congress gave this extraordinary power to a President who was 
far from squeamish in pursuing his objectives under the embargo legislation. 
In their studies of the embargo, Leonard White and Burton Spivak have 
pointed out numerous instances in which Secretary of the Treasury Albert 
Gallatin’s sounder judgment softened Jefferson’s more aggressive tendencies.96 
Jefferson was prepared, for example, to countenance guilt by association, 
urging that anyone from a town that was “tainted with a general spirit of 
 
93.  Not only the original Embargo Act but also its many amendments were generally requested 
and drafted by the administration. See SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 156-75. 
94.  Henry Adams described the Republicans in Congress as almost in a panic as they 
abandoned Jefferson’s scheme and made him suffer the indignity of signing the repeal 
statute. See 4 ADAMS, supra note 6, at 272-89. 
95.  LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 119, 137 (1963). 
96.  See SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 139-42; WHITE, supra note 15, at 423-73. 




disobedience” be debarred from any permit to carry on commerce unless the 
applicant demonstrated that he had never said or done anything himself in 
support of resistance to the embargo.97 He requested that prosecutors allow 
him to judge personally whether the death penalty should be sought for 
convicted violators of the embargo’s prohibitions. He believed that there would 
be too many to be punished with death and he wanted to decide who should be 
marked as examples and who should simply suffer long imprisonment.98 Wills, 
perhaps, has gone too far in concluding that “Jefferson had set up a state 
terrorism that made the Alien and Sedition prosecutions under Adams look 
minor by comparison.”99 
But Wills has not gone much too far with respect to what Jefferson was 
prepared to do. The crucial fact of the matter, of course, is that Jefferson was 
not permitted to do everything that he was prepared to do. As we shall soon 
see, the courts put some significant limits on the administration of the 
embargo. More importantly, for current purposes, Congress did not give the 
President quite all the authority that he wanted. While Congress was willing to 
give the President or the enforcement officers authority to seize provisions that 
were “unusual” when delivered to places near the border with Canada or 
Spanish Florida, Jefferson wanted authority to make such seizures anywhere in 
the United States. That particular request was never made to Congress because 
Gallatin assured Jefferson that it “could not pass.”100 And Congress balked 
when Gallatin proposed that all civil suits against collectors should be tried 
only in federal court, that a Treasury Department ruling that a seizure was 
“reasonable” should protect collectors from damages, and that the President 
should have authority to use state militias for enforcement without 
authorization from the governors who were the militia’s commanders.101 
Even so, it was often suggested in Congress that the embargo legislation, 
particularly the President’s power to suspend it, was an unconstitutional 
 
97.  Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Nov. 13, 
1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 193, 194. 
98.  Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Sept. 9, 
1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 160, 160. Jefferson apparently 
believed that resistance to the embargo should be considered treason. Nothing in the 
statutes attempted to make such conduct treasonable, however, and Jefferson’s position was 
vigorously rejected by Justice Livingston in United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397, 399-400 
(C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No. 15,407); see also 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 352-53. 
99.  WILLS, supra note 23, at 54. 
100.  WHITE, supra note 15, at 430. 
101.  See SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 175-76. 
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delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch.102 That argument 
never prevailed, but it surely had some merit, for the suspension power was 
not just a power to suspend upon the finding of certain facts, but a power to 
suspend with such “exceptions” as the President thought prudent. This was 
very close to an authority to rewrite the legislation. This nondelegation 
argument, of course, had the weakness of all such claims. What Congress gave 
it could also take away. The suspension power itself was only available when 
Congress was not in session, and it became inoperative under the statute 
twenty days after Congress had returned to Washington. And although 
Jefferson would have pressed on with the embargo indefinitely, and Madison 
might have followed suit, when enforcement of the embargo became too 
unpopular, Congress repealed the President’s authority. 
2. The System of Administrative Control 
The embargo legislation obviously required thousands of individual 
decisions by customs collectors, naval officers, and U.S. Attorneys in the 
various federal districts. In addition, the statutes seemed to give the President a 
personal responsibility for granting permits and reviewing seizures. How were 
all of these decisions to be made in an effective, orderly, and consistent 
fashion? Revenue officers, naval officers, and U.S. Attorneys in the field were 
subject to radically different conditions in differing parts of the country. And 
every case was certain to offer some unique aspects based on its peculiar facts. 
Moreover, state personnel—governors, legislatures, and militia—also took 
some part in the enforcement of the embargo. What sort of administrative 
system could unify the actions of all these disparate and dispersed actors? 
The first problem was what to do about the discretion that Congress had 
vested in the President himself. The initial Embargo Act prohibited any vessel 
from leaving for a foreign port unless “under the immediate direction of the 
President of the United States.”103 Merchants read this provision as allowing 
the President to dispense exemptions at will, and applications poured in from 
every quarter. The virtual impossibility of sorting legitimate requests from 
evasion schemes drove Jefferson and Gallatin toward a highly restrictive 
interpretation of the statute. Because an unrestrained power to exempt vessels 
from the embargo would have defeated its purposes, Jefferson decided that 
Congress must have meant that he was to provide exceptions only when a 
voyage by a private vessel was necessary to carry on “public” (apparently 
 
102.  See CURRIE, supra note 17, at 148-50. 
103.  Ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451, 452 (1807). 




meaning “governmental”) business. Gallatin duly put a notice to this effect in 
various newspapers.104 
Even with this restrictive interpretation, the President’s dispensing power 
turned out to be an embarrassment. John Jacob Astor, who had personal and 
financial connections to Jefferson and Gallatin (and later to James Monroe and 
Henry Clay, among others),105 received permission from the President to clear 
his vessel, the Beaver, from New York to carry home a distinguished Chinese 
mandarin who was stranded in the United States. Alas, it turned out that this 
mandarin was an ordinary Chinese man dressed up in finery. The 
embarrassment became more acute when it was revealed that Astor turned a 
profit of $200,000 on the voyage.106 
Given the President’s restrictive interpretation of his initial dispensing 
authority, few permits were issued, and merchants who had goods stranded in 
foreign ports felt aggrieved. They wrested from Congress a more targeted 
provision authorizing the President to permit voyages solely for the purposes 
of recovering goods already owned by American interests but located in foreign 
ports.107 A remarkable number of merchants turned out to have property 
abroad. Before Congress repealed this authority, at Jefferson’s request, 594 
vessels had been allowed to sail to foreign ports. Many of them failed to return, 
“gladly forfeiting bond for the freedom and profits of the neutral trade.”108 The 
value of the property authorized to be brought back under these permits was 
approximately $7 million.109 And although Gallatin, in conjunction with the 
President, limited permissions largely to the recovery of goods in the West 
Indies, the volume of trade done under these permits was a substantial 
impediment to the embargo’s success.110 
But as an administrative matter, assuring fairness and consistency in the 
President’s determinations was a small problem. The permits issued from a 
single source, the President, who had his policy advisor, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, close at hand. Regulating the behavior of customs collectors and 
naval officers was a much more challenging task. Gallatin rose to it with his 
usual energy. During the first eleven months of the fifteen-month embargo, 
 
104.  See SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 160. 
105.  For a description of Astor’s political connections and influence, see JOHN DENIS HAEGER, 
JOHN JACOB ASTOR: BUSINESS AND FINANCE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1991). 
106.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 429 n.24 (citing ROBERT GREENHALGH ALBION, THE RISE OF 
NEW YORK PORT, 1815-1860, at 197 (1939)). 
107.  Second Supplementary Act, supra note 67, § 7, 2 Stat. at 475.  
108.  MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 888 (1970). 
109.  WHITE, supra note 15, at 430. 
110.  See SEARS, supra note 42, at 66-67. 
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Gallatin issued 584 circulars or letters of instruction to enforcement personnel 
concerning the implementation of the embargo.111 The major problem was the 
coasting trade. Stopping coastal traffic starved Americans, not Englishmen. 
Thus it had to be permitted unless, in the statutes’ terms, a collector believed 
that there was an intent to evade the embargo. But in an era of sailing ships, 
weather often diverted vessels from their intended course. And just off the 
coast lay dozens of British vessels capable of “capturing” American 
merchantmen and taking them to a British port in the West Indies. Virtually 
everything seemed suspicious when ending up in a foreign port could, under 
the statute, be excused if it resulted from the “perils of the sea.” 
The collectors clearly needed guidelines, and Gallatin supplied them. For 
example, in a circular of April 28, 1808, collectors were told that they might 
find that there was an intent to evade the embargo based upon: (1) the 
declarations of the parties or the suggestions of others; (2) unusual shipments 
in terms of quantity or price, or in particular provisions, such as timber and 
lumber, naval stores, and all articles consumed in the West Indies; (3) former 
known evasions by the persons seeking permits; or (4) known business 
connections with agents of foreign nations.112 Because the West Indies received 
virtually everything it consumed from somewhere else, that provision alone 
would make almost every shipment suspicious. But Gallatin went on to assure 
the collectors that these four grounds were not exclusive and that they should 
“detain, investigate and refer in all doubtful cases.”113 
As time went by, hundreds of questions arose, which required further 
circulars and instructions. For example, how much of the cargo of a vessel 
needed to be “suspicious” to justify detention? The Treasury adopted a rule 
that suspicious cargo could only make up one-eighth of the value of the total in 
the vessel.114 Gallatin also tried to unify practice by adopting a presumption 
that any collector’s decision to detain a vessel was justified. Jefferson had 
delegated to Gallatin the authority under the statute to decide whether a 
collector’s preliminary judgment to detain should be confirmed, and Jefferson 
instructed Gallatin that whenever he was doubtful, he should consider the 
President as voting for detention. Moreover, in Jefferson’s view, the suspicious 
 
111.  NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT UNDER JEFFERSON 119 (1978). 
Gallatin’s circulars and instructions are collected in a manuscript volume in the National 
Archives entitled “Circulars, Office, Secretary of the Treasury,” September 14, 1789, to February 
21, 1828, “T.” 
112.  Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808 (on file with author) [hereinafter Gallatin, Circular 
of Apr. 28, 1808]; see also WHITE, supra note 15, at 435. 
113.  Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808, supra note 112. 
114.  SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 167. 




character of a shipment, or of the activities of a vessel, could be better 
determined by an official on the spot than by someone working from a paper 
record. As a general rule, therefore, he thought that Gallatin should rely on the 
judgment of the collector who had made the original detention.115 
While the general rule, “when in doubt, detain,” seemed to unify practice, 
the determination to routinely confirm detentions delegated discretion to the 
collectors. And under the provisions of the embargo acts, only their decisions 
to detain were referred to the President, or to his delegate, the Secretary of the 
Treasury;116 grants or permits were not. There was little reason to believe that 
collectors around the country, personal differences aside, would behave in a 
unified fashion. In New England, revenue and naval officers met with armed 
resistance. Some were killed and several resigned.117 It hardly seemed likely that 
those who stayed on in this environment would be as energetic in interdicting 
trade as those working in states where the population was more supportive of 
the President’s program. And in every instance, collectors had to consider 
whether the persons with whom they were dealing were likely to sue. 
Collectors were individually liable for any damages from an improper 
detention.118 Six months into the embargo experiment, Gallatin despaired of 
the effectiveness of the detention system. He wrote to Jefferson, “Since the 
collectors will not place themselves in a position to be sued, we must let the 
vessels go, and depend on [naval] force to enforce the embargo.”119 
White has concluded that collectors and U.S. Attorneys by and large did 
their duty. But the personnel available to implement the embargo were simply 
inadequate to prevent smuggling when that meant policing the hundreds of 
harbors and inlets along the whole eastern seaboard.120 Moreover, resistance 
was supported in New England by judges, juries, and elected officials. We will 
consider the judicial situation shortly, but the political opposition to the 
embargo in New England was sufficient in itself to impede implementation. 
The unpopularity of the embargo had not only helped to put Federalists 
back into control of some New England legislatures, but had also spurred open 
talk of cessation from the Union and the establishment of a New England 
Confederacy. In Warren’s words: 
 
115.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 436-37. 
116.  See Third Supplementary Act, supra note 70, § 11, 2 Stat. at 501.  
117.  See SEARS, supra note 42, at 143-96. 
118.  See infra text accompanying notes 202-215.  
119.  SPIVAK, supra note 60, at 173.  
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MASHAW_11-07-06_FORMATTED FOR SC1 5/30/2007 11:39:19 PM 
the yale law journal 116:1636   2007  
1664 
 
Every attack which Virginia had made, from 1798 to 1800, upon the 
Alien and Sedition Laws was now re-echoed in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut. The most radical doctrines advanced in the Virginia-
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-1799 were adopted and strengthened. 
Jefferson’s own arguments as to the rights of a State and of the people 
to disregard unconstitutional laws were now turned against him.121 
State governors were given two opportunities to stifle enforcement of the 
embargo. The first was a blunder by Jefferson. In an attempt to make the 
determination of when coastal trade was “suspicious” more palatable to local 
interests, Jefferson wrote to all of the state governors authorizing them to issue 
permits for the importation of provisions, particularly flour, when it was 
necessary for the sustenance of their state populations. This was a move in the 
direction of Republican principles, the decentralization of authority, but 
Gallatin feared that it would be the end of effective enforcement of the 
embargo.122 If the governors could clear shipments of basic foodstuffs, much of 
the trade with the British and French West Indies might proceed unimpeded 
by the embargo.  
The Treasury Department struggled to gain some control over the flour 
issue. Gallatin first transmitted instructions to the various collectors that 
shipments of flour and other similar provisions were to be considered a cause 
for detention, and he called for weekly information on imports and exports to 
be relayed to the Treasury Department.123 The collectors were somewhat 
confused: Was any shipment of flour a prima facie cause for detention, or was 
it merely strong evidence that a ship was suspicious? And what ports were 
covered? Gallatin sent seemingly inconsistent responses to the collectors.124 
This ad hoc system of writing individual letters was unsustainable; Gallatin 
needed to provide more detailed instructions on whether and to what extent 
 
121.  1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 358. 
122.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to President Thomas Jefferson (May 
23, 1808) (on file with author). In any event, most governors behaved responsibly. Only 
Governor Sullivan of Massachusetts issued permits for the transport of flour to all comers, 
to merchants both inside Massachusetts and in other states. Sullivan did not break the 
embargo himself, but his activities were a scandal that hampered compliance everywhere. 
123.  See Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 6, 1808 (on file with author) (“[The President] 
perceives no necessity at present for the transportation of flour and similar articles from one 
port of the Chesapeake and its waters to another port on the waters of the same bay; or from 
any port whatever to ports in the Chesapeake; Delaware or Hudson; or to any other places 
which export such articles.”). 
124.  Compare Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Shee, Collector of Phila. 
(May 17, 1808) (on file with author), with Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, 
to Charles Simons, Collector of Alexandria (May 12, 1808) (on file with author). 




flour should be considered a cause for detention if the interpretive guidelines 
were to have any force. On May 20, 1808, Gallatin issued a circular to all the 
collectors moderating the ban on flour shipments but giving some more 
specific criteria for action: 
[I]t seems that moderate shipments of flour and provisions not 
exceeding in value one eighth part of the amount of the bond, cannot, 
when no other cause of suspicion occurs, be considered alone, as either 
intended or calculated to evade the Embargo. I think therefore that such 
shipments to such an extent, to places to which similar articles have 
been usually exported from your Districts may be allowed, particularly 
when made on vessels regularly trading between the two places; 
provided always that you have no other reason to believe that there is 
an intention to evade or violate the Embargo. Some latitude may also be 
given in the case of vessels belonging to other ports and now in your 
District, which had actually laden or purchased their cargoes, and . . . 
under no suspicion whatever. This letter must be considered as 
explanatory of the circular of the 6th instant, and not as altering the 
instructions contained in the circular of [the] 28th to which you will be 
pleased strictly to adhere.125 
Notwithstanding these efforts at controlling local prejudices, the collectors 
retained very significant discretion to respond to the political climate of their 
region when deciding whether to detain a ship. “Unusual shipments” of flour 
were to be considered a sufficient cause for detention, and no flour at all was to 
be transported to any “other place[] which export[s] such articles.”126 But 
“moderate shipments” were to be allowed if they were usually exported from 
the collector’s district. How was a collector supposed to interpret “unusual,” 
“moderate,” “usually exported,” or “some latitude”? 
Meanwhile, Jefferson tried to rein in the most conspicuously lenient 
governor.127 In a letter to Governor Pinckney on July 18, 1808, he demanded 
that all shipments of flour be considered prima facie suspicious to ensure that 
the decisions by the collectors were as consistent as possible. But he then gave 
the governors their second chance at nullification. The provisions of the 1809 
Enforcement Act authorized the President to use the Army and the militia to 
 
125.  Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 20, 1808 (transcription on file with author). 
126.  Gallatin, supra note 123. 
127.  See Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Governor Charles Pinckney (July 18, 1808), 
in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 102, 102-03. 
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enforce the embargo.128 This statutory authorization was, as has been noted, 
extraordinary. A Federalist Congress in 1792 had authorized presidential resort 
to the militia in the case of invasion, insurrection, or opposition to the 
execution of the laws that was too powerful to be suppressed by the usual 
means. But a federal district judge had to certify the breakdown of civil 
authority.129 In 1809, by contrast, a Republican Congress passed a statute that, 
on its face, gave the President the authority to call out the militia for the 
ordinary enforcement of the law whenever he thought it necessary. 
On Gallatin’s advice, Jefferson decided that the governors, who were the 
commanders of the state militias, should exercise this authority. Given the 
political resistance to the embargo, as well as the enormous resistance to the 
Enforcement Act, this was surely prudent. Jefferson asked the governors to 
pick officers from their state militias to be in charge of detachments that might 
be called upon by federal officers to enforce obedience to the embargo.130 New 
England again resisted. The Governor of Connecticut responded to the 
Secretary of War that he had no authority to carry out the President’s 
instructions under the Connecticut Constitution and that the President had no 
authority to direct him under the U.S. Constitution. The Governor reported 
his actions to the Connecticut legislature in a speech favoring state 
interposition in response to unconstitutional federal statutes. The legislature 
promptly adopted a statute prohibiting any state official from lending any 
assistance to the enforcement of the embargo. 
In Massachusetts, Governor Sullivan had been succeeded by Levi Lincoln, 
who had served in Jefferson’s cabinet as Attorney General. Lincoln acquiesced 
to Jefferson’s request, appointing militia officers whom he believed to be 
reliable. His legislature rewarded him with a resolution of censure and formally 
petitioned Congress for repeal of the embargo as an unconstitutional 
imposition on the civil liberties of American citizens and an invasion of the 
authority of the states. Lincoln wrote to Jefferson that he feared 
impeachment.131 
Yet implementation of the embargo was not an administrative failure. 
Although it was not successful in coercing Britain or France, the embargo 
managed to coerce—or perhaps one should say regulate—American commerce. 
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DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: SECOND TERM, 1805-1809, at 651-55 (Jefferson 
& His Time vol. 5, 1974). 




As White has put it, “The major administrative question was whether the 
government possessed a system strong enough, reliable enough, and equipped 
with the necessary legal authority and physical power to enforce the embargo. 
The record showed that such a system existed . . . .”132 The concentration of 
administrative discretionary power necessary for success—the authority to 
refuse to allow anything to move in commerce on suspicion of the motives of 
the mover—was, however, politically intolerable. The fifteen-month experiment 
collapsed. Administrative powers of this level of coercive force were not seen 
again until the Civil War. 
Notwithstanding its oppressiveness, the embargo system was not lawless. 
Authority emanated from Congress, not from some executive assertion of 
independent war powers. Congress added authority only incrementally as prior 
authorizations proved inadequate. The administrators at the top struggled 
mightily to develop clear standards and to impose consistency on the efforts of 
widely dispersed officials. Some “democratization” of authority through 
delegation to the states was attempted even though it threatened to wreck the 
system. And the courts were not excluded from participation in enforcement or 
in the review of official action. Indeed, White’s conclusion that enforcement 
was effective might well have proved much too optimistic had the embargo 
continued for a longer period. For, as we shall see, the available system of 
judicial review—that is, court enforcement of criminal sanctions and common 
law actions against officials—had the capacity to derail effective administration 
where the embargo was unpopular. 
The most impressive contribution to lawfulness came, however, from the 
system of internal control established by the Treasury. Contrary to Henry 
Adams’s proclamation that Jefferson “assumed the responsibility for every 
detail of [the embargo’s] management,”133 the President could not 
micromanage the particulars of enforcement. Though the statutory power to 
execute the laws was often given to the President, much of the content of the 
enforcement policies came from the Treasury Department and, in particular, 
from Gallatin.134 For every embargo statute, Gallatin sent instructions to the 
field, highlighting the particularly relevant provisions of the statute, providing 
a standardized set of interpretations, directives, and instructions, and 
 
132.  WHITE, supra note 15, at 472. 
133.  4 ADAMS, supra note 6, at 251. 
134.  See Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Apr. 
19, 1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 29, 29-30 (delegating 
authority to Gallatin to develop enforcement rules); Letter from President Thomas Jefferson 
to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Aug. 11, 1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
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authorizing the exercise of local discretion when necessary.135 Some of those 
missives transmitted instructions from the President. Others revealed close 
consultation between Gallatin and Jefferson. Many were issued simply on the 
delegated authority of the Secretary.136 
The Treasury Department was also in daily correspondence with the 
collectors. Specific questions regarding permits, detentions, and interpretations 
of the embargo laws were sent to Gallatin, who responded with binding 
advisory letters137 (in which he often referenced recent circular letters138). While 
 
135.  A more detailed discussion of the content of these instructions is provided below. See 
generally Albert Gallatin, Circular of Dec. 31, 1807 (on file with author) [hereinafter Gallatin, 
Circular of Dec. 31, 1807] (creating interim rules after the ambiguity of the initial 1807 
Embargo Act); Albert Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 21, 1808 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 21, 1808] (creating rules for and transmitting specific instructions 
with respect to section 7 of the second supplementary act); Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 
1808, supra note 112 (providing detailed instructions and detention procedures for the 
supplementary act of April 25, 1808); Albert Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 16, 1809 (on file with 
author) (providing formal instructions for the Enforcement Act). 
136.  Compare, e.g., Gallatin, Circular of Dec. 31, 1807, supra note 135 (“You are instructed by the 
President . . . .”), Albert Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 12, 1808 (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 12, 1808] (“The President of the United States will immediately 
take into consideration the seventh section of the act in order that some general rules may be 
adopted for its execution.”), Gallatin, supra note 123 (“[T]he President considered ‘unusual 
shipments,’ particular of flour & other provisions, of lumber and of Naval Stores, as 
sufficient cause for detention of the vessel.”), and Albert Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 14, 1809 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 14, 1809] (“The President gives 
the following instructions . . . .”), with Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808, supra note 112 (“I 
now proceed to give some additional instructions . . . .”), Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 
18, 1808 (on file with author) (using similar language), and Albert Gallatin, Circular of Nov. 
15, 1808 (on file with author) (“It appears to me . . . .”). Indeed, Jefferson instructed Gallatin 
several times that he was in the best position to make decisions and should proceed without 
consultation. See, e.g., Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of 
the Treasury (May 6, 1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 52, 53; 
Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (May 27, 
1808), in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 66, 66; Letter of Aug. 11, 
1808, supra note 134, at 122. 
137.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Enoch Sawyer, Collector of 
Camden (Feb. 26, 1808) (on file with author) (“I have deemed it proper to furnish you with 
copies of those letters, and at the same time to request that you will consider them as 
intended for your government.”). 
138.  See, e.g., Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Gabriel Christie, Collector, & 
John Brice, Deputy Collector (Apr. 1, 1808) (on file with author) (answering a question in 
correspondence by referencing an earlier circular); Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the 
Treasury, to Charles Simms, Collector of Alexandria (May 23, 1808) (on file with author) 
(same); Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Jas Gibbon, Collector of 
Richmond (May 30, 1808) (on file with author) (correcting the collector’s interpretation of a 
circular letter). 




the majority of these letters consisted of short opinions approving or 
disapproving of detentions, the collectors often wrote to the Treasury 
Department for assistance on how to proceed with special cases, for detailed 
instructions in enforcing new legislation, and to suggest appointments to 
Customs House positions. In combination, the Treasury’s circulars and 
correspondence attempted to ensure both informed and uniform 
implementation by: (1) creating a system of information collection; (2) 
delegating authority to the collectors to take specific additional enforcement 
measures; and (3) providing guidelines to unify practice. In addition, a 
centralized appeal and oversight system provided some relief from official 
errors and held field personnel administratively accountable. 
a. Information-Gathering 
Jefferson and Gallatin realized at a very early stage that it would not be 
possible to issue general guidelines for the detention of vessels without more 
specific information about what kinds of violations were occurring in the field. 
Thus, through circulars, Gallatin standardized forms and procedures for the 
collection, transmission, and gathering of information on permits, detentions, 
and forfeitures.139 This system of information-gathering would prove to be 
essential both in holding the customs officials accountable and in ensuring that 
new rules and regulations would be developed to address new threats. 
For example, after the second supplementary embargo statute (which 
applied the embargo to both small unregistered vessels and to any exportation 
carried out on land) was passed on March 12, 1808, Gallatin issued a circular 
requiring the various officials to transmit information to the Treasury about 
what types of vessels in each district might be exempted from bonding 
requirements without endangering the enforcement effort.140 Later 
correspondence provided more specific instructions detailing what types of 
 
139.  See Albert Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 12, 1808, supra note 136 (requiring customs officials to 
transmit data about vessels excepted under the second supplementary act); Gallatin, supra 
note 123 (requiring collectors to transmit to the Treasury a weekly statement of vessels laden 
with articles of domestic produce, the type and quantity of the produce on board, and their 
destination—the purpose of which was to collect better data on what constituted an 
“unusual shipment” for detention); Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 14, 1809, supra note 136 
(transmitting forms for the different types of bonds and certificates and for the various 
types of vessels under the Embargo Act).  
140.  Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 12, 1808, supra note 136. 
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boats should be considered safe or dangerous141 and what factors collectors 
should consider in finding an “intent to evade” the embargo.142 
 The information sent by each district called Gallatin’s attention to specific 
tactics being used to evade the embargo and allowed the Treasury to respond. 
For instance, in late 1808, the Treasury received information that many vessels 
had begun taking one-third more flour on board than was permitted by their 
loading certificates. Once off the coast, these merchantmen sold the flour to 
waiting foreign vessels.143 Using this information Gallatin instructed the 
collectors to initiate spot checks on vessels that had already completed loading 
their cargo and had received permission to depart.144 
Thus, although there was no public notice-and-comment period prior to 
the issuance of the Treasury’s guidelines, Jefferson and Gallatin were not 
running a two-man show. The input of the local customs officials was 
indispensable. As information accumulated from the field, instructions from 
Washington became more and more detailed.145 
b. Specific Delegations of Authority 
Even so, Gallatin recognized the necessity of delegating authority to the 
collectors and, indeed, of permitting them to delegate further. They were, for 
example, authorized to employ a corps of “temporary inspectors” in small ports 
who could grant clearances and provide certificates recognizing the landing of 
cargos. These personnel were also authorized to permit vessels to provide a 
general bond rather than specific bonds for each departure, if they were 
 
141.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Shee, Collector of Phila. 
(Mar. 26, 1808) (on file with author). 
142.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
143.  See Albert Gallatin, Circular of Nov. 12, 1808 (on file with author). 
144.  Id.; see also Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Thomas Forster, Collector 
of Presyne Isle (July 28, 1808) (on file with author) (warning of evasions on the Canadian 
border). 
145.  See, e.g., Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Allen McLane, Collector of 
Balt. (Apr. 15, 1808) (on file with author) (“The practice adopted by you in relation to 
special bonds . . . is certainly correct, and you will observe by my Circular of the seventh of 
this month that all the collectors have been directed to conform to the same rule.”); Letter 
from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Shee, Collector of Phila. (May 9, 1808) 
(on file with author) (asking the collector to communicate what articles might be safely 
added to the list of permitted articles so that the Treasury “may thereby be enabled to adopt 
some additional rules”). 




confident that the ships were employed only in the coastal trade.146 Similarly, 
although the initial Embargo Act gave the President the authority to issue 
“such instructions to the officers of the revenue, and of the navy and revenue 
cutters of the United States, as shall appear best adapted for carrying the same 
into full effect,”147 much was subdelegated, first to Gallatin and through him to 
the collectors.148 Hence, though the captains of revenue cutters received their 
commissions directly from the Treasury Department, the collectors were 
responsible for the general operation of each port’s revenue cutters, including 
how they should be stationed, organized, and deployed. Indeed, in 1809, 
collectors were given authority to contract for and direct additional “fast sailing 
vessels” if they thought it necessary to stop evasions.149 And although the 
supplementary act of April 25, 1808, barred the departure without presidential 
permission of any vessel having cargo on board for any district adjacent to the 
 
146.  Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808, supra note 112. This circular also provided detailed 
instructions for (1) the sixth section of the Act, which forbade the departure of any vessel 
having a cargo on board for any district adjacent to the territory of a foreign nation, Third 
Supplementary Act, supra note 70, § 6, 2 Stat. at 500; and (2) what collectors should 
consider in finding “an intent to evade” the embargo, see Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808, 
supra note 112; see also Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 7, 1808 (on file with author); Albert 
Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 29, 1808 (on file with author) [hereinafter Gallatin, Circular of 
Apr. 29, 1808] (authorizing payment of twenty cents per clearance to compensate temporary 
inspectors); Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Gabriel Christie, Collector 
of Balt. (Jan. 9, 1808) (on file with author). 
147.  Ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451, 452 (1807). 
148.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Jeremiah Olney, Collector of 
Providence (July 23, 1808) (on file with author) (providing that the commanding officers of 
the gunboats were to be governed by general rules established by the several collectors). 
149.  Albert Gallatin, First Circular of Jan. 16, 1809 (on file with author) (“You are hereby 
authorized by the President in conformity with the 13th Section of the act of 9th instant to 
hire for a term not exceeding six months, and to arm and employ a fast sailing vessel of the 
dimensions and draft of water best calculated for the object but not exceeding one hundred 
and thirty tons. The vessel may be commanded by a master, first and second mate, whom 
you will nominate to me, but in the meanwhile appoint and employ, and who will be paid at 
the same rate as a similar officer on board the Revenue Cutters: the crew not to exceed 
twenty five men, and the vessel to be armed with guns or cannonades and muskets, in the 
best manner which you can provide. She is intended principally to prevent escapes of vessels 
from your District; and when not wanted for that purpose, to cruize as you may direct.”); 
see also Albert Gallatin, Second Circular of Jan. 16, 1809 (on file with author) (“You will be 
pleased to report the result of your inquiry, stating particularly the construction, 
dimensions, draft of water, and price of such vessel or vessels, also whether guns or 
cannonades for arming them can be obtained, and at what price.”).  
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territory of a foreign nation,150 Gallatin authorized the collectors in districts 
adjacent to foreign nations to grant permission when they saw fit.151 
The second supplementary act of March 12, 1808, which exempted vessels 
departing to recover personal property abroad, also demanded individualized 
determinations of the legitimacy of these recovery voyages.152 Under Gallatin’s 
instructions, the collectors were given authority to receive applications stating 
the value and type of property to be imported and proof of possession, and, 
when warranted, to grant permission to vessels of a tonnage proportionate to 
the type of property intended to be imported.153 Through such delegations and 
subdelegations, the political authority of the President was rapidly 
bureaucratized and brought under the (sometimes tenuous) control of 
Treasury regulations. 
c. Interpretive Guidelines 
The primary purpose of the Treasury’s massive issuance of circulars and 
interpretive correspondence was not to gain local knowledge or to delegate 
authority, but to guide the exercise of discretion by widely dispersed 
enforcement personnel. Gallatin’s important circular of April 28, 1808, 
describing how collectors were to form their “opinions” of when there was “an 
intent to evade,” has already been mentioned.154 Those instructions were then 
constantly updated as new information was received and further statutes were 
passed. Following a provision of the 1809 Enforcement Act,155 for example, the 
Treasury provided new rules on what constituted “an intent to evade” that 
superseded the circular of April 28, 1808. The new rules—issued under an 
express statutory power of the President to direct detentions156—were harder 
 
150.  Third Supplementary Act, supra note 70, § 6, 2 Stat. at 500. 
151.  See Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 29, 1808, supra note 146; Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of 
the Treasury, to George Hoffman (Apr. 29, 1808) (on file with author). 
152.  Second Supplementary Act, supra note 67, § 7, 2 Stat. at 475. 
153.  See Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 21, 1808, supra note 135. There were two exceptions to this 
grant of discretion: (1) the vessel could not exceed the rate of one ton for each $100 of the 
value of the property; and (2) in any cases in which the collector doubted whether there was 
an intent to evade the embargo, the application had to be referred to the Treasury 
Department. See id.; see also Albert Gallatin, Circular of July 1, 1808 (on file with author) 
(providing more specific rules for granting permission to vessels seeking to bring back 
personal property into the United States under section 7 of the second supplementary act). 
154.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
155.  Ch. 5, § 10, 2 Stat. 506, 509 (1809). 
156.  The absence of this authority from earlier statutes had important legal consequences. See 
infra notes 182-189 and accompanying text. 




edged, expressly forbidding certain types of shipments, thus directing rather 
than guiding the formation of the collectors’ “opinions.”157 
d. Internal Accountability for Seizures and Forfeitures 
The first supplementary act, passed on January 9, 1808,158 provided that all 
penalties and forfeitures incurred by the embargo might be mitigated or 
remitted in the manner prescribed for customs duties generally.159 Petitions for 
relief were to be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury who, under the 
Enforcement Act, 
shall thereupon . . . have power to mitigate or remit such fine, 
forfeiture, or penalty, or remove such disability, or any part thereof if, 
in his opinion, the same shall have been incurred without willful 
negligence, or any intention of fraud in the person or persons incurring 
the same; and to direct the prosecution . . . to cease . . . upon such 
terms or conditions as he may deem reasonable and just.160  
Aggrieved merchants, masters, shippers, or ship owners might, therefore, 
obtain relief directly from the Secretary. 
These petitions also provided information to the central officials 
concerning the behavior of the field personnel. It is unclear from the general 
correspondence and circular letters whether the Treasury had a standardized 
system for sanctioning malfeasance, but it seems that an informal one existed. 
If the charges leveled in a petition were serious enough, Gallatin asked for an 
explanation.161 And while Gallatin monitored the actions of the collectors, they 
exercised oversight and control over lower-level officials. Correspondence 
between Gallatin and the collectors reveals that surveyors and inspectors, for 
example, were required to send regular reports to the collectors regarding the 
 
157.  See Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 14, 1809, supra note 136. 
158.  First Supplementary Act, supra note 64, 2 Stat. 453. 
159.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1797, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 506. 
160.  § 10, 2 Stat. at 509. For examples of such petitioners, see Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y 
of the Treasury, to J. Bennet, Collector of Bridgetown (Feb. 16, 1808) (on file with author); 
Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Shee, Collector of Phila. (Mar. 3, 
1808) (on file with author); and Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Enoch 
Sawyer, Collector of Camden (May 16, 1808). 
161.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Berry Wild, Deputy Collector of 
Boston (Nov. 16, 1808) (on file with author) (asking for the collector’s response to a charge 
of partiality in issuing permits). 
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boarding and searching of vessels, the confiscation of illegal cargo, and the 
investigation of smuggling activities.162 
Collectors at different ports also engaged in some forms of “peer review.” 
They corresponded regularly to coordinate the enforcement of the laws. 
Coordinated action became increasingly important with the passage of the 
third supplementary act of April 25, 1808, which required a certificate of 
landing each time a vessel entered into a port, to ensure that the ship had not 
illegally loaded or unloaded cargo along the way.163 In part because of the 
infeasibility of organizing the certificates of landing through the Treasury 
Department, the management of these certificates fell to the collectors at the 
various ports acting in concert.164 
3. The Role of Judicial Review 
Legal control of the embargo’s administration was divided between the 
federal and state courts. Enforcement suits—that is, suits for bond forfeitures, 
penalties, and the forfeiture of vessels and their cargo—were pursued in federal 
court. Suits against federal officials for illegal conduct were largely brought in 
state court as common law actions of trespass, replevin, and the like. In both 
situations, the legality of administrative action was at issue. Customs collectors 
or naval officers could detain ships because they intended to violate or had 
violated the embargo statutes. But the ship and its cargo were not forfeited, nor 
would other penalties attach, unless the U.S. Attorney for the district brought 
an action against the vessel or the owner and prevailed on the merits. The 
judgment in that action would determine, at least implicitly, whether the 
official detention or seizure had been proper. Similarly, officials sued in 
trespass, or under some other writ, for detaining a vessel or its cargo could only 
escape liability by pleading their legal authority under the embargo statutes. 
Because they had no immunity, the legality of their acts would be determined 
by trying out their defenses on the merits. These relatively straightforward 
approaches to determining the legality of official conduct were complicated, 
 
162.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Enoch Sawyer, Collector of 
Camden (Mar. 31, 1808) (on file with author) (noting that the bonds contemplated by the 
embargo acts must be taken by the collector himself and that the surveyors were not 
authorized to clear vessels until the collector did so). 
163.  See Third Supplementary Act, supra note 70, 2 Stat. 499; Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y 
of the Treasury, to Allen McLane, Collector of Wilmington (Dec. 30, 1807) (on file with 
author) (stating that the certificate of landing for goods transported in the coastal trade 
should be produced within four months). 
164.  See Letter from Albert Gallatin to Enoch Sawyer, supra note 162 (requiring collectors to give 
the names of suspicious vessels to other collectors). 




however, by divisions of authority, both between federal and state courts and 
between judges and juries. And these divisions made lawsuits a particularly 
potent threat to the financial well-being of enforcement personnel, particularly 
collectors. 
a. The Embargo and the Federal Judges  
Thomas Jefferson was famously distrustful of the federal judiciary.165 He 
viewed it as antidemocratic and as the last stronghold of Federalist ideology. 
And notwithstanding Judge Davis’s opinion sustaining the constitutionality of 
the embargo legislation, Jefferson also believed that the federal courts 
obstructed the embargo’s implementation.166 But a look at the reported cases 
suggests that the judges were relatively evenhanded in their approach. 
Moreover, their involvement in embargo litigation foreshadowed the 
development of some important principles of contemporary administrative 
law. 
Several Supreme Court decisions concerning the embargo were unhelpful 
to the administration, but it is hard to view them as legally unjustified. For 
example, in Durousseau v. United States,167 the government sued to secure 
forfeiture of a bond guaranteeing that a ship would land and discharge its 
cargo at a U.S. destination. The ship landed in Havana and the master claimed 
to have been driven there by weather. The Spanish government refused to 
allow the ship to clear port without selling its cargo. When it returned empty, 
the United States moved to have its bond declared forfeit. The lower court 
ruled for the government. In its view, the bond guaranteed that the ship would 
land its cargo in an American port unless it was lost by “dangers of the sea,” 
not unless it was sold in a foreign port where the ship had been driven by those 
dangers. The Supreme Court reversed. It was of course true that the owner had 
obtained the benefit of selling the cargo in a foreign port where prices were 
dramatically higher than at home. But having been driven there by the weather 
and forced to sell by a foreign power, the owner could not be said to have 
violated his agreement.168 
The Supreme Court upheld technical defenses by ship owners in other 
cases as well. In The Sloop Active v. United States,169 a fishing vessel loaded with 
 
165.  See ACKERMAN, supra note 90, at 111-268 and sources cited therein. 
166.  See 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 325-38.  
167.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307 (1810). 
168.  Accord United States v. Hall, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 171 (1810). 
169.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 100 (1812).  
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provisions was stopped after leaving the wharf but before having cleared the 
harbor. Although the vessel had no permit to sail, the Court would not affirm 
the lower court’s decision in favor of forfeiture. The embargo statute made it 
an offense to leave “port” on an unlicensed foreign voyage. The sloop Active 
had left the wharf, but it had not yet cleared the port. 
Otis v. Bacon170 was cut from the same cloth. The Court reviewed a 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court determination that a collector was liable 
for conversion for detaining a ship and its cargo. The collector argued that 
section 11 of the statute of April 25, 1808,171 authorized detention if in his 
opinion the vessel intended to violate the embargo, and he was of the opinion 
that it had so intended. However, the vessel in question had arrived at a U.S. 
destination and had obtained a permit to unload before the collector seized it. 
Under the statute, collectors were authorized to detain vessels “ostensibly 
bound with a cargo to some other port of the United States,” but that they 
believed were in fact headed for a foreign destination.172 In the Court’s opinion, 
a ship that had arrived at its destination and obtained a permit to unload could 
not be “ostensibly bound” anywhere. Hence, the collector had acted outside of 
his authority. 
It is not hard to understand why an administration struggling to 
implement the embargo would view decisions like these as unfriendly. And 
perhaps they were. But the Court was interpreting a penal statute with harsh 
forfeiture provisions. It was certainly not an aberration for the Court in 
interpreting such legislation to demand that the actions of the defendant or 
alleged violator satisfy all the conditions of the statute before liability attached.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court decided several cases that gave comfort to 
the administration. In Brig James Wells v. United States,173 for example, the 
Court required that the exemption for dangers of the seas be demonstrated by 
clear and positive evidence. The Court obviously viewed as inherently 
suspicious the story that a vessel bound from New York to St. Mary’s, Georgia, 
would be forced by wind, wave, and a leaky hull to put in at St. Bart’s in the 
Lesser Antilles. The tradewinds in those latitudes blew from the east, not from 
the west. 
And in a pair of cases, the Court also gave a very expansive reading to the 
collectors’ discretion in detaining a vessel on the “opinion” that it intended to 
 
170.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 589 (1813). 
171.  Third Supplementary Act, supra note 70, § 11, 2 Stat. at 501. 
172.  Id.  
173.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22 (1812). 




violate the embargo. In Crowell v. McFadon,174 the plaintiff argued that the 
collector could rely on his opinion in a suit for damages only if he could 
demonstrate that there were some reasonable grounds for forming that 
opinion. The Court ignored this sensible argument, holding that the collector 
had the authority to seize if he had an honest opinion of the vessel’s nefarious 
intent.  
Otis v. Watkins175 was to like effect. The plaintiff there argued that a 
collector must exercise reasonable care in seeking information to form his 
opinion of a vessel’s intentions. In discussing his claims, the Court, per Justice 
Livingston, stated: 
The jury are told that it was the collector’s duty to have used reasonable 
care in ascertaining the facts on which to form an opinion. 
. . . But the law exposes his conduct to no such scrutiny. If it did, no 
public officer would be hardy enough to act under it. If the jury 
believed that he honestly entertained the opinion under which he acted, 
although they might think it incorrect and formed hastily or without 
sufficient grounds, he would be entitled to their protection.176 
It is perhaps understandable that the Court would take this broad view of the 
collector’s authority in the context of a damage action tried before a 
Massachusetts jury. Not only was Massachusetts notoriously unsympathetic to 
the embargo, but the Chief Judge of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
had often stated his opinion, extrajudicially, that the embargo was 
unconstitutional.177 Indeed, on one occasion the U.S. Supreme Court had to 
reverse the Massachusetts court three times in the same case in order to provide 
legal protection for a hapless collector.178 
Nevertheless, the idea that administrative discretion could be legally 
exercised, not only incorrectly, but hastily and without a rational basis, 
troubled Chief Justice Marshall. He filed a separate opinion noting that the 
statute under which the collector had acted required a collector who detained a 
vessel on his own suspicion to hold it “until the decision of the President of the 
United States, be had thereupon.”179 In Marshall’s view, “[i]t follow[ed] 
 
174.  12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94 (1814). 
175.  13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339 (1815). 
176.  Id. at 355-56. 
177.  See 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 341-42. 
178.  See Otis v. Walter, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 192 (1826) (constituting the third round in the 
imbroglio). 
179.  Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 356 (opinion of Marshall, C.J.). 
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necessarily from the duties of forming an opinion and of communicating that 
opinion to the president for his decision in the case, that reasonable care ought 
to be used in collecting the facts to be stated to the president and that the 
statement ought to be made.”180 On that basis, Marshall believed that the trial 
judge’s instruction to the jury “that it was the duty of the collector, as collector, 
to have used reasonable care in ascertaining the facts on which to form an 
opinion” was not erroneous.181 
Although, as Watkins illustrated, the general principle was surely not 
established as of 1815, Marshall seemed to have held a view that now forms the 
core of judicial review of administrative action: discretion is always conferred 
on administrators on the implicit assumption that it will be reasonably 
exercised. But, of course, administrators no longer have to defend themselves, 
save in very rare instances, in state court damage actions before hostile juries. 
The most important case concerning the embargo, other than the decision 
on its constitutionality, was also not decided by the Supreme Court. Ex parte 
Gilchrist182 involved one of the Treasury’s early instructions to collectors that 
the President considered vessels loaded with provisions to be suspicious and 
subject to detention. Acting on this instruction, the collector at Charleston 
refused to grant clearance to a vessel loaded with rice and ostensibly bound for 
Baltimore. The collector had stated publicly that in his personal opinion the 
vessel was not suspicious but that he was bound by presidential instructions to 
detain it. Armed with this admission, the owner brought a mandamus action in 
the circuit court to require the collector to grant a clearance. 
Justice Johnson, for the circuit court, granted the mandamus, holding that 
President Jefferson’s instructions to the collector had been unauthorized. In 
Johnson’s view, the statute required the collector to exercise his own judgment 
in forming an opinion. Nothing in the statute gave the President the authority 
to direct the collector’s judgment (in fact, that authority would not appear 
explicitly until the Enforcement Act in 1809183). Without saying so directly, 
Johnson in effect held that the President had no inherent authority to direct 
lower-level officials in the exercise of their discretion under a statute—at least 
when the statute itself seemed to demand that the lower-level officer exercise 
his own judgment based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 
And in ringing tones he declared that “[t]he officers of our government, from 
the highest to the lowest, are equally subjected to legal restraint; and it is 
 
180.  Id. at 358. 
181.  Id.  
182.  10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420). 
183.  Ch 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 506, 507 (1809). 




confidently believed that all of them feel themselves equally incapable, as well 
from law as inclination, to attempt an unsanctioned encroachment upon 
individual liberty.”184 
In his holding, Johnson foreshadowed a number of subsequent opinions, 
most famously the Supreme Court’s determination concerning President 
Truman’s instructions to his Secretary of Commerce in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.185 But, at the time, the decision was something of a political 
bombshell. The Federalist press praised it to the skies. The Republican press 
attacked Johnson so relentlessly that he felt compelled to defend himself in 
print twice over the ensuing months.186 
The President was outraged at this usurpation of his authority by a judge—
even one whom he had appointed. He immediately demonstrated his contempt 
for the finality of judicial interpretation.187 Jefferson secured an opinion from 
his Attorney General, Caesar A. Rodney, that controverted Johnson’s statement 
of the law.188 Jefferson then distributed Rodney’s opinion widely to the press 
and to the collectors of revenue. The latter were instructed to ignore Johnson’s 
opinion and to follow the President’s instructions. The press reported that 
collectors were following the Attorney General’s opinion rather than Johnson’s. 
But Gallatin was not so sure. Mandamus was the least of the collectors’ 
litigation worries. Recognizing that liability in damages was a much larger 
problem, Gallatin wrote to Jefferson, “we cannot expect that the collectors 
generally will risk all they are worth in doubtful cases.”189 
b. Juries and Judges in Federal and State Courts  
Gallatin’s fear that collectors would be swayed by the prospect of suit in 
state court was far from fanciful. He had proposed legislation protecting 
collectors by putting all embargo-related litigation in the federal courts and by 
 
184.  Gilchrist, 10 F. Cas. at 356. 
185.  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
186.  For discussion of Gilchrist and the reactions to it, see 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 324-38. 
187.  Jefferson’s consistent position was not that the judiciary had no final authority to determine 
the meaning of laws, including the Constitution, for purposes of deciding particular cases, 
but that this power was shared equally with the other branches of government when they 
were carrying out their constitutional functions. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE 
PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 151-52 (Jefferson & His Time vol. 4, 1970); 1 
WARREN, supra note 84, at 264-67. 
188.  See Letter from C.A. Rodney, Attorney Gen., to President Thomas Jefferson (July 15, 1808), 
reprinted in 1 AM. L.J. 429, 433-39 (1808).  
189.  1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 338 (quoting Gallatin).  
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providing immunity from a suit for damages if the collector obtained a 
Treasury certification of the reasonableness of his actions. Congress responded 
by providing only that collectors would be protected if they were carrying out 
the statute or any general rules or instructions issued by the President. This left 
it to state courts and state-empanelled juries to determine the validity of the 
collector’s defense. That collectors would view this defense as a thin reed is 
surely understandable. State courts had gone so far as to issue injunctions and 
writs of mandamus against collectors ordering them to release detained 
vessels.190 And juries refused to convict many who evaded the law, even when 
the cases were tried in federal court. John Quincy Adams wrote to W.B. Giles 
concerning the situation in Massachusetts: “There may be impediments to 
execution (of the laws) besides those known to the Constitution. . . . [T]he 
District Court, after sitting seven or eight weeks and trying upward of forty 
cases, has at length adjourned. Not one instance has occurred of a conviction 
by jury.”191 
The problems that Gallatin and Adams identified involved a complex and 
changing set of legal relations between federal and state jurisdictions and 
between judges and juries in the determination of law and fact. In the 
implementation of the embargo, these questions interacted to make successful 
judicial enforcement problematic at best and to render energetic administrative 
enforcement hazardous to an officer’s pocketbook. We will consider 
enforcement first, then official liability. 
Enforcement in federal court was of two types: libels in admiralty for 
forfeiture of ships and cargos, and civil actions for the forfeiture of bonds and 
civil penalties. The difference was highly consequential. Admiralty actions were 
tried by the court without a jury; civil actions were jury trials. Douglas Jones 
investigated the results of enforcement actions in Massachusetts in 1808 and 
1809.192 All were in the court of Judge Davis, the Federalist judge who had so 
strongly endorsed the constitutionality of the embargo in The William.193 In 
cases decided by Davis alone, most resulted in conviction, either by judicial 
determination after trial or because the defending parties pleaded “no contest.” 
 
190.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 458-59. 
191.  3 WORTHINGTON CHAUNCEY FORD, WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 287-88 (N.Y., 
MacMillan 1809). 
192.  See Douglas Lamar Jones, “The Caprice of Juries”: The Enforcement of the Jeffersonian Embargo 
in Massachusetts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307 (1980). 
193.  See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 




Federal juries during the same period brought in twelve convictions while 
awarding fifty-three acquittals.194 
Given these numbers, a legal struggle over the reach of admiralty 
jurisdiction and the role of juries in admiralty and in civil actions was 
predictable. A number of technical arguments were available. The famous 
admiralty provisions of section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 reserved “to 
suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law 
is competent to give it.”195 And even before encountering issues concerning the 
enforcement of the embargo of 1807-1809, the Supreme Court had been given 
two major opportunities to try to draw the boundary between admiralty and 
the common law.196 According to that jurisprudence, admiralty jurisdiction 
applied to offenses against navigation acts when (1) the suit was in rem (i.e., 
based on a seizure of property); (2) the offense occurred wholly on water; and 
(3) the legislation imposed only civil penalties. 
Under these criteria, respondents seeking a common law jury trial could 
argue as a factual matter that the offense involved was partially land-based or 
took place on inland waters that did not qualify at that time as within the 
maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. They could argue as a legal matter 
that the embargo was intended as criminal legislation. Indeed, there was 
respectable opinion that admiralty practice itself included jury trials because 
English practice, from which ours was drawn, treated violations of revenue, 
trade, or navigation statutes as offenses tried by jury in the Court of 
Exchequer.197 The creation of new vice-admiralty courts that could try such 
cases without a jury was one of the crucial grievances that set the colonies on 
the course to revolution.198 
The role of the jury in civil cases at common law was also hotly contested. 
In colonial practice juries had frequently decided issues of both law and fact.199 
 
194.  Jones, supra note 192, at 326 n.68; see also 3 FORD, supra note 191, at 287 (noting that there 
were no jury convictions in 1808). 
195.  An Act To Establish the Judicial Courts of the United Sates, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).  
196.  See United States v. The Schooner Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443 (1808); United 
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); see also United States v. Schooner Sally, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 406 (1804). 
197.  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 349-50 (photo. reprint 1970) (N.Y., O. 
Halsted 1826). 
198.  See AMMERMAN, supra note 58, at 64-67. 
199.  See Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of the Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 605-06 
(1939); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT 
OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 3-4 (1975) (describing juries 
as deciding law); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated 
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592 (1993) (noting that juries in the colonies were “the chief 
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By 1808 that situation was in transition, with judges increasingly claiming the 
authority to instruct juries on the law.200 This more general legal dispute about 
the role of the jury also affected legal struggles in embargo cases. Samuel 
Dexter, for example, the losing attorney on the constitutional issue in The 
William, continued to argue the constitutional question to juries in common 
law enforcement proceedings, notwithstanding Judge Davis’s threat to hold 
him in contempt.201 And, of course, general jury verdicts did not distinguish 
between findings of law and those of fact. There is no way to know how many 
of those Massachusetts jury acquittals or refusals to indict were based on the 
juries’ opinion that the embargo was an unconstitutional infringement of 
liberty of commerce. 
While jury nullification made enforcement of the embargo difficult in 
federal courts, the liability of federal officers responsible for enforcement was 
wholly in the hands of juries and was tried almost exclusively in state courts. 
Officers had no immunity for legal or factual error unless it was provided by 
statute. And although the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for removal 
jurisdiction, it did not provide the federal courts with either general federal 
question jurisdiction or special jurisdiction for suits against federal officers.202 
Hence, most common law actions against enforcement officials in state court 
were not removable. Moreover, as Justice Johnson had held in Ex parte 
Gilchrist, instructions from superiors, including the President, would not 
protect an officer found to lack authority under the statute.203 
 
assessors of legal claims and the primary enforcers of legal rights for their communities”). 
As John Adams put it, “It is not only [a juror’s] right but his Duty . . . to find the Verdict 
according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and Conscience, tho in Direct 
opposition to the Direction of the Court.” John Adams, Adams’ Diary Notes on the Right of 
Juries (Feb. 12, 1771), in 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 228, 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller 
B. Zobel eds., 1965). 
200.  An important case to this effect was decided in Massachusetts in 1808. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 
Mass. (3 Tyng) 1 (1808); see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860, at 141-43 (1977). 
201.  See 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 345 n.2. Warren had the legal context wrong, but the basic 
story is apparently correct. See Jones, supra note 192, at 321 n.49.  
202.  The one exception during the Jeffersonian period was a provision in the 1815 Non-
Intercourse Act permitting removal to federal court of suits against revenue officers for 
conduct involving the enforcement of that statute. An Act To Prohibit Intercourse with the 
Enemy, and for Other Purposes, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198 (1815). 
203.  See 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420). In this, Johnson was following recent 
Supreme Court precedent, see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), a 
circumstance that may partially explain Jefferson’s appeal to his Attorney General, rather 
than to the Supreme Court, for an opinion.  




In January 1809, in section 10 of the Enforcement Act, Congress made a 
halting step toward moving judicial review out of the context of state court 
damage actions and into federal court jurisdiction free of jury determination. 
Persons aggrieved by seizures of ships or property were given a special action 
in federal court against the seizing officer to seek release of their property via 
summary process. Prevailing petitioners recovered their goods; losers paid the 
collector treble his court costs.204 
This potentially expeditious procedure might have enticed parties into 
federal court. But note what the statute omitted. Federal court jurisdiction was 
not exclusive; common law actions in state court remained available. And in 
those actions the statute merely allowed the collector to “plead the general 
issue, and give this act and the instructions and regulations of the President in 
evidence, for his justification and defence.”205 Gallatin’s proposals for exclusive 
federal jurisdiction and for Treasury determination of reasonable grounds for 
seizure were rejected by a Congress that, in the same statute, authorized the 
President to enforce the law by using the Army or state militias. Attachment to 
state court protection of private rights against federal administrators remained 
strong. 
The risk to collectors, and to their willingness to enforce the law, was thus 
hardly a figment of Gallatin’s imagination. We have already encountered 
William Otis, who had to appeal to the Supreme Court three times to avoid 
liability in just one case.206 White has also recounted the travails of David 
Gelston,207 appointed collector for the port of New York in 1802. While gaining 
$37,000 through his share of the value of seized property during his eighteen 
years of service, he lost $107,000 in only one of the lawsuits brought against 
him complaining of wrongful seizures. Gelston was known as a vigilant officer 
but hardly a swashbuckling wielder of the sword of federal authority. One 
congressional report said that “[w]hile any thing was left to the discretion or 
judgment of Mr. Gelston, he inquired, examined, reported, but made no 
seizure.”208 
The only remedy for officers like Otis and Gelston when found personally 
responsible by state courts was to throw themselves on the mercy of Congress. 
But the claims committees were not necessarily merciful and were always slow. 
 
204.  See Enforcement Act, ch. 5, § 10, 2 Stat. 506, 509-10 (1809). 
205.  Id. (emphasis added). 
206.  See supra notes 170, 175, 178 and accompanying text. Otis was so harassed that at one point 
he fled the country. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 156 n.31. 
207.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 153-56. 
208.  H.R. DOC. NO. 169-1, at 1 (1818). 
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In response to one of Gelston’s claims for reimbursement, Congress delivered 
the following dictum: 
While the Government has important rights which are to be duly 
regarded, the citizen has his rights, which should not be overlooked nor 
forgotten in our zeal to enforce the laws. If an officer will wantonly and 
without probable cause seize upon the property of an individual who is 
engaged in carrying on a lawful commerce, he ought to be made to 
respond in the courts of justice for the injury inflicted, without the 
most remote prospect that he will be remunerated by the Government 
whose laws he has violated by oppressing one of her citizens.209 
This in a case in which Gelston had lost in court because of a key witness’s 
refusal to testify and had appealed to Congress without substantiating records 
because they were lost when the British burned Washington in 1814. In other 
instances, Gelston, or rather his estate, belatedly obtained some congressional 
relief. Having left office in 1820, his accounts were finally settled in 1842.210 
In the face of these obvious disincentives to energetic official action, why 
did the system of judicial review of federal official action by juries in state 
common law damage actions persist? A modern answer might emphasize the 
peculiar incentive structure of federal officeholding. Collectors like Otis and 
Gelston, along with scores of other officials, were compensated wholly or in 
part by fees and commissions. This system incentivized diligence and 
promoted action. The prospect of damages for malfeasance, by promoting 
caution, made the incentives symmetrical—more or less. 
But the better explanation probably lies in history and political ideology. 
The jury was a bulwark of protection against official oppression for colonial 
Americans subjected to rule from afar. The Crown could manipulate admiralty 
court jurisdiction to avoid juries and protect officers, as it had done in the 
Stamp Act.211 But as long as common law courts remained open, juries could 
provide a check on arbitrary officials.212 
This history informed the Anti-Federalist opposition to a federal judiciary 
and shaped the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, not to mention the 
Sixth and Seventh Amendments, which preserve state court jurisdiction and 
the right to jury trial.213 Jeffersonian Republicans were the direct descendants 
 
209.  H.R. REP. NO. 23-276, at 2 (1834), quoted in WHITE, supra note 15, at 155. 
210.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 155 & n.29. 
211.  OLIVER M. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 212 (1951). 
212.  HORWITZ, supra note 200, at 28.  
213.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1322-24 and sources cited therein. 




of the Anti-Federalists. While Federalist Congresses had made some movement 
toward protecting officials from damages when their acts, although illegal, 
were taken with probable or reasonable cause,214 Republican Congresses were 
ideologically inclined to distrust both executive discretion and judicial 
judgment. Jefferson could lead them to compromise their ideological 
commitments to experiment with the embargo—a regime that ultimately 
authorized the exercise of administrative discretion of a breadth and force 
almost unique in American history. But Congress balked when asked to limit 
official accountability to the people through jury trial.215 
D. The Embargo and the Development of Administrative Law 
Several important developments have already been mentioned: the extreme 
“presidentialism” of the embargo system; Justice Johnson’s insistence that 
Congress’s statutory allocation of decisional authority trumped any inherent 
power of the President to instruct subordinates; Jefferson’s “nonacquiescence” 
in Johnson’s ruling; Chief Justice Marshall’s tentative development of the idea 
that the conferral of administrative discretion implicitly demanded reasoned 
and reasonable exercise of that discretion; and the potentially devastating effect 
of judicial review of federal official conduct in the form of state common law 
actions tried before local juries.  
At a more general level, the embargo experience demonstrates a recurring 
pattern in the competition between administration and legality. The law can 
often function only through administration. But administrative discretion is at 
war with law. And both courts and administrators instinctively seek to bring 
discretion under control. Courts faced with claims of individual rights are loath 
to find that the law is powerless in the face of administrative malfeasance. 
Administrators, because of the imperatives of responsible administration, 
shrink from unconstrained discretion vested in themselves and fear the 
centrifugal effects of discretion vested in subordinates. If for no reason other 
than self-protection, they often seek to establish guidelines for their own 
discretionary judgments. And they inevitably construct supervisory routines 
and modes of instruction to bend peripheral discretion toward centralized 
control.  
This tendency to make discretion answerable both hierarchically and legally 
is prominent in the story of the embargo’s implementation. Jefferson was given 
 
214.  Id. at 1330. 
215.  Protection from state courts, but not from juries, was provided for customs collectors in 
1817. See An Act To Continue in Force an Act, Entitled “An Act Further To Provide for the 
Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage,” ch. 109, 3 Stat. 396 (1817). 
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enormous statutory discretion under the embargo statutes, but one of his first 
acts was to issue an interpretation limiting his own authority.216 He delegated 
much of his decisional authority to Gallatin, as Secretary of the Treasury, but 
with a clear default rule for doubtful cases. And Gallatin energetically 
employed the system of Treasury circulars and instruction letters that 
Alexander Hamilton had pioneered in the early years of national revenue 
collection217 to guide the actions of collectors scattered throughout the ports of 
the eastern seaboard. 
But internal administrative attempts at lawfulness, at creating an internal 
law of administration through administrative direction, almost inevitably run 
afoul—at some point—of the external understanding of the law in Congress or 
in the courts. During the embargo episode, Congress complied to a large 
degree but still resisted some requests for authority that grew out of what the 
administrators viewed as administrative imperatives. These instances of 
congressional recalcitrance largely involved the administration’s request for 
protection from the other guardian of lawfulness, the judiciary. 
Here real conflict arose. The courts demanded strict conformity with 
statutes in the prosecution of forfeiture actions. And Justice Johnson resisted 
the unifying authority of presidential direction when he believed that the 
statute provided no such authority. Jefferson’s nonacquiescence in the court’s 
ruling reveals for the first time in American administrative history the critical 
question that lies at the core of our idea of the rule of law in a government of 
separated powers: when implementation of law is divided between 
administrators and courts, whose understanding of the law should prevail? 
The participants in this early struggle over the meaning of government 
according to law could no more definitively resolve that question than others 
have been able to do in the subsequent two centuries. 
The judicial instinct to cabin administrative discretion is evident in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s prescient equation of administrative legality with 
reasonableness and reason-giving. Marshall’s view—that a statute conferring 
discretion and subjecting it to executive review implicitly contained at least a 
requirement to give reasons for the action when the actor was called to account 
in court—was, however, ahead of its time. His colleagues were focused instead 
on authority to decide—what Richard Stewart famously labeled the 
 
216.  In sharply limiting the scope of a recently passed statute by news release, Jefferson perhaps 
initiated the practice of presidential “signing statements” that a recent ABA report credits to 
his protégé James Monroe. See TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS & THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT 7 (2006). 
217.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1307. 




“transmission belt” theory of legality.218 Revenue officials and U.S. Attorneys 
could in some instances plead the “reasonableness” of their actions to a judge 
who might hold them harmless in a damage action or on a motion for court 
costs even though their conduct had been unauthorized or their prosecution 
unsuccessful.219 But these were exceptional statutory provisions that apparently 
suggested no general principle of “reasonableness” to the legal mind of the 
early nineteenth century. 
At the same time, experience with the enforcement of the embargo 
provided graphic evidence of the potential for jury trials and common law 
damage actions to defeat effective administration. Congress surely understood 
this potential; Gallatin pointed it out in the administration’s request for 
protective legislation. Congress’s refusal to provide protection for federal 
officials from state courts and common law juries tells us something about the 
understanding of governance according to law in the Republican era—but 
what? 
I suggested earlier that the answer lay in the role of the jury as a buffer 
between citizens and officials in Anti-Federalist and Republican ideology. That 
is surely a partial answer. But the role of the common law as the ultimate 
protector of individual liberty was hardly the partisan prejudice of Jeffersonian 
Republicans, or indeed of early-nineteenth-century Americans. A.V. Dicey 
famously proclaimed as late as 1939 that subjecting officials to the common 
law’s requirements in ordinary courts was the very essence of maintaining the 
rule of law in England and in countries, like the United States, that derived 
“their civilisation from English sources.”220 
The Republican Congress that rejected Gallatin’s pleas was part of a legal 
world that was not ours. That legal world seems to have had no categories 
within which to work out a system of judicial review that “balanced” the 
demands of administrative efficiency against judicial protection of private 
rights to produce a nuanced approach to judicial control of administrative 
action. That is, perhaps, why Marshall’s suggestion that a collector’s opinion 
about a ship’s intentions might be reviewed for reasonableness and might 
require reasons, while utterly familiar and routine for us, seems to have 
attracted no support among his colleagues.221 A claim of public authority was 
simply a special defense that might be offered by an “official” sued as a private 
 
218.  Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 
1676 (1975). 
219.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1330. 
220.  DICEY, supra note 39, at 330. 
221.  See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.  
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individual. If the official acted correctly, he had legal authority to act and was 
protected. If he made a mistake, he had no authority and was liable.  
No one imagined that suit could be brought against the United States or 
the Treasury Department for the actions of a local revenue collector. Congress’s 
tepid response to Gallatin’s request for a Treasury-authorized reasonableness 
defense for collectors—a statutory, nonexclusive, federal court remedy to 
release impounded property—provided an action that was still to be brought 
against the officer individually. Relief against the government was provided 
only via internal administrative appeal to the Secretary for release of property 
or remittance of a forfeiture. 
This system of common law remedies could underprotect private rights as 
well as disable administration. For while the system of common law remedies 
produced de novo review via jury trials in the enforcement of the embargo, in 
the public lands context, to which we shall soon turn, common law remedies in 
the form of property actions tended to make the decisions of administrative 
tribunals final. Judicial review was limited to claims of lack of jurisdiction. And 
here, once again, reasonableness was irrelevant. 
This “jurisdictional” approach was not confined to public lands cases. 
United States v. Morris222 arose out of the nonimportation statute that 
superseded the embargo. Morris was a U.S. Marshal for the Southern District 
of New York who had been ordered by the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Maine to sell certain goods and chattels that had been condemned in an 
enforcement action in that court. However, before Morris could sell the goods 
and remit the proceeds to the United States (to be shared between the United 
States and the collector and the surveyor for the port of Portland), the 
Secretary of the Treasury granted the ship owner’s petition for a remission of 
the forfeiture. Morris then returned the vessel and its cargo to its owners. 
The collector and surveyor brought suit against Morris, on their own 
behalf and on behalf of the United States, seeking the value of the vessel and 
cargo. Morris responded by pleading both “the general issue and a special plea 
in justification, that the forfeitures had been remitted by the Secretary of the 
Treasury.”223 The plaintiffs responded that the Secretary of the Treasury had 
no authority to remit a forfeiture after the judgment of a district court and that, 
in any event, Morris’s plea could not be effective because he had not indicated 
the justification and the factual basis for the Secretary’s approval of the owner’s 
petition for remission. The district court held for Morris, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed. 
 
222.  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 246 (1825). 
223.  Id. at 248. 




Justice Thompson’s opinion for the Court made clear that the statute 
providing the Secretary with authority to remit remained effective as long as 
the forfeited goods had not been sold and their proceeds distributed. More 
important for our purposes, Thompson thought that the grounds upon which 
the Secretary had acted were irrelevant and, therefore, need not have been 
pleaded by Morris in his answer. In Thompson’s words: 
It is not competent for any other tribunal, collaterally, to call in 
question the competency of the evidence, or its sufficiency, to procure 
the remission. The Secretary of the Treasury is, by the law, made the 
exclusive judge of these facts, and there is no appeal from his 
decision. . . . If the plea, by setting out the warrant at large, contains, as 
I have endeavoured to show, an averment, that a statement of facts had 
been transmitted to the Secretary by the proper officer, as required by 
the law, it was all that was necessary. This gave the Secretary 
cognisance of the case, and which was sufficient to give him 
jurisdiction. But what effect that statement of facts would, or ought to 
have, upon his opinion, whether the forfeiture was incurred without 
wilful negligence, or any intention of fraud, is a matter that could not 
be inquired into.224 
This case, along with the embargo cases denying that collectors needed 
reasonable grounds for their opinions when seizing vessels, suggests a judicial 
tendency to treat administrators by strong analogy either to legislatures or to 
courts. If administrators acted within their authority, they were like 
legislatures, which did not need to give reasons for their determinations, or like 
coordinate tribunals, reviewable only for jurisdictional error. But the hapless 
official who was shown to have misgauged his authority had the same liability 
as a private party.225 
Some non-barking dogs are worth considering as well. While the popular 
and judicial consideration of the constitutionality of the embargo focused on 
congressional power to act under the Commerce Clause, the war powers 
provisions, the inherent sovereignty of the nation, and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, little attention (save in Congress226) was given to the 
constitutionality of delegating sweeping powers to the President to waive the 
 
224.  Id. at 284-85.  
225.  Exceptions to this system were occasionally provided by statute. For example, limited 
protection was afforded revenue officers who enforced the Non-Intercourse Acts 
accompanying the War of 1812. See An Act To Prohibit Intercourse with the Enemy, and for 
Other Purposes, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198 (1815). 
226.  See CURRIE, supra note 17, at 148. 
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application of the embargo’s prohibitions in particular cases or to suspend its 
operations in whole or in part. The summary seizure powers of collectors and 
naval officers and the ex parte review of those seizures by the President or his 
delegate seem not to have been challenged as due process violations. 
The lack of due process concerns may be easily explained. Summary seizure 
of property for violation of revenue or navigation acts was customary in 
England, in the colonies, and in the states and the national government after 
the Revolution.227 Indeed, it is customary today.228 And, as we have seen, under 
the embargo there were ample post-seizure opportunities for an aggrieved 
owner to try both facts and law before a court, either in an enforcement or in a 
damage action. The necessities of enforcement easily justified ex parte 
administrative action. 
As a theoretical matter, the nondelegation issue may be of more moment. 
Although that principle is honored much more in the breach than in the 
observance,229 somewhat similar presidential powers to regulate wages and 
prices have faced stiff nondelegation challenges in times of both war230 and 
peace.231 But as a practical matter, the issue never came up except in Congress. 
Jefferson never exercised the suspension power. Disappointed petitioners for a 
presidential waiver neither wanted to attack the constitutionality of the 
President’s authority nor had standing to complain of permission granted to 
others. Plaintiffs pursuing collectors for damages seem to have been content to 
challenge the way discretion was exercised, not the constitutionality of 
delegating that discretion in the first instance. And nothing in the Marshall 
Court’s jurisprudence suggested that a nondelegation claim would receive a 
particularly hospitable reception. 
In The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,232 the Court upheld a 
delegation, under the subsequent Non-Intercourse Acts, of presidential 
authority to determine by proclamation whether Great Britain and France had 
revoked or modified their edicts such that “they shall cease to violate the 
 
227.  See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 272-80 
(1855). 
228.  See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350 (1978) (describing the 
power to collect taxes by levy as “essential” to the tax system). 
229.  Cass Sunstein’s quip that the nondelegation doctrine has had only one good year in the 
Supreme Court and over 200 bad ones is surely apt. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“We might say that the conventional doctrine has had 
one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”). 
230.  See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
231.  See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971). 
232.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). 




neutral commerce of the United States.”233 Justice Johnson’s opinion for the 
Court dismissed as almost frivolous the notion that Congress could not make 
the operation of a statute depend upon a condition while delegating to the 
President the determination of whether that condition had occurred.234 But the 
Non-Intercourse Acts did not provide the President with the authority to pick 
and choose among the provisions that would be suspended or extended. 
The only other nondelegation case decided by the Marshall Court is hardly 
more instructive. Wayman v. Southard upheld a delegation of authority to the 
courts to adopt rules and procedures to govern their own operations.235 While 
articulating the idea that Congress could not delegate to others “powers which 
are strictly and exclusively legislative,” Marshall stated baldly that “Congress 
may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully 
exercise itself.”236 In typical fashion, Marshall made no attempt to distinguish 
between powers that were exclusively legislative and those that were not, nor 
did he bother citing The Cargo of the Brig Aurora. While Currie’s studies of 
constitutional debates in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century 
Congresses reveal that those debates were punctuated by repeated assertions of 
the nondelegation principle,237 the early Supreme Court maintained an almost 
studied indifference to protecting Congress from itself. 
Of the administrative law developments engendered by the embargo 
experiment, Johnson’s opinion and Jefferson’s nonacquiescence in it perhaps 
excite the greatest interest from twenty-first-century administrative lawyers. 
The “unitary executive” debate and the virtues or vices of “presidential 
administration” are hot topics for us and seem destined to remain so.238 
Johnson’s opinion suggests an understanding of the President’s inherent 
directive power that is decidedly unfriendly to strong unitarianism. Congress 
had lodged discretionary authority in the collectors and there it would stay 
until changed by statute, as it was in the 1809 Enforcement Act. As Kevin Stack 
has recently argued, Johnson’s position is supported by congressional practice 
 
233.  Id. at 383 (citing An Act To Interdict the Commercial Intercourse Between the United States 
and Great Britain and France, and Their Dependencies; and for Other Purposes, ch. 24, 2 
Stat. 528, 530 (1809)). 
234.  Id. at 388. 
235.  23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). 
236.  Id. at 42-43. 
237.  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, 
at 73-74, 109, 146-49, 160, 186-87, 244-48, 255 (1997); CURRIE, supra note 17, at 148, 152-53, 
313. 
238.  See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers To Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 263 (2006), and sources cited therein. 
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both then and now and by persuasive concerns for maintaining an appropriate 
balance between legislative and executive authority.239  
Jefferson’s refusal to accept the Court’s position was equally consistent 
with presidential claims of authority throughout American history. At the time, 
the Federalist press denounced Jefferson’s actions as further evidence of his 
disrespect for the law, his intent to destroy judicial independence, and the 
tyranny of the embargo.240 To be sure, Jefferson’s position, supported by 
Attorney General Rodney’s opinion, directly contradicted Marshall’s dicta in 
Marbury v. Madison241 that mandamus would lie against even the highest 
national officers to require the performance of nondiscretionary duties. But 
these statements were dicta, and Johnson did not even cite Marbury in 
Gilchrist.242 
Rodney’s opinion, however, did cite Marbury—for the proposition that the 
1789 Judiciary Act had, albeit unconstitutionally, conferred original mandamus 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, not on district or circuit courts.243 And 
Johnson, in one written defense of his opinion, came very close to conceding 
this point.244 So Jefferson and Rodney had a reasonable, if technical, argument 
that collectors could legally ignore writs of mandamus issued to them by lower 
federal courts. 
But that technical jurisdictional argument sidesteps the larger issues of the 
constitutional position of the President in executing the law. Does the 
President have inherent constitutional authority to direct lower-level officials’ 
actions under any statute, not just those explicitly delegating enforcement 
responsibility to the President himself? Should a President, or any responsible 
administrator for that matter, comply with lower court interpretations of the 
law with which he disagrees? 
On the latter question one might certainly argue that the administration’s 
most appropriate path would have been an appeal to the Supreme Court. But 
such an appeal would have taken months, and might have taken years. 
Meanwhile collectors needed instruction about whether to follow the 
presidential directives contained in Gallatin’s circulars or their own opinions 
concerning statutory interpretation. A directive maintaining the administration’s 
 
239.  See id. at 316-22.  
240.  See 1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 331-33. 
241.  See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168-71 (1803).  
242.  See 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5420). 
243.  1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 330; Letter from C.A. Rodney to President Thomas Jefferson, 
supra note 188, reprinted in 1 AM. L.J. 429, 435 (1808). 
244.  1 WARREN, supra note 84, at 335. 




power of direction, under the relatively extreme circumstances of the embargo, 
was at least prudent and probably essential. Nor was Jefferson simply waging 
ideological warfare against the judiciary. 
Jefferson explained the necessity for uniform rules, and his specific reasons 
for rejecting Johnson’s position in Gilchrist, in a letter to Governor Pinckney.245 
The letter emphasized crucial rule of law values that are as familiar today as 
Jefferson seemed to believe they should have been then. First, Congress could 
not anticipate all of the ways in which the embargo might be evaded. 
Administrative discretion was necessary. But if that discretion were left to the 
collectors individually, the law would not be uniformly enforced; citizens 
would be treated unequally and, indeed, might be subjected to biased 
 
245.  Jefferson wrote: 
The Legislature having found, after repeated trials, that no general rules could 
be formed which fraud and avarice would not elude, concluded to leave, in those 
who were to execute the power, a discretionary power paramount to all their 
general rules. This discretion was of necessity lodged with the collector in the first 
instance, but referred, finally, to the President, lest there should be as many 
measures of law or discretion for our citizens as there were collectors of districts. 
In order that the first decisions by the collectors might also be as uniform as 
possible, and that the inconveniences of temporary detention might be imposed 
by general and equal rules throughout the States, we thought it advisable to draw 
some outlines for the government of the discretion of the collectors, and to bring 
them all to one tally. 
With this view they were advised to consider all shipments of flour prima 
facie, as suspicious. . . .  
But your collector seems to have decided for himself that, instead of a general 
rule applicable equally to all, the personal character of the shipper was a better 
criterion, and his own individual opinion too, of that character.  
You will see at once to what this would have led in the hands of a[] hundred 
collectors . . . and what grounds would have been given for the malevolent 
charges of favoritism with which the federal papers have reproached even the 
trust we reposed in the first and highest magistrates of particular States . . . . The 
declaration of Mr. Theus, that he did not consider the case as suspicious, founded 
on his individual opinion of the shipper, broke down that barrier which we had 
endeavored to erect against favoritism, and furnished the grounds for the 
subsequent proceedings. The attorney for the United States seems to have 
considered the acquiescence of the collector as dispensing with any particular 
attentions to the case, and the judge to have taken it as a case agreed between 
plaintiff and defendant, and brought to him only formally to be placed on his 
records. But this question has too many important bearings on the constitutional 
organization of our government, to let it go off so carelessly. I send you the 
Attorney General’s opinion on it, formed on great consideration and consultation. 
It is communicated to the collectors and marshals for their future government.  
Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Governor Charles Pinckney, supra note 127, at 
102-04. 
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administration. Unified control by hierarchical superiors was therefore 
essential. Second, these principles of the constitutional organization of the 
government should not be treated as having been decided finally in a lawsuit 
that seemed to have been arranged between the parties, rather than after the 
serious consideration reflected in the enclosed opinion by Attorney General 
Romney.  
The President bore the responsibility under the statutes and the 
Constitution for effective and uniform enforcement of the law. And Gallatin 
was energetically attempting to carry out that responsibility. From their 
perspective, controlling and guiding lower-level exercises of discretion was the 
essence of effective, impartial, and lawful administration. Most administrators 
would agree. Hence, executive nonacquiescence in the decisions of one or 
several lower court decisions, pioneered by Jefferson in the administration of 
the embargo, has persisted—along with dire predictions that it undermines 
rather than reinforces the rule of law.246 
The broader issue of presidential directive authority remains similarly 
vexed. Arguably, the Supreme Court had already decided this question in Little 
v. Barreme.247 But while the Court’s opinion clearly established that an 
executive direction cannot, through misconstruction of a statute, immunize 
official action that would otherwise be unlawful, the misconstruction in that 
case was very clear. The statute authorized the seizure of vessels sailing to 
French ports, not vessels sailing from them, as the seized vessel had been. The 
seizing officer, by way of defense, offered specific instructions from the 
President that covered vessels both going and coming. Hence, while the officer 
had made a further mistake, seizing a Danish vessel thinking it to be American, 
the Court concluded that his actions could not have been justified even if the 
vessel had been of American origin.248 By contrast, the instructions that 
Jefferson provided under the Embargo Act could have been read as simply 
narrowing the discretion of customs officials by telling them on what basis to 
form an opinion that a vessel intended to violate the embargo. There is surely a 
much stronger argument that the President had an inherent authority to 
provide that sort of direction.  
 
246.  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989); Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit 
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 
YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against 
Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990); see also Dan T. Coenen, The 
Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (1991). 
247.  6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
248.  See id. at 178-79.  




Note, moreover, that the historical record seems barren of any claim of 
inherent executive authority to regulate foreign commerce, even though the 
embargo was motivated entirely by foreign affairs concerns and was explicitly 
justified as a substitute for war. Jefferson never claimed that the initial 
embargo statute—combined with the Take Care Clause or his powers as 
Commander in Chief—authorized him to deploy whatever means necessary to 
make it effective. Instead he returned to Congress again and again to seek 
additional authority—and to divest himself of permit authority (to repatriate 
goods in foreign ports) that he felt compelled to exercise but that threatened 
effective enforcement. One wonders what Jefferson and his contemporaries 
would make of the twenty-first-century claims of executive prerogative 
emanating from George W. Bush’s White House.249  
In any event, the repeal of the embargo signaled not only the end of that 
experiment, but also the eclipse of virtually any form of “presidentialism” in 
administration for the remainder of the Jeffersonian-Republican period. 
Jefferson lost his power to lead Congress and his party before he left office.250 
His Republican successors seem never to have had it. The Republican Party 
had always been a loose ideological grouping subject to factional strife and 
regional tensions. And its dedication to limited government at the national 
level meant that the usual carrots and sticks—patronage and support for local 
projects at national expense (or exclusion from those electoral benefits)—were 
largely unavailable to Republican presidents seeking to maintain party unity. 
Jefferson had been successful largely through charm and reputation. But 
none of his successors had his stature or his social skills, and, in any event, they 
were operating in a changed environment. New states expanded the 
membership in Congress beyond the limits of dinner-table diplomacy. And the 
intense competition for the favor of the party nominating caucus among 
presidential hopefuls further fractured Congress into warring camps. Indeed, 
because that competition often involved cabinet secretaries, who were also 
dependent on Congress for authority and funding, loss of power in Congress 
translated rapidly into loss of presidential control over the executive branch. 
Political control of administration shifted to Congress and its committees.251 
 
249.  E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National 
Security Agency Described by the President 1-3, 28-36 (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf. 
250.  On the closing months of Jefferson’s second term, see generally MALONE, supra note 131, at 
527-670. 
251.  The dynamics of power in Congress and in the executive branch during the Jeffersonian-
Republican period are ably dissected in JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON 
COMMUNITY, 1800-1828, at 213-49 (1966).  
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While the President and the Treasury worked out implementation of the 
embargo using the broad authority granted by a compliant Congress, that 
same Treasury (and after 1812, its General Land Office) sold the public lands 
pursuant to detailed federal statutes and subject to intense oversight by an ever 
more vigilant Congress. 
ii. bureaucratizing land 
Beyond desires for limited government and noncoercive implementation—
desires much in evidence in the resistance to the embargo—Republicans prized 
two further principles that were highly salient to all administration: 
congressional control of policy, and governmental economy. Acting on the first 
yielded highly detailed legislation, constant legislative revision of ineffective 
policies that could not be modified by administrative action, and incessant 
congressional demands for reports on administrative costs and implementation. 
Honoring the second led to underfunding, understaffing, and enormously 
time-consuming accounting requirements.252 In combination, these legislative 
tendencies made administration tedious, tardy, and inflexible. When put in the 
early-nineteenth-century context of a rapidly expanding population and 
territory, a rudimentary transportation system, and a citizenry imbued with the 
“frontier spirit,” faithful execution of Congress’s laws disposing of public lands 
took on some of the characteristics of Mission: Impossible. 
Surveying and selling the public lands were the largest and most difficult 
administrative tasks of the Republican era. The “public domain,” as it came to 
be called, was the result of state cessions of their land claims beyond the 
Alleghenies, the Louisiana Purchase, the Spanish cession of the Red River 
Basin, and the acquisition of East and West Florida. All together this public 
domain represented a vast reservoir of potential national wealth and provided a 
crucial outlet for the growth of the American population. It also posed a 
political and administrative challenge of the first importance.  
Alexander Hamilton had viewed the public lands primarily as a source of 
revenue and only secondarily as an opportunity for national expansion.253 But 
 
252.  White has discussed numerous examples of the administrative problems created by 
Republican congressional parsimony. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 188-89, 204-05, 235-36, 
294, 400. 
253.  Hamilton’s report to the House of Representatives on July 20, 1790, stated: 
[I]n the formation of a plan for the disposition of the vacant lands of the United 
States, there appear to be two leading objects of consideration: one, the facility of 
advantageous sales, according to the probable course of purchases; the other the 
accommodation of individuals now inhabiting the western country, or who may 




revenue from land sales was disappointing in the Federalist period,254 and the 
rapid development of the agrarian West, which would almost surely be a 
stronghold of Republican political sentiment, was not high on the list of 
Federalist political priorities. Jeffersonian Republicans took a very different 
view. Parceling out the public domain to settlers implemented Jefferson’s 
vision of a nation of virtuous small farmers.255 And land sales could not only 
make up for some of the revenue loss from the repeal of internal taxes, but 
could also produce government revenue without government coercion. The 
sale of public lands might simultaneously secure the Republican dream of an 
agrarian republic with an invisible government and no public debt. 
Selling off the public domain was crucially important for other reasons as 
well. Settlers were hardly waiting for the national government to get its act 
together. They were moving west. If these settlers were to be loyal citizens of 
 
hereafter emigrate thither. The former, as an operation of finance, claims primary 
attention; the latter is important, as it relates to the satisfaction of the inhabitants 
of the western country.  
Alexander Hamilton, Plan for Disposing of the Public Lands (July 20, 1790), in 1 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS 4, 4 (Walter Lowrie ed., Wash., D.C., Duff Green 1834), 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsp.html. Hamilton’s plan was oriented 
primarily at making sales attractive to large purchasers. He imagined that most sales would 
take place at a General Land Office located in the national capital. While some tracts would 
be set aside for small purchasers, he envisioned sale of whole townships, ten miles square, or 
in other quantities that might be sold by special contract. Id. 
Hamilton also suggested that controversies over rights or claims be determined by 
commissioners of the General Land Office who were specially appointed for this purpose. 
Their decisions would be final. His plan called for general statutory authorization to be filled 
in by rules adopted by the General Land Office and published in the official gazette of each 
state, and in a territorial gazette if one existed. He cautioned Congress that the 
commissioners would be responsible for carrying out the general policies or principles of the 
legislation, but that Congress should “leave room for accommodating to circumstances 
which cannot, beforehand, be accurately appreciated; and for varying the course of 
proceeding, as experience shall suggest to be proper.” Id. at 5. He worried that there would 
be “obstructions and embarrassments” in the execution of the land laws if Congress 
attempted to legislate “at greater precision and more exact detail.” Id. The first Treasury 
Secretary’s emphasis on sales of large tracts, administrative adjudication of claims, and 
broad executive policy discretion are in some sense the antithesis of Republican principles. 
254.  In 1800, for example, the last year of Federalist administration, only 67,800 acres of public 
lands were sold. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-78, pt. 1, at 430 (1975). 
255.  There is some question whether the policies adopted for the sale of the public domain 
primarily benefited small landholders rather than speculators who wanted to assemble 
larger tracts for investment. For an analysis of the role of speculation in the Midwest and the 
South, see PAUL W. GATES, LANDLORDS AND TENANTS ON THE PRAIRIE FRONTIER (1973) 
[hereinafter GATES, LANDLORDS]; and Paul Wallace Gates, Private Land Claims in the South, 
22 J. S. HIST. 183 (1956) [hereinafter Gates, Land Claims]. 
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the United States rather than agitators for secession or annexation by a foreign 
sovereign, they needed to hold valid title to their lands under a secure patent 
from the national government. If the U.S. government could not provide them 
with a valid claim to their property, they would surely be interested in some 
alternative governmental arrangement that could do so. 
Systematic surveying, sale, and titling of public lands also had military and 
foreign affairs implications. Settlement needed to be expanded, but it also 
needed to be limited to those lands where Indian titles had been cleared. 
Failure to do so would provoke skirmishes—perhaps large-scale Indian wars. 
The fledgling American government had also promised hundreds of 
thousands, perhaps millions, of acres of “bonus lands” to veterans of the 
Revolutionary War, a crucial incentive for enlistment and service in an army 
chronically incapable of meeting its payroll.256 And making good on these 
bonus promises was an important way to people the frontier with an already 
trained militia. Veteran settlers would be useful as a defense against Indian 
raids and as a buffer on the frontiers with Great Britain in the North and with 
Spain and France in the South and West. 
Finally, land hunger was epidemic in the early nineteenth century. Eastern 
farmers, who had exhausted the fertility of their lands, and recently arrived 
immigrants both wanted to move west. So did the veterans who had been 
promised substantial land bounties that had never been received. Men of 
means and influence were also eager to speculate in western lands. If the 
government could not satisfy the desires of all these citizens clamoring for the 
sale of public lands, it would be a political failure of considerable moment. 
The United States needed both an effective land policy and an efficient 
administrative system. It lacked both. The usually reliable and always 
interesting Henry Adams said in his biography of Gallatin: “The details of 
organization of the land system . . . implied much labor and minute attention, 
but they are not interesting, and they may be omitted here.”257 For Adams’s 
biographical purposes, he may have been correct, although the importance of 
land office business to his subject when he served as Secretary of the Treasury 
 
256.  See An Act To Revive and Continue in Force, an Act in Addition to an Act Intituled “An Act 
in Addition to an Act Regulating the Grants of Land Appropriated for Military Services and 
for the Society of the United Brethren for Propagating the Gospel Among the Heathen,” and 
for Other Purposes, ch. 30, § 4, 2 Stat. 236, 236 (1803); An Act in Addition to an Act 
Intituled “An Act Regulating the Grants of Land Appropriated for Military Services, and for 
the Society of the United Brethren for Propagating the Gospel Among the Heathen,” ch. 13, 
§ 5, 2 Stat. 14, 15 (1800) [hereinafter 1800 Land Grant Act]. 
257.  HENRY ADAMS, THE LIFE OF ALBERT GALLATIN 299 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott 1879). 




can hardly be overstated.258 But if one is interested in the life of the country and 
the development of its administrative systems, Adams’s omission should not be 
repeated. As one historian asserted in another context, “[W]ho will say that the 
operations of the land office at Marietta or at Zanesville are less worthy of the 
work of the historian than are events like the taking of Fort Ticonderoga or the 
battle of Bunker Hill?”259 
A. Land Policy 
Colonies that had sold public lands for revenue had generally used a 
flexible system. Their land offices or surveyors were given considerable 
discretion to negotiate the size of parcels sold and the price and terms of the 
sales. Following the advice of a report in which Jefferson had had a 
conspicuous role, the Continental Congress in 1785 adopted a much more 
bureaucratic approach. No land was to be sold until substantial parts of the 
public domain were surveyed. Surveyors were to use the range, township, and 
section system based on meridian lines that had been the general practice in 
New England. Land was to be sold in large lots at fixed prices and only at 
public auction.260 Through meticulous surveying and carefully recorded 
transfers, a sturdy system of land titles would bring stability and prosperity to 
the American West. As Edward Everett said in 1856, by this system “[t]he 
superficies of half a continent is thus transferred in miniature to the bureaus of 
Washington.”261 
Everett should have said “was eventually transferred.” The original system 
was ambitious, but its implementation was glacial. The Continental Congress 
compromised its policy almost immediately by selling large, unsurveyed tracts 
 
258.  Very early in the administration of the land office business as established by Congress in 
1800, Gallatin complained that the necessity to give opinions to field officers and to 
“examine and correctly to decide every doubtful case which may occur in the execution of 
the land law” was making it impossible for him to carry out his other duties as Secretary. 
But he did so for twelve years before Congress saw fit to provide any relief. MALCOLM J. 
ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837, at 48-49 (1968). 
259.  Louis Pelzer, The Public Domain as a Field for Historical Study, 12 IOWA J. HIST. & POL. 568, 
575 (1914), quoted in ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258, at x. 
260.  For a description of the development of the 1785 ordinance, see PAYSON JACKSON TREAT, 
THE NATIONAL LAND SYSTEM 1785-1820, at 41-65 (1910). 
261.  EDWARD EVERETT, The Uses of Astronomy, Address on the Occasion of the Inauguration of 
the Dudley Astronomical Observatory (Aug. 28, 1856), in THE USES OF ASTRONOMY 1, 25 
(N.Y., Ross & Tousey 1856), available at http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=moa;idno=AAN1277.0001.001. 
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to land company speculators. But even with this attempt to jump-start sales, 
the opening of the public domain failed to keep pace with actual settlement. 
Settlement on lands in which Indian claims had not been extinguished by 
treaty or purchase created constant conflict. To keep the peace, the government 
twice sent the Army to remove squatters and burn their improvements—
creating enormous resentment and only partially stemming the tide of illegal 
settlement.262 
Preoccupied by other matters, Congress did not return to the land sales 
issue until well after the Constitution was ratified. Meanwhile no sales were 
made under the 1785 ordinance. The new Congress apparently did not fault the 
original system. Its 1796 land statute263 was quite similar to the 1785 ordinance 
and equally slow in getting anything to market. The law required that seven 
ranges be surveyed before any sales were allowed, and it maintained the large 
tract, fixed-price system. Most settlers could not afford to buy a large tract at 
two dollars per acre, nor were speculators terribly interested at that price. 
Congress’s solution in 1800264 was to keep the price at two dollars, but to 
make sales on credit. To facilitate sales, it set up a system of four land offices in 
the West near the places where land was to be sold. Each office had a register 
to handle the details of surveys and the platting and registration of claims, and 
a receiver to handle the money.265 Continuing the Federalist system for paying 
officers, the register and receiver were put on commission and further 
compensated by fees for various activities connected with the sale of the 
land.266 But the implementation of public land sales as a serious national 
enterprise would fall to Republican Congresses and administrations. 
The credit system boosted sales but created an administrative and political 
nightmare. Land could be bought for one-quarter down, with three subsequent 
payments that did not begin for two years. This approach fueled speculation by 
both settlers and investors. Buyers were confident that they could make the 
land pay, or resell it at a profit, before the second installment came due. Many 
 
262.  See TREAT, supra note 260, at 46, 372-74.  
263.  An Act Providing for the Sale of the Lands of the United States, in the Territory Northwest 
of the River Ohio, and Above the Mouth of Kentucky River, ch. 29, 1 Stat. 464 (1796) 
[hereinafter 1796 Northwest Act]. 
264.  See An Act To Amend the Act Intituled “An Act Providing for the Sale of the Lands of the 
United States, in the Territory Northwest of the Ohio, and Above the Mouth of Kentucky 
River,” ch. 55, 2 Stat. 73 (1800) [hereinafter 1800 Northwest Amendments]. 
265.  Id. §§ 1, 6. 
266.  See An Act Regulating the Grants of Land, and Providing for the Disposal of the Lands of 
the United States, South of the State of Tennessee, ch. 27, 2 Stat. 229 (1803) [hereinafter 
1803 Land Act]. 




turned out to be wrong. The government thus rapidly created thousands of 
individual debtors who would have to be pursued for the remainder of their 
payments or be required to forfeit their land claims if they failed to pay. 
Vigorous enforcement against impecunious settlers with problematic national 
loyalties, and often with considerable “sweat equity,” was politically 
unattractive to say the least.267 
Debt was in one sense the biggest land policy issue from 1800 to 1820. In 
1804 Gallatin urged Congress to eliminate the credit system, sell land in 
smaller lots, and lower the prices.268 Others, including special congressional 
committees empanelled to study the problem, recommended the same thing.269 
Congress, ever eager to promote sales and settlement and pressured by both 
territorial governments and speculators, simply retained the credit system and 
provided relief to debtors, usually by extending the time for payment.270 
Multiple rounds of debt relief were rationalized on two grounds. First, 
because locals would not bid for their neighbors’ forfeited land, and indeed 
would be persecuted by so-called claims clubs if they did,271 it was not clear in 
any event that the government could collect much from forfeiture sales. 
Moreover, debtors claimed that they were the victims of government policy. 
After all, Congress had enacted the embargo and authorized the War of 1812, 
both of which had undermined commerce. It had also failed to pacify Indian 
tribes on the frontier and was implicated in the virtual collapse of the financial 
system by its failure to recharter the first Bank of the United States. 
As a consequence, the United States was selling land, but it was not 
collecting much revenue. In 1820 nearly half of the sales price for all lands sold 
in the prior twenty years remained outstanding.272 This of course assumes that 
the government actually knew how much was owed. In a series of relief acts, 
Congress had, among other things, allowed claimants to pay partial amounts 
 
267.  See BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 82-100 (1924). 
268.  See Albert Gallatin, Alterations of the Laws for the Sale of Public Lands (Jan. 2, 1804), in 1 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 166, 167-68. 
269.  See Report of the House Committee on Public Lands, Credit on Public Lands (Apr. 5, 1806), 
in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 265, 266. A similar 
recommendation was made by a special Senate committee at the time of the adoption of the 
1812 statute, which established the General Land Office and reorganized the land office 
business. See Revision of the Laws for the Sale of Public Lands (Feb. 19, 1812), in 2 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 367, 367-69. 
270.  For an example, see An Act To Suspend the Sale of Certain Lands in the State of Ohio, and 
the Indiana Territory, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 378 (1806). 
271.  On the history and actions of claims clubs, see EVERETT DICK, THE LURE OF THE LAND 59-67 
(1970). 
272.  For further treatment of the history of the credit system, see TREAT, supra note 260, at 125-42. 
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on their claims subject to interest and penalties based upon the degree to which 
they were delinquent.273 And a new statute changing the terms of these 
indulgences appeared almost every year. The sheer computational challenge of 
keeping up with all these individual debtors, who dribbled in minute amounts 
for past due payments, tended to overwhelm both the local land offices and the 
Treasury officials who tried to oversee the system.274 
The Secretary and other officials in the Treasury were given some relief in 
1812 when Congress established a General Land Office with a commissioner to 
oversee the whole operation.275 And no new sales on credit were allowed after 
1820. Even so, Congress was compelled to provide additional debt relief in a 
series of acts from 1821 to 1832, at which point the last of the credit problems 
created between 1800 and 1820 were finally resolved.276 
While credit had boosted sales, and purchasing interest at every auction 
was intense, parcels were slow to come on the market. Congress had agreed by 
treaty to honor claims based on French and Spanish grants, and it recognized 
by statute prior titles from colonial or state governments as well as “preemptive 
rights” for those who had settled lands prior to survey.277 Lands could not, 
therefore, be finally surveyed and sold until the validity of existing private 
claims was determined. This turned out to be incredibly burdensome.278 The 
British, Spanish, and French governments used different land systems, and the 
latter two permitted highly informal grants. Records were lost, and forgery and 
perjury were hardly unknown.279 One student of the claims process in the 
Mississippi Territory estimated that there were twenty-three different types of 
 
273.  See An Act To Extend the Time for Making Payment for the Public Lands of the United 
States in Certain Cases, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 591 (1810). 
274.  See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258, at 31. 
275.  See An Act for the Establishment of a General Land-Office in the Department of the 
Treasury, ch. 68, 2 Stat. 716 (1812). 
276.  See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258, at 137-56. 
277.  See An Act Respecting Claims to Land in the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana, ch. 36, 2 
Stat. 440 (1807). Most of the relevant treaties and acts of cession relevant to private land 
claims in the Republican period and earlier are collected in E.J. BALDWIN, LAWS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS UNDER THE CONFEDERATION, TREATIES, 
PROCLAMATIONS, SPANISH REGULATIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS RESPECTING THE PUBLIC 
LANDS (Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1828). 
278.  See TREAT, supra note 260, at 198-229 (describing, among many other things, the forty-year 
history of the settlement of the claims of “a few settlers” in Illinois and Michigan). 
279.  On the widespread frauds employed in making private land claims, see DICK, supra note 271, 
at 13-17. 




claims available to parties pursuant to grants from Britain, Spain, and 
Georgia.280  
Congress recognized that the territorial courts could not make decisions on 
all of these claims. It therefore created the nation’s first large-scale 
administrative adjudication process, about which much more will be said later. 
Suffice it for now to note that this system, while it did heroic duty, only 
mitigated the delays. Delay provoked more settlers to “squat” on the public 
domain with no formal title. Informal settlement, in turn, generated new 
demands for “preemptive rights” that Congress often granted, thus creating 
more claims to be adjudicated.281 
So-called bounty lands for veterans added a further layer of 
complication.282 Special plots of land had been set aside as military bounty 
lands or exclusive military reserves. But these often had to be shifted as 
surveyors came back to report that this or that military reserve consisted largely 
of swamp or otherwise useless property. The distribution process was also 
complex. Veterans needed first to obtain a warrant, issued by the Secretary of 
War on a finding that the veteran satisfied whatever service criteria were 
specified for a land bounty. These specifications had been altered many times 
as Congress tried to deal with recruitment needs, both in the Revolutionary era 
and in the War of 1812. After receiving a warrant, the veteran then needed to 
turn the warrant into a deed or patent by “locating” the claim on eligible 
military reserve property. If the “location” was proper—that is, it was on 
surveyed lands free of other claims—the government issued a patent. The 
system was so difficult to administer that Revolutionary War claims were still 
being settled in the 1850s. 
Part of the problem was that every military bounty policy seemed to 
generate individual or wholesale injustice and a demand for further remedial 
legislation. For example, in the War of 1812, Congress made bounty land 
available only to noncommissioned officers who enlisted between the ages of 
eighteen and forty-five and served under national rather than state authority.283 
This was a perfectly sensible recruitment policy. The Army needed able-bodied 
men, and the militias, when under state command, were unreliable at best. The 
rewards for commissioned officers were thought to be sufficient without land 
bounties. But when the time came to claim bounties, these and other 
 
280.  R.S. Cotterill, The National Land System in the South: 1803-1812, 16 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 
495, 496 (1930). 
281.  See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258, at 200-05.  
282.  On the system of military bounty lands, see HIBBARD, supra note 267, at 116-35; and TREAT, 
supra note 260, at 230-62, from which this description is taken. 
283.  See TREAT, supra note 260, at 247.  
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limitations collapsed under the weight of attractive petitions from disqualified 
veterans. 
Abigail O’Flyng, for example, petitioned Congress for a bounty warrant 
and alleged the following facts: her husband and three sons had all served in 
the War of 1812, but all were disqualified under the existing criteria; her 
husband enlisted when he was over forty-five, and one son enlisted when he 
was under eighteen. In addition, her two sons who had been killed in battle 
had both received battlefield commissions. In short, this patriotic family had 
provided four soldiers, two of whom had been killed, and none of whom 
qualified for a bounty.284 Responding to worthy petitions and to political 
pressures, Congress had by 1855 provided bounty lands for anyone who had at 
least fourteen days’ service in any prior war.285 
B. Administration 
Administering the laws for the disposition of the public domain was a 
superficially straightforward administrative task. First, uniform rules needed to 
be established for surveys, land sales, recording of titles, and accounting. 
Second, a system was required for the adjudication of private claims. Third, the 
public domain needed to be surveyed and put up for sale. Fourth, sales had to 
be recorded, moneys collected, and land patents issued. Finally, as with any 
administrative system, some means had to be established to determine whether 
the officials who were carrying out these tasks were doing their jobs accurately, 
efficiently, and honestly. 
On another level, the tale of the administration of the public lands is a story 
of high politics and low farce, of individual heroics and massive corruption, 
and, perhaps most importantly, of the clash between the frontier mentality of 
western settlers and the legal and bureaucratic imperatives of the Treasury and 
the General Land Office. For Congress demanded technical exactitude from 
Land Office administrators but resisted hiring, compensating, and 
provisioning field personnel.286 And it yielded repeatedly (and almost 
 
284.  See 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 846 (1816). 
285.  See An Act in Addition to Certain Acts Granting Bounty Land to Certain Officers and 
Soldiers Who Have Been Engaged in the Military Service of the United States, ch. 207, 10 
Stat. 701 (1855). 
286.  See Compensation of Registers and Receivers of the Public Lands (Feb. 24, 1824), in 4 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 7 (Asbury Dickins & James C. 
Allen eds., Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1859); Compensation of the Surveyors General and 
Their Clerks (Jan. 16, 1827), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 
874, 874-76 (Asbury Dickins & James C. Allen eds., Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1859). 




universally) to the demands of western settlers and speculators who could not, 
or simply refused to, abide by the requirements of existing statutes and 
regulations.287 
1. Establishing Uniform Policies 
As with modern administrative systems, uniform policy was pursued 
through statutory specificity, administrative rulemaking, and specific 
interpretations of the rules and statutes by high-level administrators, often in 
response to inquiries from the field.288 And as with all such attempts to unify 
administrative action, these techniques were only partially successful. 
a. Statutory Specificity 
Beginning with its first post-Constitution land statute on May 18, 1796,289 
and continuing throughout the period under study, Congress struggled to be 
precise. It instructed its surveyors in great detail on marking the corners of 
townships, running section lines, marking the section corners with marks 
different from those used for the township corners, numbering sections, and so 
on.290 Deputy surveyors were required by statute to mark a tree near each 
corner of each section with the number of the section and, over it, the number 
of the township.291 Congress instructed them to “carefully note” in their field 
books the type and description of the corner trees and the numbers marked.292 
And it demanded that surveyors make measurements only with chains 
“containing two perches of sixteen feet and one half each, subdivided into 
twenty-five equal links,” and that these chains “be adjusted to a standard to be 
kept for that purpose.”293 
Statutes specified when surveyed lands were to be sold, where, and under 
whose authority. Notice of the sale was required to be given in at least one 
newspaper of each state and territory two months prior to the sale, and sales at 
 
287.  See generally DICK, supra note 271, at 1-69 (providing a splendid account of the very human 
side of the survey and sale of the public lands in the pre-Jacksonian period). 
288.  See, e.g., Frauds in Land Warrants (Apr. 12, 1808), in 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2080 (1808). 
289.  1796 Northwest Act, supra note 263, 1 Stat. 464. 
290.  See An Act Concerning the Mode of Surveying the Public Lands of the United States, ch. 14, 
2 Stat. 313 (1805). 
291.  1796 Northwest Act, supra note 263, § 2, 1 Stat. at 466. 
292.  Id. 
293.  Id. 
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different places could not take place less than one month apart. No land was to 
be sold for less than two dollars an acre, and terms were set for payment and 
receipt of the monies. Patents were to be issued only after receipt of the 
purchase price.294 Forfeiture and resale were decreed if the money was not 
paid. Special requirements were made for the keeping of accounting books and 
for reports to the Secretary of the Treasury.295 Congress tried to cover all 
contingencies, and in detail. 
Revisions were constantly required. When the specified places of sale 
turned out to be too far from the buyers, Congress opened four new land 
offices.296 When tracts offered for sale turned out to be too large, Congress 
authorized sales of half sections.297 When it was discovered that errors in the 
original surveys had produced sections that did not contain 640 acres, 
surveyors were given new instructions.298 When sales for cash (really, one-half 
down and a year to complete payment) failed to attract buyers, Congress 
initiated the credit system, along with its much more elaborate accounting 
system.299 These requirements included the almost comically detailed provision 
that 
the Registers of the Land Offices respectively, shall also note on the 
book of surveys, or original plot transmitted to them, every tract which 
may be sold, by inserting the letter A on the day when the same is 
applied for, and the letter P on the day when a receipt for one-fourth 
part of the purchase money is produced to them, and by crossing the 
said letter A on the day when the land shall revert to the United States, 
on failure of the payment of one-fourth part of the purchase money 
within three months after the date of application.300 
Yet, recognizing that the complex accounting provisions in the statute might 
nevertheless be inadequate, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury 
 
294.  1800 Northwest Amendments, supra note 264, § 5, 2 Stat. at 75-76. 
295.  Id. § 6. 
296.  See id. 
297.  See An Act Making Provision for the Disposal of the Public Lands in the Indiana Territory, 
and for Other Purposes, ch. 35, 2 Stat. 277 (1804) [hereinafter Indiana Territory Land Act]. 
298.  Congress later declared by statute that inaccurate surveys would be considered accurate. See 
An Act Concerning the Mode of Surveying the Public Lands of the United States, ch. 14, 2 
Stat. 313 (1805). 
299.  See 1800 Northwest Amendments, supra note 264, §§ 4-5, 7, 2 Stat. at 74-76. 
300.  Id. § 8. 




to prescribe such further regulations “as to him may appear necessary and 
proper.”301 
b. Administrative Regulation 
And so, in statute after statute, Congress attempted to plug holes and solve 
problems created by its earlier efforts. But statutory specificity simply was not 
up to the job of instructing officials in the field.302 The Treasury, and later the 
General Land Office, had to fill in the gaps with general regulations and with 
specific advice. For example, the statute requiring that trees mark the corner of 
townships imagined that nature would provide one at the exact spot that the 
surveyors’ chains indicated. Nature was not so kind, and an early regulation 
authorized surveyors to put a post at the true corner of the township and then 
mark two “witness” or “bearing” trees.303 Detailed descriptions and compass 
bearings to the posts in the surveyors’ field notes presumably would allow the 
post subsequently to be located and properly identified. And, of course, trees 
did not always exist anywhere near the township corners. Regulations 
permitted the use of stone markers where the region supplied them.304 On the 
prairie land of Indiana, additional regulations prescribed the use of posts 
surrounded by mounds of earth. The township corner mound was to be six 
feet square and three feet high; the mound at a section corner was to be only 
2.5 feet across and 2.5 feet high. When the surveyors got further west, even 
posts were almost impossible to obtain. Surveyors were instructed to bury 
charcoal in a hole at the exact corner beneath a section or township mound. 
One story, perhaps apocryphal, tells of a surveyor who, in terrain completely 
devoid of wood or stones, stuck a burned matchstick at each corner of a section 
and entered in his day book that he had set charred sticks of the best available 
timber.305 
 
301.  Id. § 11. 
302.  Congress seems belatedly to have recognized this truism when it stated that “[i]n all 
legislation, much must necessarily be left to construction, and the sound discretion of those 
charged with the administration of the laws.” H.R. REP. NO. 18-130, at 1 (1824). 
303.  For a description of surveying difficulties, see DICK, supra note 271, at 21-23. 
304.  Some of these regulations are collected in W.W. LESTER, DECISIONS OF THE INTERIOR 
DEPARTMENT IN PUBLIC LAND CASES AND LAND LAWS PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH THE REGULATIONS OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE (Phila., 
H.P. & R.H. Small 1860). Lester reproduced, for example, the Manual of Instructions for 
surveyors as revised through 1855. See id. at 703-24. 
305.  The tale of the matchsticks is from GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 81 (1947). 
Other examples are from DICK, supra note 271.  
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There seems to have been no particular process for adopting these general 
rules or regulations, which were issued as circulars or letters to the various local 
land offices or to the surveyors. While the land office personnel—the register 
and receiver in each office and the clerks they employed—doubtless attempted 
to follow the Treasury or General Land Office instructions, deputy surveyors in 
the field were sometimes a different matter. These “officers” were contract 
help, paid by the mile surveyed and operating under extreme conditions 
imposed by terrain and weather as well as by Indian tribes that sometimes took 
a dim view of their activities. Many made valiant efforts under extremely trying 
circumstances. Others defrauded the government. In Gladwin County, 
Michigan, the survey crew apparently did its work entirely from a hotel room, 
and the government had to spend $50,000 to resurvey the 150 townships that 
this resourceful crew had so imaginatively plotted.306 
Of course, problems with surveys were not the only, or even the most 
numerous, issues that arose from gaps or unrealistic requirements in the 
statutes or, indeed, from the attempt to apply general rules to specific cases. 
Faced with issues that their instructions seemed not to cover, field personnel 
inundated the Treasury and the General Land Office with inquiries. Malcolm 
Rohrbough’s well-known book, The Land Office Business, is based in large part 
on an analysis of the correspondence between field offices and the seat of 
government from 1789 to 1837.307 According to Rohrbough’s bibliography, the 
general circulars sent from the General Land Office comprise four folders. 
Correspondence sent and received is contained in 156 volumes—excluding 
correspondence concerning private land claims, which was incessant. The 
correspondence between the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner 
of the General Land Office alone occupies an additional fifteen volumes. One 
can only marvel at Rohrbough’s diligence (or that of his graduate students) 
and at the extraordinary efforts made to unify federal land policy by 
authoritative interpretation from the center to the periphery in the first three 
decades of the nineteenth century. 
2. Adjudicating Private Claims 
a. The Statutory System 
Although the surveyors had the utmost difficulty in reducing territory 
marked by rivers, swamps, mountains, and almost impenetrable underbrush to 
 
306.  See DICK, supra note 271, at 24-30. 
307.  See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258.  




plats composed of the six-mile-square townships and one-mile-square sections 
that Congress demanded, the congressional concern for systematic and 
accurate surveying was well placed. The alternative system, used principally by 
Virginia prior to the cession of its public lands to the United States (and 
subsequently with respect to the Virginia Military Reserve), generated endless 
litigation. Under that system, settlers “located” lots by choosing tracts of land 
and having them surveyed by whatever boundaries (e.g., rivers, streams, 
bridges, or trees) came to hand. The results were inaccurate surveys and 
overlapping claims that took years to resolve.308 Real property cases were the 
largest single category of substantive nonconstitutional cases on the Supreme 
Court’s docket between 1815 and 1835. And many of these cases resulted from 
Virginia grants made in Kentucky prior to cession or on the lands it reserved 
for Revolutionary War veterans.309 Land claims often took years to unravel and 
involved highly complex questions of conflict of laws, statutory interpretation, 
the relationship between common law and statute, and the interplay of state, 
national, and international law.310 
While the congressional survey scheme avoided many of the problems that 
plagued the Virginia system, it could not itself be implemented until 
preexisting claims of right to parts of the public domain were adjudicated. As 
previously mentioned, those claims were premised on grants from Spain, 
France, and Britain; grants from colonies and states with western land 
holdings prior to their cession to the United States; transfers from Indian 
tribes; and prior settlement without any assertion of title from a preexisting 
sovereign. Given the experience of the Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts with land controversies and the inadequate resources of the territorial 
courts, Congress was under no illusion that judicial resolution of these claims 
was feasible. There were nearly 10,000 private claims in the Louisiana 
 
308.  Paul Gates has reported Humphrey Marshall’s estimate that all the lands in Kentucky had 
been granted at least four times as well as his concern that sorting out the “infinitude of 
conflicting claims” had “retarded [Kentucky’s] population—obstructed her improvement—
distracted her people—impaired her morals—and depreciated the value of her rich soil, 
throughout the country.” GATES, LANDLORDS, supra note 255, at 14 (quoting 1 H. MARSHALL, 
HISTORY OF KENTUCKY 152-53 (Frankfurt, Ky., S. Robinson 1824)). 
309.  See G. EDWARD WHITE WITH THE AID OF GERALD GUNTHER, THE MARSHALL COURT AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 753-78 (History of the Supreme Court of the U.S. Nos. 3-4, 
1988). 
310.  See id. For a discussion of several such cases, see GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. 
JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 590-603 (History of the 
Supreme Court of the U.S. No. 2, 1981). 
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Territory alone.311 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, and Missouri had 
at least another 6000 claims that were confirmed.312 
Faced with private claims that were both voluminous and complex, 
Congress chose to establish a “commissioner” system in the hope that 
administrative adjudication could do speedily and effectively what judicial 
adjudication could not. Although this system ultimately accomplished its goals 
and laid the basis for an adjudicative process in the Land Office that persisted 
for decades, the trials and tribulations of the administrative adjudicators were 
many and varied. 
And disappointed applicants never tired of petitioning Congress for relief. 
A perusal of the congressional materials preserved for this period in the 
American State Papers reveals a colossal number of documents related to public 
lands and particularly to private claims.313 A substantial number of these 
documents are the reports of commissioners on private claims. A greater 
number (by several orders of magnitude) are petitions or congressional actions 
on petitions for relief from statutory requirements, legislative confirmation of 
claims, grants of preemptive rights, authority to withdraw erroneous locations 
of claims, and so on.314 Many of these petitions were from individuals, but they 
also originated with land companies, towns, and states. Thus, while private 
claims were heard by commissioners, Congress was often the final arbiter.315 
 
311.  Harry L. Coles, Jr., Applicability of the Public Land System to Louisiana, 43 MISS. VALLEY HIST. 
REV. 39, 51 (1956). 
312.  Gates, Land Claims, supra note 255, at 203. 
313.  For these materials, see 1-3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253; 4 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253 (Asbury Dickins & James C. Allen 
eds., Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1859); and 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, 
supra note 253 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1860). 
314.  For an example of one of the many special statutes granting relief to individuals, see An Act 
in Addition to the Act Intituled “An Act Regulating the Grants of Land Appropriated for the 
Refugees from the British Provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia,” ch. 35, 2 Stat. 242 (1801). 
315.  Appeals to Congress persisted long after the claims commissions had completed their work. 
A House committee in 1836 complained that 
[e]very succeeding year brings forth new and additional applicants, produced by 
the circumstances of speculators and companies, in various States of the Union, 
becoming interested by purchase in those grants, as well as by the multiplication 
of heirs of some of the original grantees. By these and other causes, the claimants 
are becoming more imposing from their wealth, numbers, and influence, yearly. 
Gates, Land Claims, supra note 255, at 191. 




b. Claims Adjudication in Practice 
The claims adjudication process began in the Confederation period with 
the Continental Congress’s resolution to provide for the recognition of claims 
by French settlers in the Illinois Territory. Congress authorized the territorial 
governor to recognize claims based on prior legitimate authority and, if a 
settler’s legal title was inadequate, to allocate 400 acres per family to citizens 
who had settled there prior to 1783. The governor was to award these latter 
“donation lands” by lot and to examine titles otherwise presented. When titles 
were confirmed, land was to be laid out by survey at the claimants’ expense. 
This general process sounded simple enough, but it was forty years before the 
final claims were resolved.316 
The first official recognition of the complexities of the private claims 
powers seems to have occurred on February 18, 1791, when President George 
Washington laid Governor Arthur St. Clair’s initial report on the Illinois claims 
before Congress. The Governor reported that claimants had appeared not only 
with some evidence of French governmental grants, but also with claims 
pursuant to Indian transfers and to a multitude of grants made by various 
Virginia officials when the territory had been a part of Virginia’s western lands. 
These latter grants included executive awards by two different Virginia 
administrators and hundreds more provided by civil courts that Virginia had 
established in its western territory. St. Clair reported that the administrators’ 
authority to make land grants was uncertain. As far as he could ascertain, the 
Virginia courts’ authority was nonexistent. 
St. Clair hardly knew what to do. Many of the claimants had been settled in 
this location for years and had improved the property upon which they made 
claims. Many also provided substantial aid to the United States during the 
Revolutionary War, both as suppliers of goods and services and as veterans of 
various militias. Yet virtually no written records existed to establish the time of 
their settlement or to evidence grants from the French government. Most of 
the Virginia grants were wholly without authority (and had been issued for the 
corrupt purpose of collecting fees from the grantees).317 Moreover, following a 
royal proclamation in 1763, transfers by Indian tribes to individuals were not 
recognized.318 
 
316.  The elaborate history of the resolution of these French settlement claims in the Northwest 
Territory, described below, is set out in some detail in TREAT, supra note 260, at 198-229. 
317.  See id.  
318.  Only the sovereign could extinguish Indian title by purchase or treaty, and in many places it 
was a criminal offense to accept such transfers. See MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND 
TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 155-78 (1953). Congress passed a host of statutes 
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In short, these were often worthy claimants. But they were unable to prove 
their titles or claims by the application of the property law that St. Clair had 
been instructed to follow, or to establish the prior residency and citizenship 
requirements for donation lands. A host of other circumstances suggested the 
need for further legislation recognizing yet other types of claims, and St. Clair 
made a long list of recommendations to Congress.319 
Congress responded, thus setting the stage for a continuing series of 
adjudications, further recommendations, and further legislation that stretched 
over four decades. Over time, as Congress broadened the categories of 
claimants and as time passed, records became scarcer and even less reliable. 
Speculators and other opportunists entered the picture, and perjury was 
practiced on a massive scale.320 All in all, the adjudicatory process for 
determining land claims in the Northwest Territory did not get the land claims 
adjudication process off to an auspicious start. 
Part of the problem had been a confusion of congressional purposes. It was 
unclear whether, in dealing with early claims in the Northwest Territory, 
Congress was primarily actuated by fiscal, legal, or benevolent motives.321 
Congress seemed intent on raising revenue and was loath to recognize rights to 
property that it might otherwise sell. Yet the United States clearly had an 
obligation under treaties with Great Britain and France (and later Spain), and 
under the agreements by which Virginia and other states ceded their western 
 
authorizing purchases or gifts to extinguish Indian claims. See, e.g., An Act To Make Further 
Appropriations for the Purpose of Extinguishing the Indian Claims, ch. 43, 2 Stat. 291 
(1804). These treaty negotiations often involved high politics and serious issues of war or 
peace. See, e.g., REMINI, supra note 26, at 88-100 (describing multiyear negotiations with the 
Creeks concerning their lands in Georgia). 
319.  See Land Claimants in the Northwestern Territory (Feb. 18, 1791), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 13. 
320.  See DICK, supra note 271, at 14-15. 
321.  Adjudicatory mechanisms established for other territories or other purposes were occasionally 
less ambiguous. For example, in 1798, Congress provided for donations of property to 
Canadian refugees who had aided the United States in the Revolution and had been forced 
to flee their homes in Canada as a result. See An Act for the Relief of the Refugees from the 
British Provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia, ch. 26, § 4, 1 Stat. 547, 548 (1798). Here the 
purpose was clearly altruistic, and the procedures were reasonably well tailored to that end. 
Criteria were set out for qualification, and applicants were instructed to produce evidence of 
their entitlement before any judge of the United States or of any state. That evidence was 
then sent to the Secretary of War, who, along with the Secretary and Controller of the 
Treasury, examined the evidence and provided a quantity of land “in proportion to the 
degree of [the individual’s] respective services, sacrifices and sufferings, in consequence of 
their attachment to the cause of the United States.” Id. The most deserving were allowed 
1000 acres; the least, a distribution of 100. The administrators were also allowed to single 
out particularly meritorious cases and make recommendations for larger grants. See id.  




lands to the nation, to honor preexisting claims based on grants by those 
sovereigns.322 Congress also wanted to provide benefits to citizens who had 
performed some service for the United States or who had a strong moral claim 
based on settlement and improvement of their properties. 
After 1800, when Republican Congresses came to deal with private land 
claims in the Indiana and Mississippi Territories and in Louisiana and the 
Floridas, they clearly had learned something from the debacle in the Northwest 
Territory. Special commissioners, sometimes the register and receiver of the 
local land offices and sometimes special presidential appointees, were 
empowered to adjudicate claims under much more specific criteria. The 
commissioners were given full authority to compel attendance at hearings, to 
administer oaths, to examine witnesses, and to decide the cases “according to 
justice and equity.”323 In some cases the commissioners’ decisions were made 
final. In others they were, at least nominally, only a recommendation to 
Congress, which made a final disposition.324 But as a matter of practice, 
Congress confirmed virtually all claims that were ruled upon favorably by the 
commissioners.325 Time limits were set within which claims were to be 
presented to the commissioners, and, according to the statutes, claims not 
presented by that time were forever barred.326 
Again, this all sounds reasonably straightforward, but of course it was not. 
Many records were lost or unavailable, and parol evidence generated the usual 
problems of perjury and fraud.327 In addition, the land systems of France, 
 
322.  See sources cited supra note 277.  
323.  Indiana Territory Land Act, supra note 297, § 4, 2 Stat. at 278-79.  
324.  See 1803 Land Act, supra note 266, 2 Stat. 229. 
325.  Gates, Land Claims, supra note 255, at 190. 
326.  For the major variations on the private claims process, see An Act for Ascertaining Claims 
and Titles to Land Within the Territory of Florida, ch. 129, 3 Stat. 709 (1822); An Act for 
Ascertaining the Titles and Claims to Lands in that Part of the Louisiana [Territory] Which 
Lies East of the River Mississippi and Island of New Orleans, ch. 67, 2 Stat. 713 (1812); 
Indiana Territory Land Act, supra note 297; and 1803 Land Act, supra note 266. 
327.  Issuance of fraudulent French and Spanish titles was a particular problem in the Louisiana 
and Florida Territories. See DICK, supra note 271, at 15-16. A local commentator in 1850 had 
this to say about the scramble for property in Louisiana after its transfer to the United 
States: 
Claims and evidences of title were to be raked up from old records, musty 
documents, antiquated titles, concessions, settlement-rights, transfers, entails, 
and every species of oral and written evidence of title, real and factitious. 
Claims of this character were eagerly sought by the land speculator, and as 
freely produced by the needy creole, and the avaricious fabricator. An active 
commerce sprung up between the artful land-jobbers and the docile, unlettered 
settler; titles, complete and incomplete, were multiplied in endless variety. 
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Spain, and Great Britain were quite different. And, of course, some of the 
“British” practice was actually in the form of grants from colonies, such as 
Georgia or Virginia, that had their own peculiarities.328 In short, these were 
difficult cases that required energetic investigation and considerable linguistic 
and legal skill. But Congress, with its usual parsimony, was hesitant to provide 
adequate pay or support for its land commissioners. As George Graham 
pointed out to the Senate in response to its request for a report on the causes of 
delay in adjusting land claims in part of Louisiana, it was impossible to obtain 
the services “of individuals qualified by their independence of character and 
discriminating powers of mind, to adjust these claims speedily and 
satisfactorily, unless a more adequate compensation for their services [was] 
given.”329 
And, of course, as long as claims could not be settled, lands could not be 
surveyed and public sales could not be conducted. Meanwhile, the settlers 
marched inexorably westward, entering lands by purchase from a land office 
when they could, and by illegal occupation when they could not. The 
adjudication of private claims was thus a sort of perpetual motion machine. 
The more claims the commissioners had to determine, the longer it took to 
generate surveyed lands for sale, and the more “illegal” settlers arrived to press 
even more private claims. 
Congress clearly had a soft spot for settlers with defective claims. It relaxed 
the evidentiary requirements for proof when the rules excluded too many 
claimants,330 and it authorized awards of lands to whole categories of claimants 
 
Gates, Land Claims, supra note 255, at 185 (quoting J.W. Monette, Early Spirit of the West (pt. 
2), 8 DEBOW’S REV. 407, 409 (1850)). 
Apparently, the commissioners were appropriately skeptical because Congress passed a 
special statute permitting suits in the territorial courts to establish claims rejected for fraud 
or forgery. See An Act for the Disposal of Certain Tracts of Land in the Mississippi 
Territory, Claimed Under Spanish Grants, Reported by the Land Commissioners as 
Antedated, and To Confirm the Claims of Abraham Ellis and Daniel Harregal, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 
526 (1809). 
328.  Congress occasionally adopted special state rules explicitly. See An Act Authorizing Patents 
To Issue for Lands Located and Surveyed by Virtue of Certain Virginia Resolution 
Warrants, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 437 (1807). 
329.  George Graham, Causes of the Delay in Adjusting the Land Claims in the District of St. 
Helena in Louisiana (Dec. 22, 1823), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 
253, at 550, 551. 
330.  See An Act Supplementary to an Act Intituled “An Act for Ascertaining and Adjusting the 
Titles and Claims to Land, Within the Territory of Orleans, and the District of Louisiana,” 
ch. 39, § 4, 2 Stat. 391, 392 (1806). 




that the commissioners had previously disqualified.331 The rules changed so 
often that Congress ordered the collection and arrangement in one volume of 
all laws, resolutions, treaties, and proclamations related to the public lands to 
be distributed to the land offices and the claims commissioners.332 
Having a copy of the statutes was surely useful, but the laws were not self-
interpreting. The Louisiana land commissioners were instructed to decide 
“according to the laws and established usages and customs of the French and 
Spanish governments.”333 Gallatin was sufficiently confused about exactly what 
this meant, and how this criterion related to other statutes that Congress had 
passed on the same subject, that he despaired of providing any interpretation 
for the commissioners. He finally transmitted copies to the registers without 
any interpretation or instructions concerning the law’s meaning.334 In any 
event, the commissioners took testimony from leading citizens of the territory 
concerning prior usages and customs and used this testimony as their guide to 
French and Spanish law.335 A later compiler of the French and Spanish land 
laws stated, however, that he had examined the reports of the various boards of 
commissioners from their inception to 1829 and that he had found very few 
references to French or Spanish law or custom. The uniform rules that he had 
uncovered seemed to him to consist largely of common law principles.336 
Settlers with no figment of a legal title might have been ignored, and 
Congress sometimes passed “get tough” statutes that criminalized settlement 
without title and disqualified illicit settlers from ever gaining a patent. The 
President was authorized to use whatever military force was necessary to 
remove them unless they obtained a temporary residency permit from the 
 
331.  See An Act Regulating the Grants of Land in the Territory of Michigan, ch. 34, § 2, 2 Stat. 
437, 438 (1807). 
332.  See An Act Providing for the Printing and Distributing of Such Laws of the United States, as 
Respect the Public Lands, ch. 33, 2 Stat. 589 (1810). 
333.  An Act Respecting Claims to Land in the Territories of Orleans and Louisiana, ch. 36, § 4, 2 
Stat. 440, 441 (1807). 
334.  Coles, supra note 311, at 52 n.46. 
335.  See REPORT OF THE REGISTER AND RECEIVER OF THE LAND DISTRICT SOUTH OF RED RIVER IN 
LOUISIANA, UPON THE LAND CLAIMS SITUATED BETWEEN THE RIO HONDO AND THE SABINE, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 19-50, at 3-7 (1826).  
336.  See Letter from Joseph M. White to Henry Clay, Sec’y of State (Feb. 4, 1829), in 5 AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 631 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., 
Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1860). 
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relevant land office.337 But these statutes were almost impossible to enforce, 
and Congress, in the end, generally provided relief from them.338 
The massive entrance of settlers onto the unsurveyed public domain 
created the political necessity of providing them with some sort of preemptive 
right to purchase when surveys were finally accomplished. For example, the 
House of Representatives of the Mississippi Territory petitioned Congress in 
1808 to grant preemptive rights to 
that great number of persons, many of whom are heads of families 
[who had] emigrated to that territory within the last twelve months, 
under an expectation that, on their arrival, lands of the United States 
might be procured by purchase; but the sales being protracted, and the 
lands not likely to be exposed to sale within a short time, they were 
constrained either to settle on the lands of the United States or seek a 
residence within the Spanish lines.339 
In this case, the House Committee on Public Lands, recognizing that granting 
such rights would “be offering an inducement to future intrusion, and be 
giving support to a practice liable to many abuses,” recommended that 
preemptive rights not be provided.340 
But Congress passed thirty-two special or temporary preemption statutes 
between 1799 and 1838,341 along with general preemption acts in 1830, 1832, and 
1838.342 Occupancy or cultivation was usually required for a preemptive claim 
but, by custom, they had taken many forms—from building a house and 
raising a corn crop, to harvesting sugar, to marking trees for clearing and 
nothing else (sometimes called “tomahawk rights”).343 Even if a settlor’s 
preemptive claim was defective, it was likely to be recognized by neighbors and 
enforced by conspiracy when the land was put up for sale. Neighbors refused 
to bid against each other and banded together to intimidate outsiders who 
might have had the temerity to bid on an already “settled” parcel.344 
 
337.  See An Act To Prevent Settlements Being Made on Lands Ceded to the United States, Until 
Authorized by Law, ch. 46, 2 Stat. 445 (1807). 
338.  See DICK, supra note 271, at 50-69. 
339.  Pre-emption Titles in the Mississippi Territory (Nov. 21, 1808), in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 546, 546.  
340.  Id.  
341.  See LESTER, supra note 304, at 64-65.  
342.  See ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258, at 200-20.  
343.  See DICK, supra note 271, at 5.  
344.  See id. at 50-69. 




The statutes providing for land commission adjudication of private claims 
made those determinations final against the United States, but not against 
third party claimants. These latter claims would have to be fought out in the 
courts.345 When settlers lost their preemption certificates to claimants with 
superior legal title, Congress at least refunded the certificate holders’ payments 
toward receiving a patent.346 The mass administrative justice dispersed by the 
commissioners on private claims may not have satisfied the formal procedural 
and evidentiary criteria for trials in the courts of law. But an ever-vigilant 
Congress seems to have been determined to ensure that if justice was skewed, 
it was mostly skewed in favor of claimants. Federal statutes confirming 
commission awards virtually never rejected a positive finding and often made 
special provisions to qualify those whose claims had been rejected.347 
c. Adjudicatory Process Before the Land Commissioners  
The public lands statutes dealt with the determination of private claims in a 
fairly consistent fashion. Each statute provided for the appointment of private 
claims commissioners, stated in general terms the law to be applied by them, 
and specified whether their decisions were final or only tentative until 
confirmed by Congress. The commissioners were empowered to call and swear 
witnesses and to receive evidence as in a court of law. Statutes instructed them 
how notice was to be given of their proceedings and about the time period 
within which claims might be filed and adjudicated. 
A common requirement was that the claimant provide  
notice in writing, stating the nature and extent of his claims, together 
with a plot of the tract or tracts claimed, and . . . also, on or before [the 
required date] deliver to the said register, for the purpose of being 
recorded, every grant, order of survey, deed, conveyance, or other 
 
345.  When adverse claimants appeared brandishing Spanish papers on one side and British 
documents on the other, commissioners were sometimes instructed to await judicial 
resolution, 1803 Land Act, supra note 266, § 6, 2 Stat. at 232, or to refer the matter to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, An Act for Ascertaining Claims and Titles to Land Within the 
Territory of Florida, ch. 129, § 4, 3 Stat. 709, 717 (1822). 
346.  An Act in Addition to an Act, Intituled “An Act Regulating the Grants of Land and 
Providing for the Disposal of the Lands of the United States, South of the State of 
Tennessee,” ch. 46, § 1, 2 Stat. 400, 400 (1806). 
347.  See, e.g., An Act To Confirm Certain Claims to Lands in the District of Jackson Courthouse, 
in the State of Mississippi, ch. 146, 4 Stat. 408 (1830); see also Harry L. Coles, Jr., The 
Confirmation of Foreign Land Titles in Louisiana, LA. HIST. Q., Oct. 1955, at 1.  
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written evidence of his claim, and the same shall be recorded by the said 
register, in books to be kept for that purpose.348  
Boards of commissioners were to appoint a clerk for the purpose of recording, 
“in a book to be kept for the purpose, perfect and correct minutes of the 
proceedings, decisions, meetings and adjournments of the boards, together 
with the evidence on which such decisions are made.”349 In some cases, the 
statutes provided for an appearance by either a specially appointed agent or a 
U.S. Attorney to represent the interest of the United States.350 
The clerks were also required to “prepare two transcripts of all the 
decisions made by the said commissioners in favor of the claimants to land.”351 
When signed by the commissioners, these transcripts were to be submitted to 
the Surveyor General and to the Secretary of the Treasury, and any claims 
upon which a favorable commission decision had been made were not to be 
disposed of until a final decision by Congress. A similar requirement applied to 
rejected claims, but here the commissioners were to include the “substance of 
the evidence adduced in support” of the claims and “such remarks thereon as 
they may think proper.”352 That report was to be sent to the Secretary of 
Treasury and presented to Congress at its next ensuing session. The greater 
degree of formality and completeness for reports on rejected claims seems to 
suggest, once again, the congressional interest in assuring that justice was done 
to private claims petitioners. 
Yet notwithstanding this considerable attention to commission structure 
and process, federal legislation left a substantial number of questions to be 
resolved by administrative rule or practice. What were the formal requirements 
for stating a claim? Were witnesses required to appear, testify, and be cross-
examined by the commissioners or representatives of the United States? Or 
could testimony be provided by letter, affidavit, or in some other form? What 
sorts of documentary evidence of a grant or title were acceptable? Could parol 
evidence substitute when documents were missing? Could claimants be 
represented by attorneys or others? What sorts of findings and reasons were 
expected from commissioners when they decided a case? 
 
348.  1803 Land Act, supra note 266, § 5, 2 Stat. at 230. 
349.  Id. § 6. 
350.  See, e.g., An Act Supplementary to the Act Intituled “An Act Regulating the Grants of Land, 
and Providing for the Disposal of the Lands of the United States, South of the State of 
Tennessee,” ch. 61, § 4, 2 Stat. 303, 304 (1804). 
351.  Indiana Territory Land Act, supra note 297, § 4, 2 Stat. at 279. 
352.  Id. 




As might be expected, the treasury secretaries, and later the commissioners 
of the General Land Office, were active participants in developing adjudicatory 
policies. For example, on September 8, 1806, Gallatin sent two documents to 
the private claims commissioners for St. Louis. The first contained a series of 
substantive directions concerning the interpretation and application of the 
statute authorizing the adjudication of claims in that territory. The second 
provided procedural instructions concerning the organization of the 
commissioners’ reports of claims decisions and the factual and legal matters 
that were to be included in these “transcripts” for each decided claim. But 
recognizing that not everything could be controlled by central directive, 
Gallatin concluded by suggesting that the commissioners include such other 
matters as would in their judgment inform Congress about the facts and 
circumstances surrounding their decisions.353 And in his correspondence 
Gallatin described the commissioners as “the sole judge[s] of what should be 
considered” and as “court[s] without appeal for the purpose of which they 
were initiated.”354 
The reports of the various commissions only hint at the procedures that 
they employed. They often contain a paragraph or two on each claim stating 
the evidence in very summary form and the basis for the commission’s decision 
in a generally conclusory fashion. From these documents, one can discern that 
the commissioners were accepting all manner of evidence, including official 
certificates and grants, affidavits of interested parties and witnesses, and live 
testimony before the commissions themselves. Given the difficulties of travel 
and communication on the frontier, it seems likely that much of this work was 
done “on the papers” rather than in hearings involving live testimonial 
evidence. And while enterprising “country lawyers” set themselves up near 
land offices to represent claimants, the commissioners’ reports have very little 
in them that one would characterize as legal argument. The reports were meant 
to satisfy Congress and Treasury officials, not a reviewing court. 
3. Administrative Oversight and Enforcement 
a. Audit and Inspection 
The statutes establishing the land offices in the field and the commissioner 
system for adjudicating claims required periodic reporting, usually quarterly, 
 
353.  See BALDWIN, supra note 277, at 986-88. 
354.  Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Parke Alton (Aug. 9, 1810) (on file 
with author). 
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but sometimes monthly, to the Treasury Department, or later to the General 
Land Office.355 But in any such system, there is always the question of whether 
the report represents reality. Examination at the seat of government could 
uncover inconsistencies in the reports or mathematical errors, of which there 
were many. But were the land offices holding public auctions in the fashion 
prescribed by statute? Did their entries accurately reflect what had happened at 
the auctions? Did the officers properly conduct private sales of unsold parcels? 
Was there collusion, favoritism, bribery, or extortion? 
None of these things could be determined from the face of the reports. And 
field inspections of the land offices in the early years of public land sales were 
not very useful.356 They were carried out by locals deputized for the purpose, 
persons who not only had no training, but who were often friends or associates 
of the land office personnel. 
In 1816 Treasury Secretary Alexander J. Dallas reformed the audit system. 
He deputized one of the clerks of the General Land Office in Washington to go 
into the field to examine all of the land offices. This examiner could use the 
same inspection methods in each office and compare the quality of their 
operations. And upon returning to Washington, he also could convey an 
enormous amount of useful, informal information to the central office that 
might not be contained in, or appropriate for, written reports. All written 
reports would be made available to Congress and would likely show up in the 
press.357 
This vastly superior system resulted in many reforms, but it required some 
additional expenditures for the travel expenses of the clerk. And whenever 
money was involved Congress wanted to exercise close supervision over 
administration. The ever-vigilant House of Representatives demanded a report 
from the Secretary of the Treasury concerning 
the manner in which the several land offices of the United States were 
examined prior to the 1st of January, 1818, the names and places of 
residence of the persons by whom such examinations were made, the 
respective compensation allowed to each individual so employed, and 
the whole expense thereof to the United States; and, also, that he report 
the manner in which the same duty has been performed since the said 
1st January, 1818, together with the names, professions, stations, and 
place of residence, of the persons who have been appointed to make 
such examinations, what offices each was appointed to examine, the 
 
355.  See, e.g., 1800 Northwest Amendments, supra note 264, § 9, 2 Stat. at 77. 
356.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1305-06. 
357.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 523-27. 




reports made by each, the accounts presented for their respective 
services, the amount of money allowed to, or drawn or retained by, 
each of them; whether any of them have, during the said period, been 
allowed, or received, any other compensation from the Government; if 
so, how much, and for what service rendered or duty performed, and 
whether some plan may not be devised whereby the same duty may be 
performed with equal advantage and less expense to the 
Government[]. . . .358 
The new Treasury Secretary, William H. Crawford, sent all of this information 
to Congress along with a defense of the new system.359 Congress was satisfied, 
and the new system of audit continued. 
b. Settling Accounts and Enforcing Payment  
Auditing the books and inspecting the offices was one thing; collecting the 
money that was due to the United States for the sale of public lands was quite 
another. Republican Congresses had in effect continued the system of settling 
accounts that dated from the Federalist period. The Controller of the Treasury 
was responsible for enforcement—that is, to ensure that officers, in this case 
the receivers of the Land Department, submitted their accounts. When 
accounts were in arrears, the Controller’s only remedy was to bring suits 
against them or on their surety bonds. Indeed, if reports had never been 
submitted, two lawsuits were required, one to produce the account, and a 
second to pursue any deficiency. 
Under this cumbersome system, some accounts in the General Land Office 
remained unsettled for a decade.360 In part this resulted from the complex 
 
358.  Examination of the Several Land Offices (Jan. 28, 1822), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, 
PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 253, at 452, 452 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
359.  In Crawford’s words:  
When a different person is employed to examine each office, the judgment which 
is formed of the manner and style in which the books are kept will depend upon 
the intelligence, the prejudices, or partialities, of the different examiners; but, 
when the same person examines a number of offices, the same intelligence is 
exercised in each case, exempt, too, from partiality or prejudice, when the 
examiner is not a neighbor or connexion of the officer. The impression produced 
upon the officers themselves by the mode which has been practised since 1815, 
prove, incontestibly, its superiority over the other. An examination now is not a 
matter of form. 
Id. at 453. 
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statutory requirements for accounting records. A fiscally austere Congress was 
loath either to relax the accounting requirements or to give the auditing 
departments sufficient personnel to deal with the accounts that flooded in as 
the land office business exploded. But the requirement that personnel be 
policed by lawsuit certainly did not aid the Controller in clearing the backlog. 
Gallatin had recognized that the system was inadequate as early as 1801,361 
but Congress did not provide reforms until 1817. And that statute merely 
centralized the audit function and provided additional staff.362 Collection still 
occurred through court action. Finally, in 1820,363 Congress applied to all 
receivers of public monies the enforcement procedure that had been used 
against delinquent collectors of excise taxes as early as 1793.364 
Under this “new” summary procedure, the Controller, or a specially 
appointed collection agent, could issue a distress warrant to any U.S. Marshal 
against any officer who had failed to render his accounts or remit money as 
prescribed by law. The warrant permitted summary forfeiture of the collector’s 
bond and seizure and sale of any other of the officer’s properties necessary to 
settle the debt365—a process that gave rise to the first-ever due process case 
decided by the Supreme Court.366 Additional statutes in 1823 and 1828 
permitted further administrative relief, withholding the salary of officers whose 
accounts were in arrears and dismissing them from the public service for failure 
to submit quarterly returns.367 As a result of these reforms, most of the 
 
360.  Letter from Joseph Anderson, Comptroller of the Treasury, to Benjamin Huger, Chairman 
of the Comm. of Unsettled Balances (Mar. 14, 1816), in 3 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FINANCE 
125, 127 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1834) (“The 
accounts of the General Land Office are greatly in arrears; some of them remain unsettled 
from seven to ten years. These accounts are intricate, and generally very large; from ten to 
fifteen days is required for the best accounting clerks to examine one of them.”). 
361.  Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to President Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 
1801), in 1 ALBERT GALLATIN, THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 63, 68 (Henry Adams ed., 
Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1879). 
362.  See An Act To Provide for the Prompt Settlement of Public Accounts, ch. 45, 3 Stat. 366 
(1817). 
363.  See An Act Providing for the Better Organization of the Treasury Department, ch. 107, 3 
Stat. 592 (1820).  
364.  Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1319 n.214.  
365.  See 3 Stat. 592. 
366.  See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
367.  See An Act To Prevent Defalcations on the Part of the Disbursing Agents of the 
Government, and for Other Purposes, ch. 2, 4 Stat. 246 (1828); An Act Concerning the 
Disbursement of Public Money, ch. 9, 3 Stat. 723 (1823). 




substantial collections of land offices found their way into the Treasury or were 
used for its purposes.368 
4. Congressional Reports and Investigations 
Congressional control of administration was a major part of Republican 
dogma. And as the previous discussion illustrated, Republican Congresses 
tended to practice what they preached. The reporting and recording 
requirements for claims determinations and the exquisitely specific surveying 
statutes are cases in point.369 But, as we have seen, Republican Congresses 
inevitably had the same difficulties as Federalist Congresses in constraining 
administrators’ discretion by statute. On some major issues, such as how to 
adjudicate private land claims, Congress could do no better than to instruct the 
commissioners to honor the government’s treaty and cession commitments, to 
adjudicate in accordance with the law of the place and time of an alleged grant, 
and to confirm or deny claims on the basis of “justice and equity.”370 
Uniformity in the interpretation of the applicable laws and the elaboration of 
the notions of “justice and equity” would have to come from Treasury and 
Land Office instructions. 
Over time even Republican Congresses came to recognize the need to 
tolerate administrative discretion. For example, many recording errors in 
locating claims resulted from the necessarily inexact surveys of the public 
domain and the incorrect or missing marks of the surveyors. When a buyer 
discovered that his land had been misrecorded in the land office, the register, 
operating under highly specific statutory instructions, had no authority to 
correct the error. The buyer’s only recourse was to petition Congress for a 
special statute authorizing the correction,371 and many such statutes appear in 
the Statutes at Large prior to 1819.372 In that year, Congress finally authorized 
 
368.  Because there were few available banks in the western territories, the United States also used 
land offices, and other offices that received funds, as disbursing agents by drawing drafts 
upon their accumulated funds to pay the country’s debts. For general discussion of the 
accounting system and its reform, see WHITE, supra note 15, at 162-82. 
369.  On similar attempts to increase fiscal control by more specific appropriations, and on the 
partial success of those efforts, see id. at 108-16. 
370.  Indiana Territory Land Act, supra note 297, § 4, 2 Stat. at 278. 
371.  See, e.g., An Act To Prescribe the Mode in Which Application Shall Be Made for the 
Purchase of Land at the Several Land-Offices; and for the Relief of Joab Garret, ch. 11, 2 
Stat. 556 (1810). 
372.  In part because of the highly specific way in which it legislated, Congress had to return 
again and again to the issue of the survey and sale of the public lands. The lists of the public 
acts of Congress contained in the second, third, and fourth volumes of the Statutes at Large 
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the registers and receivers of land offices to make corrections upon the 
application of purchasers. The only statutory guidance was that buyers provide 
“testimony satisfactory to the register and receiver of public moneys.”373 
At the same time, the Jeffersonian-Republican period saw Congress come 
into its own as an overseer of administrative departments. The American State 
Papers document hundreds of congressional requests for information, often—
as we saw in the case of payments to land office inspectors—in highly detailed 
form.374 As the Federalists had before them, Republican presidents and heads 
of departments generally complied with these requests.375 And all departments 
filed annual reports with Congress accompanying the annual message of the 
President. 
While Republican Congresses used many ad hoc and special investigative 
committees, the Republican period saw the institutionalization of Congress in 
ways that permitted it to exercise more continuous and informed oversight 
over government operations. By 1816 the House had established six standing 
committees on expenditures—one each for the Departments of State, Treasury, 
War, Navy, and the Post Office, and one on public buildings. This 
institutionalization was a part of Henry Clay’s general campaign to empower 
Congress “to take control of the government.”376 The House also had standing 
committees that dealt with matters of general legislation concerning these 
departments. Republican Congresses thus divided congressional work into 
roughly the authorization and appropriations functions that have lasted until 
 
reveal that Congress passed over 250 public lands statutes between 1800 and the close of the 
second session of the twenty-second Congress in 1833. See 2 Stat. at iii-xxxviii; 3 Stat. at iii-
xxxix; 4 Stat. at iii-xxxix. 
373.  An Act Providing for the Correction of Errors in Making Entries of Land at the Land 
Offices, ch. 98, 3 Stat. 526, 526 (1819). 
374.  See, e.g., Amount of Emoluments and Allowances to the Registers and Recievers of Land 
Offices, Exclusive of Salary (May 1, 1826), in 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS, 
supra note 253, at 773 (Asbury Dickins & James C. Allen eds., Wash., D.C., Gales & Seaton 
1859); Compensation of Registers and Receivers of the Public Lands, supra note 286, at 8; 
Compensation of the Surveyors General and Their Clerks, supra note 286, at 874. 
375.  One example of an exception was President Monroe’s refusal to send certain papers to the 
House concerning charges against a naval officer and a political operative stationed in Peru. 
See President James Monroe, Message to the House of Representatives (Jan. 10, 1825), in 2 
RICHARDSON, supra note 8, at 278. 
376.  RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD BEFORE 
1825, at 216 (1917). While internal congressional and party politics were also involved, here 
as elsewhere, congressional structure responded to the need to monitor administrative 
action. See Keith E. Whittington & Daniel P. Carpenter, Executive Power in American 
Institutional Development, 1 PERSP. ON POL. 495 (2003), available at http://journals. 
cambridge.org/article_S1537592703000367. 




the present time. But unlike Congresses of the twenty-first century, 
Republican Congresses of the early nineteenth century had no staff to do much 
of the detail work. As a consequence, while the committees on expenditures 
labored mightily to contain the costs of the national government, they found it 
impossible to inquire carefully into departmental accounts and still discharge 
their general legislative duties.377 
Even so, after Jefferson left office, Republican Congresses attempted, with 
some success, to shift the balance of power with respect to the political control 
of administration away from the department heads and the President and 
toward Congress and its committees. Moreover, a number of the reports and 
inquiries that populate the American State Papers reveal that casework was 
becoming a substantial congressional activity, and one that kept individual 
members in relatively continuous contact with executive departments. White, 
for example, has reported the contents of a letter written by Representative 
John McLean:  
During the last winter, I never was more industriously engaged than in 
attending to the private business of others, when the house was not in 
session. There were three western mails a week, by which my principal 
letters were received—these often amounted to between 30 and 40, 
generally on business, which required my attention at the different 
offices.378  
Political control of administration was thus becoming not only a means by 
which Republican Congresses monitored the implementation of their general 
political preferences, but also a means by which private interests sought 
executive favor, or at least consideration, through the auspices of congressional 
representation. 
5. Judicial Review and the Public Lands 
The position of the officials deciding public lands claims was almost the 
opposite of those enforcing the embargo, who labored under the ever-present 
threat of a common law damage action tried before a local jury. To be sure, 
land office personnel had no official immunity either. But for reasons both 
practical and legal, errors of fact or law in determining private land claims or 
issuing land patents seldom, if ever, put their patrimony at risk. 
 
377.  See WHITE, supra note 15, at 105 & n.62.  
378.  Id. at 101. 
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One practical reason was that claimants wanted the land, not damages, and 
officials had no title to the public domain, legal or equitable. Lawsuits pursued 
specific remedies rather than damage actions—sometimes mandamus, 
injunction, or ejectment against officials in those rare cases when they were in 
possession, but almost always ejectment against another claimant in 
possession. This practical desire to pursue specific relief rather than damages, 
even when an officer was the possessor, was facilitated by a legal peculiarity. As 
then-Professor Antonin Scalia demonstrated nearly four decades ago, sovereign 
immunity had no effect on public lands litigation until the twentieth 
century.379 There was simply no discussion of sovereign immunity in the 
Supreme Court opinions involving public lands actions seeking specific 
remedies against federal officers,380 notwithstanding the obvious fact that the 
only party that could hold or transfer title or possession was the United States. 
A second practical consideration was the availability of relief from 
Congress. As noted earlier, when claimants had a reasonable moral case, but a 
weak legal one, Congress habitually intervened to provide relief. Congressional 
petitions were rendered even more attractive by a second legal consideration: 
the extremely narrow scope of review that the courts were prepared to exercise 
in public lands cases. There was no statutory provision for review of the 
commissioners’ decisions on private land claims, which meant that review by 
appeal or on a writ of error was unavailable.381 Moreover, most commission 
decisions affirming title required congressional confirmation. After Congress 
acted, the courts simply declined to review a legislatively settled claim 
directly.382 Collateral attacks on the validity of a patent might be raised by a 
third party claimant in an action for ejectment, or by way of defense when the 
holder of a patent sought to eject a third party in possession.383 But, as Ann 
Woolhandler has argued, the courts treated the patent decisions of the land 
office as the decisions of a coordinate tribunal that could be attacked only for 
jurisdictional error.384  
 
379.  See Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REV. 867, 882-909 (1970).  
380.  Id. at 885.  
381.  Ann Woolhandler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 197, 226 (1991).  
382.  See Tameling v. United States Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 663 (1876).  
383.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Zane’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 92 (1809) (concerning a contest 
between two buyers who purchased the same parcel from two different land offices). 
Matthews might be considered an example of either or both. 
384.  See Woolhandler, supra note 381, at 216-19.  




This restrictive approach to judicial review broke down in the late 
nineteenth century under the twin assaults of judicial expansion of the idea of 
jurisdictional error385 and of appeals to the courts’ equitable powers to remedy 
“mistakes, injustice, and wrong,”386 for example, by the device of a constructive 
trust. But review then mutated into a form of the nonstatutory judicial review 
of government action that is familiar to contemporary administrative 
lawyers,387 rather than into the pursuit of errant officials for damages at 
common law.388 
C. Public Lands Policy and the Development of Administrative Law 
Here as elsewhere, Congress’s attempt to eliminate implementing 
discretion by statutory specificity was doomed. Public lands statutes either 
hamstrung administration or failed to eliminate the need for administrative 
policy judgment, or they produced both effects at once. Their 250 (often highly 
specific) public lands statutes notwithstanding, Republican Congresses created 
a vast system for the survey and sale of nearly half a continent that demanded 
significant development of administrative policy and an unprecedented exercise 
of administrative adjudicatory authority. As Scalia put it in his 1970 article, “In 
the present age, it is difficult to apprehend the former magnitude and 
importance of public-lands law. Our present society contains no institution, 
with the possible exception of the federal income tax, whose importance . . . 
remotely approximates the dominating influence of the public lands during the 
nineteenth century.”389 
Given the impossibility of developing all this law by statute, and the 
obvious limitations of judicial oversight in a system of judicial review that 
emphasized the authoritativeness of the decisions of administrative land 
tribunals, public lands law was developed largely through administration. How 
did the techniques of policy development and claims adjudication in the 
Treasury and the General Land Office contribute to the development of 
American administrative law? 
 
385.  Id. at 219. 
386.  Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 84 (1871). 
387.  Indeed, by their sheer bulk, land office decisions were probably the most common subject of 
judicial review proceedings in the federal courts by the end of the nineteenth century. Scalia 
has remarked that they attained a volume that in 1970 might have been described as “habeas 
corpus proportions.” Scalia, supra note 379, at 884. 
388.  See Woolhandler, supra note 381, at 197-98.  
389.  Scalia, supra note 379, at 882. 
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From the viewpoint of a twenty-first-century administrative lawyer there is 
something (indeed, there are several things) constitutionally problematic about 
the whole land office adjudicatory process. Begin with Article III. What 
justifies the wholesale transfer of the determination of private claims from the 
courts to administrative commissions? 
The “public rights” nature of these controversies is hardly obvious.390 To 
be sure, the implicitly adverse party is the United States. But unlike other 
contemporaneous administrative adjudications—veterans’ disability claims,391 
customs and excise appeals,392 or the issuance of military land warrants393—
private land claims often invoked standard sources of property law, domestic 
and foreign. Some, of course, were claims based on federally conferred 
statutory preemption rights or were claims to grants of “donation” or “bonus” 
lands. But the central concern of the early land commissioners was the 
adjudication of private claims based upon the British, French, Spanish, or state 
property laws. 
Nor will it really do to suggest, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 1980s-era 
jurisprudence on the propriety of delegations of adjudicatory jurisdiction, that 
these private law claims were merely incidental to a public law regime394 and 
made no significant inroads into the overall allocation of the judicial power 
under the Constitution.395 The determination of claims to real property was 
legally and economically the most significant business of the courts, both 
federal and state, during this period. The use of commissions rather than 
courts for public lands determinations was motivated by the volume of cases 
that would have to be decided, not by their insignificance. 
There is also the matter of the Fifth Amendment’s demand that no person 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. When due 
process protections are required, a neutral decider is a fundamental element of 
a constitutionally adequate hearing. Could due process possibly countenance 
adjudication of private land claims by government employees (usually the 
 
390.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (articulating the 
“public versus private rights” test for determining what claims are required to be heard in 
Article III courts). 
391.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1332-33. 
392.  See id. at 1313.  
393.  These adjudications were handled by a clerk in the War Department who was part of the 
general staff. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 235-36. 
394.  See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
395.  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). 




register and receiver of each local land office) who were removable at will, and 
who were paid on commission for sales of the very public lands at issue?396 
There are some more or less plausible ways of sidestepping these issues. 
The claims commissions were initially established in territories, not states, and 
the application of the Constitution to territories, other than the provision 
giving Congress plenary authority over them, was problematic.397 Territorial 
judges, for example, failed to fit the Article III model. They served for terms of 
years and were sometimes appointed by the President alone without senatorial 
approval. The use of non-Article III courts in the territories was approved by 
the Supreme Court as early as 1828.398 Hence, even if land claims had been put 
in “the courts,” they would have initially been in non-Article III territorial 
courts. 
This consideration may explain why issues of the constitutionality of the 
claims commissions seem never to have been raised when Congress considered 
their establishment. But this explanation is not fully persuasive. Many in 
Congress did believe that the Constitution applied in the territories and 
objected on both separation of powers and individual liberties grounds to the 
treaty concluding the Louisiana Purchase and to the statute establishing the 
government for the Orleans Territory.399 Moreover, the territorial dodge fails 
to explain why no constitutional objections seem to have been made to the 
private claims commissions after the territories became states.400 And 
reviewing courts’ characterization of the commissions as coordinate tribunals, 
whose judgments could not be attacked as long as they had exercised power 
within their statutory jurisdiction, fairly cried out the question, “But how can 
these bodies, consistent with Article III, be considered courts?” 
Part of the answer lies, perhaps, in anachronism. The Article III question, 
for example, jumps out at us, but it seemed not to trouble lawyers of the early 
 
396.  See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973) (holding an indirect financial interest 
sufficient to disqualify an adjudicator under the Due Process Clause). 
397.  See CURRIE, supra note 17, at 109-14. 
398.  See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 (1 Pet.) U.S. 511 (1828). 
399.  See CURRIE, supra note 17, at 109-14. 
400.  In some cases, jurisdiction was belatedly transferred to federal courts. For example, the 
federal district court for Missouri took the place of the Louisiana claims commissions in 
1824, see An Act Enabling the Claimants to Lands Within the Limits of the State of Missouri 
and Territory of Arkansas To Institute Proceedings To Try the Validity of Their Claims, ch. 
173, 4 Stat. 52 (1824), although Missouri became a state in 1821. This statute also substituted 
the territorial court of Arkansas as the private claims adjudicator in that territory. Id. But the 
General Land Office was still adjudicating private claims based on foreign titles at least as 
late as 1920. INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE: ITS HISTORY, 
ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 74 (1923). 
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nineteenth century. The implication is that separation of powers had a 
different meaning for them. One possible understanding of that difference 
would suggest that early-nineteenth-century public lawyers were concerned 
with separating legislative from implementing powers, but they viewed the 
choice of implementing institutions, whether courts or administrators, as 
firmly within Congress’s discretion.401 
To be sure, in the Supreme Court’s first full dress consideration of the 
congressional power to prescribe summary administrative enforcement—a 
challenge to the 1820 statute authorizing the use of distress warrants for the 
collection of debts owed to the United States by federal officers—the Court 
stated clearly that Congress could not “withdraw from judicial cognizance any 
matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in 
equity, or admiralty.”402 Yet, the Court went on, there were “matters, involving 
public rights”403 that could be put within the jurisdiction of the courts, or not, 
as Congress deemed proper. The Court gave the sole example of “[e]quitable 
claims to land by the inhabitants of ceded territories,”404 noting that it had 
been “repeatedly decided” that these decisions by executive officers were 
“conclusive, either upon the particular facts involved . . . or upon the whole 
title.”405 
It is far from clear, of course, why the Supreme Court in the mid-
nineteenth century was so firmly of the view that public lands cases fell into the 
“public rights” category. Twentieth-century commentators have suggested that 
grants of public lands were viewed as privileges—like veterans’ benefits, 
patents, or the use of the mails—that were wholly the creature of public law.406 
But this seems an odd view of adjudications pursuant to treaties and statutes 
that bound the United States to recognize claims of private ownership 
according to the law of the place and time of transfer to the claimant. What 
counts as a “vested right” is a vexed question, but it has never been doubted 
that title to real property qualifies. 
 
401.  See Woolhandler, supra note 381, at 215 & nn.92-93. 
402.  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). 
403.  Id. 
404.  Id. This characterization of land claims as “equitable” may also explain why no Seventh 
Amendment jury trial issue was perceived with respect to the claims commissions. 
405.  Id. (citing Burgess v. Gray, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 48 (1853); and Foley v. Harrison, 56 U.S. (15 
How.) 433 (1853)). 
406.  Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s Lessee 
Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 798 (1986). Earlier commentators had taken 
a similar view. See id. at 798 n.161. 




Gordon Young has suggested that the answer may lie in the propensity of 
nineteenth-century courts to think of certain functions, including 
determination of claims to the public domain, as “executive” or 
“administrative” and entitled to almost total judicial deference.407 On this view 
the land claims process simply would not be recognized as “judicial” business 
that should raise Article III concerns. But this too is problematic. As 
Woolhandler has emphasized, the Supreme Court repeatedly described the 
public lands decisions as coming from a coordinate tribunal.408 That was why 
the decisions were final unless the tribunal lacked jurisdiction. 
A quite different interpretation is possible. From the viewpoint of the first 
quarter of the nineteenth century, claims adjudication was standard legislative 
business—when the claims were against the United States. As late as 1832, John 
Quincy Adams complained that private bills seeking monetary relief consumed 
half of Congress’s time, to the detriment of both that body and the public.409 
Yet when claims involved a substantial class of persons, such as those applying 
for relief, Congress often set up commissions to decide the worthiness of 
claims of particular individual petitioners.410 Examples include a statute, as 
early as 1794, appropriating funds for the relief of U.S. residents who had fled 
the insurrection in Santa Domingo,411 and the statute providing relief for 
property lost, captured, or destroyed by the enemy in the War of 1812.412 These 
claims commissions not only set precedents that affected the development of 
the American welfare state;413 they were also precedents for the use of 
commissions, rather than courts or Congress, to decide voluminous claims to 
be paid out of public monies. 
The establishment of relief commissions was far from uncontroversial. 
When the first such statute—a bill to relieve those whose property was 
damaged or destroyed by insurgents in the Whiskey Rebellion—was being 
 
407.  See id. at 800-01. 
408.  See Woolhandler, supra note 381, at 216-19.  
409.  See Hearing on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 49 
(1942) (quoting John Quincy Adams). 
410.  For a general description of these various relief efforts, see Michele L. Landis, “Let Me Next 
Time Be ‘Tried by Fire’”: Disaster Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-
1874, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 967 (1998). 
411.  An Act Providing for the Relief of Such of the Inhabitants of Saint Domingo, Resident 
Within the United States, as May Be Found in Want of Support, ch. 2, 6 Stat. 13 (1794). 
412.  An Act To Authorize the Payment for Property Lost, Captured, or Destroyed by the Enemy, 
While in the Military Service of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 40, 3 Stat. 
261 (1816). 
413.  See generally Landis, supra note 410.  
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debated, Representative Giles complained that the commission “mode is . . . 
totally wrong. Let persons who have suffered come here in the usual manner. It 
is said that a gentleman has had his house burned. Let him come here and tell 
us so.”414 Similar complaints were made by John C. Calhoun concerning the 
relief bill following the War of 1812. As a matter of good administration 
(meaning good Republican administration), Calhoun argued, the power to 
adjudicate claims should remain with Congress rather than be delegated to a 
commission.415 In short, from a congressional perspective, when institutional 
arrangements were still often debated in constitutional terms, the problem may 
have been perceived not as a choice between administrative adjudicators and 
courts, but as a choice between administrative and congressional 
determinations. Article III was not the potential problem; it was the 
appropriate role of Congress under Article I. 
To be sure, the decision of private land claims according to law was rather 
different from deciding compensation claims under relief statutes proceeding 
on the assumption that claimants had no legal claim on the Treasury. Yet in 
many cases, Congress—at least nominally—kept the final decision of private 
land claims for itself, even though it was incapable of acting on them 
expeditiously. A proposal to create a special commission to exercise final 
authority over claims decided by local commissioners, but left in limbo by 
congressional inaction, died for want of support in the twentieth Congress.416 
And the history of federal legislation concerning the grounds for asserting 
private claims suggests that the contemporary image of a private land claim 
was not quite our conventional image of a battle over legal title. Congress 
recognized claims based on prior legitimate authority (grants by other 
sovereigns), but it also provided “bonus lands” for military personnel, and 
“donation lands” for settlers whose legal title was inadequate. Squatters were 
given preemption rights, and Congress instructed its commissioners to decide 
in accordance with “justice and equity,” not just the law. 
Moreover, while the granting of a private land claim did not provide a right 
to appropriated funds, it established a right to property that would otherwise 
have been part of that great national storehouse of potential revenue called “the 
public domain.” In that sense the United States was a real party in interest in 
relation to these claims in much the same way that it was pursuant to relief 
statutes that authorized the granting of public funds as compensation for 
private losses. Hence, while from the perspective of the Supreme Court the 
 
414.  4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1001 (1794). 
415.  Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 297 n.26 (2003). 
416.  S. DOC. NO. 20-22, at 5 (1828). 




land commissioners’ decisions were the decisions of a coordinate tribunal, 
those viewing the commissioners from Capitol Hill may have seen these 
officials more as wilderness agents of Congress, deciding claims that Congress 
would have decided for itself, if it had had the time and manpower. 
These hypotheses are all, of course, quite speculative. The easy acceptance 
of the constitutional propriety of administrative adjudication of private claims 
to the public domain thus remains something of a mystery. Perhaps, as John 
Dickinson has suggested, the lack of a unified vision of administrative law and 
judicial review of administrative action in the nineteenth century simply 
obscured certain issues that we now see as critical.417 As Scalia has argued in his 
analysis of the puzzling lack of sovereign immunity talk in public lands cases, 
the courts saw these cases simply as public lands cases with their own 
particular and highly evolved jurisprudence.418 By the time the Article III 
question was raised in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,419 
the public lands cases were examples of what the law was, not troubling 
exceptions to some broad constitutional principle that made administrative 
adjudication problematic. If that is the explanation, one might wonder, when 
perusing the tortured twentieth-century jurisprudence of Article III from 
Crowell v. Benson420 to Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor421 and 
beyond, whether the utilization of general categories like “administrative 
adjudication” or “the executive branch” in modern legal analysis is a major 
advance.422 
We need not belabor the due process issue. Murray’s Lessee answers it by 
treating the due process and Article III questions as the same.423 The question 
of due process was a question of whether the Constitution required judicial 
process. And we know already that the Court answered, “No.”424 
True, the analysis in Murray’s Lessee was premised on a finding that 
summary administrative means for collecting debts from revenue officers were 
ubiquitous in England and in the several states, and that Congress had 
provided such a procedure as early as 1798. Such a long pedigree could, 
 
417.  JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED 
STATES 56 (1927). 
418.  See Scalia, supra note 379, at 881-82, 909-13.  
419.  59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
420.  285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
421.  478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
422.  See Peter M. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of “Seeing the 
Trees,” 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 375 (1989). 
423.  See 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 275. 
424.  See id. at 277-80. 
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perhaps, not be provided for administrative adjudication of private land claims. 
Yet the provision of commission adjudication of land claims dated back to the 
Confederation period, and that seems to have been sufficient for the Murray’s 
Lessee Court. Remember, the administrative adjudication of public lands cases 
was the sole example that the Court provided in support of its proposition that 
Congress could choose where to put the adjudication of “public rights.”425 In 
short, Murray’s Lessee reveals a legal consciousness that seemed not to contain 
the modern legal category of “administrative due process.” The question was 
simply one of which process applied: administrative, judicial, or perhaps 
legislative. 
conclusion 
The “great irony of American political development” with which this 
Article began was much in evidence in the Jeffersonian-Republican period. 
Thomas Jefferson and his followers understood democracy in a communitarian 
sense that emphasized the virtue of small-scale governments in which the 
people could be directly involved. He repeatedly suggested that the most 
important institutional development for protecting democracy would be to 
divide the country into wards.426 On this view, representative assemblies were 
merely a necessary inconvenience, the distant, national government a threat to 
democracy, and a powerful national administration almost the definition of 
tyranny. 
Yet the two national activities that I have reviewed in some detail show the 
Jeffersonian Republicans trapped by James Morone’s irony into energetic 
assertions of national power and the multiplication of national offices. War, 
after all, is probably the greatest state-builder of all. Wartime demands for 
energy, unity, and obedience, and for speedy policy development and 
implementation, almost always enhance national administrative capacity. 
Jefferson reduced the Army and Navy and substituted an embargo for war not 
only out of necessity, but also to protect democracy from the threat of a large 
military establishment and of the taxing and collecting bureaucracy that would 
be necessary to support it. Yet as Henry Adams concluded, this attempt to 
 
425.  Id. at 284. 
426.  See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA query 19 (Paris, 1784), reprinted in 
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 187, 280 (Adrienne Koch & 
William Peden eds., 1944); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor John Tyler 
(May 26, 1810), reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, 
at 604, 604-05; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), reprinted in 
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 661, 662.  




protect democracy by substituting economic coercion for war produced a level 
of executive oppression and limitation of citizens’ rights exceeding that to be 
found in European regimes that were almost constantly at war. The 
delegations of discretion to the President, and to lower-level officials to act on 
the basis of “opinion,” in the embargo legislation approached the level of 
sovereign prerogative. 
The disposition of the public domain produced similar and longer-lasting 
results. The sale of western lands in sections and half sections was part of the 
Republican dream of populating the expanding nation with yeoman farmers 
who would demand to be self-governing and who would provide a 
counterweight to the mercantile interest of the eastern seaboard. Yet land sales 
fueled massive speculation and colossal instances of corruption. More 
importantly, for our purposes, such sales demanded the creation of a national 
administrative machinery that reached into every corner of the expanding 
national territory. The independent, private landowner may have been the 
bulwark of democracy, but producing stable private titles required a national 
administrative effort of enormous proportions. Land had to be bureaucratized 
in order to be sold, and disputes about ownership demanded the creation of 
America’s first system of mass administrative adjudication. 
To be sure, the Jeffersonian Republicans were reluctant nationalists. But, 
that is the irony of their state-building. They could starve national 
administration for funds and personnel, and they did. But in the end they 
could not avoid leaving a national administration that was larger in relation to 
the country’s population than the one that they had inherited from those state-
building Federalists who preceded them. 
The story of administrative capacity, action, and practice in the Republican 
era is not, however, merely a story of reluctant state-building. It is also a story 
about how the accountability mechanisms for binding administrative power to 
both law and political oversight developed along with administration itself. 
And the story of administrative accountability in the Republican era 
emphasizes means of internal administrative control that are often ignored, or 
given only scant attention, by modern administrative lawyers.  
The preponderance of modern administrative law scholarship and 
commentary focuses on the institution of judicial review. Judicial review clearly 
existed, but in the Republican era it seemed largely to demonstrate that 
institution’s capacity for either impertinence or irrelevance. Impertinence, 
because subjecting officials to personal liability in de novo proceedings before 
local juries was a formula for timid administration. And criminal trials before 
those same local juries, the standard means of enforcement of administrative 
orders, could derail implementation whenever resistance to national policy was 
substantial. Legal accountability can be too strong as well as too weak. But jury 
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control, even nullification, seemed to cast legal control in a local and popular 
form that was not too strong for Republicans however much it might inhibit 
energetic administration. 
By contrast, as we saw in relation to the review of the determinations of 
private claims commissions, judicial review could also be weak to the point of 
virtual irrelevance. “Judicial review” in the Jeffersonian-Republican era seemed 
to be crystallizing into bipolar modalities. “Common law” review in suits for 
damages or through defenses in criminal prosecutions was de novo and highly 
intrusive; the more “public law”-oriented review via prerogative writs was 
limited to a search for “jurisdiction” or “authority” that avoided consideration 
of the question that dominates twenty-first-century substantive judicial 
review—the reasonableness of administrative action. 
There is no irony in the Republicans’ emphasis on controlling 
administration through statutory specificity and congressional oversight. 
Representative assemblies were central to their understanding of democracy in 
a republic. Assembly control over administration was thus a democratic 
imperative. The only irony here is that effective congressional control tends to 
demand both increased bureaucratization of administration and the 
bureaucratization of Congress itself. In order to exercise control, Congress 
needed information, and its demands for reports and audits pressed 
administration toward formality, record-keeping, and caution. The ever-
present prospect of being called to account for the propriety of one’s actions 
demands not only that square corners be turned, but also that those turnings 
be documented for subsequent inspection. If modern bureaucracy is drowning 
in red tape, that tape stretches back at least to the Republican era. And, of 
course, in order to do anything with this information, Congress had to 
bureaucratize itself. Federalist practice and Republican theory emphasized the 
assembly as a committee of the whole deliberating about the common good. 
Administrative oversight demanded specialized committees with knowledge of 
the relevant fields and time to pursue necessary information. 
As we have seen, statutory specificity could only do so much, and 
Republican Congresses could not really process all the information that they 
demanded administrators to provide.427 They did not have the staff. And 
parsimonious Republican legislators could not be expected to ramp up the 
administrative expenses of Congress as an economy measure (even though it 
might have been). Yet they began the institutionalization of Congress through 
 
427.  Even with the establishment of a committee to deal only with private land claims, Congress 
simply could not keep up with the land office business. As early as 1828, recommendations 
were being made to create an administrative tribunal to take over the work of the 
Committee on Private Land Claims. See S. DOC. NO. 20-22, at 5 (1828). 




a committee system that has balkanized legislative decision-making from that 
time forward. General democratic deliberation had not deteriorated by the end 
of the Republican era into modern “iron triangles” of clients, bureaus, and 
congressional subcommittees, but in the name of assuring the democratic 
accountability of administration, that process had begun. 
Finally, if one looks carefully at the Republican era, the most prominent 
and successful accountability mechanisms were the internal controls exercised 
by departments over officers in the field and the systems of checks and balances 
within departments. Customs collectors, land office commissioners, and land 
surveyors took cues from congressional legislation and oversight. And revenue 
collectors lived in fear of litigation. But the consistency, propriety, and energy 
of administrative implementation was made accountable primarily to high-
ranking officials in the Treasury and the General Land Office. These were the 
sources of instruction, interpretation, audit, and oversight that counted in the 
day-to-day activities of administrative officials. Given the level of internal 
activity designed to guide and control lower-level officials, one can hardly 
doubt the seriousness of the enterprise. Given the ubiquity of field officers’ 
requests for direction, this “internal law” of administration seems to have been 
relatively successful.428 Similar arguments might easily be made today.429 
Strangely enough, modern administrative lawyers hardly study this element of 
administrative law at all.430 I should hasten to add that the “internal law of 
administration” that was so much in evidence in the studies of the embargo 
and the sale of the public domain was not an exercise in “presidentialism” of 
 
428.  This is not to say that these internal efforts at legality and consistency were uniformly 
successful. The problem of inconsistent valuation and classification of goods in the customs 
houses was a constant complaint in later periods and produced a series of reforms and 
reconstituted appeals processes in the Jacksonian era. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE 
JACKSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY, 1829-1861, at 178-81 (1954). 
429.  Edward Rubin has argued recently that internal or bureaucratic accountability is the only 
“accountability” worthy of the name. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic 
Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, 
DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 52 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). 
430.  I count myself a modest exception. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: 
MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management 
Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, 
and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974). 
The concept of an internal law of administration as part of administrative law was developed 
in one of the earliest treatises on American administrative law. See BRUCE WYMAN, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 
1-23 (1903). For the view that the efforts of Ernst Freund and others to continue this 
tradition were overwhelmed by the rise of the case method as the only respectable approach 
to professional training, see WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNMENT (1982). 
MASHAW_11-07-06_FORMATTED FOR SC1 5/30/2007 11:39:19 PM 
the yale law journal 116:1636   2007  
1738 
 
the sort that is now quite popular.431 Presidential involvement, indeed 
micromanagement, was evident in the implementation of the embargo. But that 
distinguished the embargo episode from virtually all the rest of Republican-era 
administration. Although Jefferson’s administrative interventions were 
transparent and energetic, reinforcing democracy via presidential control was 
not a part of the intellectual toolkit of Jeffersonian Republicans. Assembly 
government was democracy. The President was picked by the electoral college, 
or not infrequently by the House of Representatives, after a campaign in which 
presidential hopefuls espoused no platform and hardly showed themselves to 
the people. Indeed, given the limitations on the franchise, the President as a 
representative of the people only became plausible with the reforms in election 
law and the consolidation of national political parties that were ushered in by 
Andrew Jackson and his Democratic successors. 
Nor did the Jeffersonian Republicans understand administration as a 
function to be performed by independent experts insulated from politics. That 
idea, too, came later. Yet certain functions within departments were made 
independent from the control of the “political” executive officers from the 
earliest days of the Republic.432 The Auditor in the Treasury Department, for 
example, determined the legality of all expenditures, subject to an appeal on 
disallowed claims to the Comptroller. Neither officer was subject to direction 
by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, although the Auditor or 
Controller could, of course, be removed.433 Similar divisions of authority 
extended to field operations. Transactions in the local land offices were in the 
general charge of the register but subject to the independent authority of the 
receiver with respect to monetary receipts and disbursements.434 Control of 
administration through internal checks and balances would become even more 
 
431.  This approach sometimes takes the form of an assertion of the constitutional necessity for a 
so-called unitary executive and sometimes merely a call for greater presidential responsibility 
for policymaking. On the unitary executive debate, see the sources cited in Mashaw, supra 
note 3, at 1267 n.25, 1271 n.32. On the political accountability advantages of presidential 
responsibility, see Kagan, supra note 92. 
432.  See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 1284-85. 
433.  This understanding continued during the Jeffersonian period, see WHITE, supra note 15, at 
164, and was forcefully confirmed early in Martin Van Buren’s tenure as President, see S. 
DOC. NO. 25-265, at 8-9 (1837) (presenting a correspondence between the Auditor and 
Secretary of the Treasury, in which the Secretary acknowledged that he had no power to 
reverse the Auditor or Controller on matters of accounts).  
434.  See An Act for Changing the Compensation of Receivers and Registers of the Land Offices, 
ch. 123, 3 Stat. 466 (1818); An Act for Transferring the Claims in the Office of the 
Commissioner to the Third Auditor of the Treasury Department, ch. 124, 3 Stat. 466 (1818). 
On the improvement in internal control mechanisms in the General Land Office, see 
ROHRBOUGH, supra note 258, at 26-70. 




prominent soon after the last Jeffersonian-Republican President gave way to 
the “Democracy” of Andrew Jackson.435  
This idea of a quasi-independent, but internally responsible, administrative 
bureaucracy continues to have attraction for those who are skeptical of the 
efficacy of governmental accountability through either judicial review or the 
polarized politics of electoral institutions.436 The efforts of men like Albert 
Gallatin in the Republican era make clear that this vision of self-restraining 
administration is something more than a mere pipe dream. 
To be sure, autocrats of all stripes prefer to control the behavior of 
underlings. And the competition for effective control between principals and 
agents in all organizations now sets the agenda for a healthy proportion of the 
economic and legal scholarship on the governance of private business 
organizations, and for political scientists who analyze institutional design from 
the perspective of the subfield of positive political theory. But in these contexts, 
control of administration is either normatively dubious (autocracy) or assumed 
to be virtuous (principal-agent theory). Is an “internal law of administration” 
similarly disconnected from democratic and rule of law values that would give 
it more claim to our attention than a realist or realpolitik account of the true 
(and perhaps sorry) state of the administrative state? 
That could be, of course—just as willful politicians or judges can warp the 
systems of political and legal accountability that structure, monitor, and 
constrain administrative action from outside administration. But that is surely 
not the system of internal administrative accountability that has been described 
in these pages. Central control and instruction of field officers implementing 
the embargo and the government’s public lands policies strongly reinforced 
democratic commitments to assembly government. Treasury and Land Office 
circulars and manuals began with the statutes and sought to unify 
interpretation around the understandings of those high-level personnel who 
had the greatest association with the legislative process—indeed, who often 
drafted the statutes. And the statutory independence of certain functions 
within departments was respected. 
Moreover, Jefferson’s singular nonacquiescence in one judicial 
interpretation of the embargo statutes was premised precisely on the necessity 
to assure rule of law values—consistency in application and the avoidance of 
local or partisan bias. Instead of asserting executive prerogative, Jefferson 
 
435.  For a discussion of the new Jacksonian approach to bureaucratic responsibility through 
organizational design, see MATTHEW A. CRENSON, THE FEDERAL MACHINE: BEGINNINGS OF 
BUREAUCRACY IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 104-39 (1975).  
436.  For a brief recent discussion of this point, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2356-64 (2006). 
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validated his position by seeking and obtaining an explicit power to direct field 
personnel in the Enforcement Act. In a similar vein, the Treasury sought and 
obtained summary enforcement power against delinquent officers in order to 
reestablish public control over public funds, and it revised and bureaucratized 
its audit procedures with respect to local land offices to assure conformity with 
federal statutes and implementing regulations. 
These observations, of course, only begin to explore the questions of 
normative appropriateness and effective institutional design that would 
illuminate the often invisible world of internal administrative law. The 
experiences of the Republican period recounted here can, at most, provide 
some support for the idea that internal administrative law is important—a legal 
world too often ignored by an administrative law focused almost entirely on 
external control and accountability. A fuller account of these matters must 
await another day. But it is perhaps not too audacious to conclude that 
Jeffersonian-Republican practices reflect an additional irony: political actors 
ideologically committed to the avoidance of national administrative capacity 
nevertheless provided us with some attractive models of what politically 
responsible and legally accountable administration might look like. They did so 
by building internal capacities for administrative control. 
